autoaugment
fb4c48608ce8825b558ccf07169a3421-Supplemental.pdf
In this section, we perform additional diagnostics that give us confidence that our models are not doing any form of gradient obfuscation or masking [3, 53]. First, we report in Table 4 the robust accuracy obtained by our strongest models against a diverse set of attacks. The cascade is composed as follows: AUTOPGD-CE, an untargeted attack using PGD with an adaptive step on the cross-entropy loss [10], AUTOPGD-T, a targeted attack using PGD with an adaptive step on the difference of logits ratio [10], FAB-T, a targeted attack which minimizes the norm of adversarial perturbations [9], SQUARE, a query-efficient black-box attack [1]. First, we observe that our combination of attacks, denoted AA+MT matches the final robust accuracy measured by AUTOATTACK. Second, we also notice that the black-box attack (i.e., SQUARE) does not find any additional adversarial examples.
Appendix
Weheldoutavalidation setfromthetraining set,andusedthisvalidation settoselecttheL2 regularization hyperparameter,which weselected from 45logarithmically spaced values between 10 6 and 105, applied to the sum of the per-example losses. Because the optimization problem is convex, we used the previous weights as a warm start as we increased theL2 regularization hyperparameter. Wemeasured eithertop-1ormean per-class accuracy, depending on which was suggested by the dataset creators. A.3 Fine-tuning In our fine-tuning experiments in Table 2, we used standard ImageNet-style data augmentationand trained for 20,000 steps with SGD with momentum of0.9 and cosine annealing [ 20]without restarts. Each curve represents a different model.