We introduce Martingale Doppelgänger-Eval, a public shadow-market benchmark for auditing whether vision-language models (VLMs) use candlestick evidence rather than extrapolate past trends. The central difficulty is identification: on real market histories, chart evidence and trend are strongly coupled, so an observational score cannot determine whether a fluent technical-analysis narrative is grounded in local visual evidence. We prove this limitation formally: no evaluation functional computed from observational chart--label data can distinguish a grounded responder from a trend-shortcut responder under strong coupling, whereas matched evidence interventions separate the same responders at an exponential rate and trend--label swaps provide an independent shortcut stress test. The benchmark therefore evaluates frozen VLMs on rendered OHLCV charts under four controlled mechanisms: a martingale-null market, injected-alpha counterfactual pairs, trend-confounder swaps, and regime shifts. A structural behavioral model identifies null-market bias, trend sensitivity, evidence sensitivity, prompt/renderer fragility, and evidence faithfulness; the accompanying statistical toolkit provides minimum detectable effects, block-aware sequential testing for metered APIs, and an overlap-weighted artifact check. Across frozen commercial and open VLMs, the identified regression assigns large positive coefficients to past trend but evidence coefficients that are zero or opposite to the rule-implied sign. Matched-pair analyses show that models either ignore injected candlestick semantics or move opposite to the rule-implied direction conditional on responding. The benchmark isolates a failure mode that standard observational chart benchmarks cannot detect and gives a reusable audit template for time-series imagery with controllable label mechanisms.

The rapid adoption of generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) has spurred interest in synthetic data as a privacy-preserving alternative to sensitive real-world datasets. However, generating high-utility synthetic data often carries the risk of memorizing and regurgitating private information from the training corpus. In this work, we present a customizable empirical auditing framework designed to detect and explain such data disclosures. Our framework introduces a mechanism to distinguish between "true disclosures"-where the system directly reproduces a user's information-and "phantom disclosures''-where the system incidentally generates a user's data. By partitioning input data into training and holdout sets and applying rigorous statistical hypothesis testing, we determine if observed disclosures are consistent with strict privacy baselines, such as zero-learning or specific Differential Privacy (DP) bounds. Crucially, this approach requires no model access, no canary insertion, and no reference model training -only the synthetic output and a held-out control set. We demonstrate that this framework effectively functions as a membership inference attack, providing empirical lower bounds on privacy leakage that are tighter than prior data-based auditing methods. Our approach is model-agnostic, applies to any synthetic data generation mechanism, and requires orders of magnitude fewer computational resources than shadow-model or canary-based alternatives.

Parameter-efficient fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) can exhibit problematic memorization of individual training examples. Empirical privacy auditing (EPA) quantifies this risk by measuring realistic data leakage on membership inference (MI) or reconstruction attacks. A key challenge in EPA is designing ``canary'' examples that are mixed with the privacy-sensitive training data. We propose generating synthetic canaries via high-temperature sampling ($T \geq 0.8$) from LLMs, using prompts tailored to the privacy-sensitive training data. These canaries act as high-influence outliers, ensuring high identifiability and hence strong audits. Further, since the canaries are themselves non-private, they are inspectable and can be inserted with repetition without jeopardizing the privacy of the real data. An important use of models fine-tuned on privacy-sensitive data is the generation of synthetic data. This also comes with privacy risk. We introduce a powerful synthetic data audit based on fine-tuning an auxiliary model on the synthetic data. Auditing the auxiliary model for the original canaries then provides a strong estimate of the privacy leakage through the synthetic data. Finally, leveraging our strong auditing methodologies, we perform a systematic investigation into the interacting effects of model capacity and canary entropy on memorization.

Multi-agent systems built on large language models (LLMs) require many coordination choices that are difficult to fix a priori: which skill protocol to invoke, which agent role should perform a subtask, which model to bind to each role, how roles should interact, when to use retrieval or verification, and when to omit a step entirely. These choices interact with task regime and operational constraints, so static pipelines and one-off model comparisons provide only a limited view of the design space. This paper introduces AgensFlow, an open-source framework that treats multi-agent coordination as an online policy-learning problem under partial observability. The framework makes coordination decisions observable and learnable from repeated trajectories, rather than treating skill, role, model, topology, and evaluation choices as fixed pipeline design. AgensFlow is evaluated on two corpora: distributed-systems incident tasks and security-advisory tasks. The evaluation shows three main results: learned routing reaches a higher-quality operating point than a fixed pipeline baseline on coordination-heavy classes; skip:X isolates topology compression as a meaningful part of the substrate; and warm-started policy graphs can reduce exploration cost while preserving plateau quality. Overall, the results support that learned, auditable routing can improve coordination-heavy multi-agent workflows over static wiring.

Benchmarks increasingly guide deployment, procurement and scientific screening, yet a score supports only the response it records, not necessarily the deployment action. We introduce deployment-complete benchmarking, which tests whether benchmark evidence determines a deployment action. A benchmark is complete for a claim exactly when the action is constant on each evidence fiber; mixed fibers expose missing deployment information, and completion curves quantify the evidence required to resolve ambiguity. In controlled response spaces, benchmark-channel conformal coverage of 94.98% transferred poorly to an unmeasured deployment channel (10.07%), whereas response-rank intervals achieved 94.91% coverage; even zero benchmark error certified only 45.4% of candidates at the largest residual size. Public audits revealed incompleteness, including 97.9% mixed Tox21 fibers and zero median certifiable fraction in main Matbench and JARVIS audits. In held-out replays, certify-then-acquire reduced false decisions from 1.19% to 0.027% in Tox21 and from 20.3% to 0.128% in JARVIS, while changing model choice and identifying deployment-relevant probes. Deployment-ready benchmarks should report evidence, supported actions, ambiguity and completion cost rather than scores alone.

Things to Do in L.A. From left, Meghann Adams, Malia Cohen and Herb Morgan are running for state controller in the California primary election. California voters will choose who oversees the state's finances as incumbent Malia Cohen faces Republican Herb Morgan, a finance executive, and Meghann Adams, a school bus driver and Peace and Freedom Party member. Morgan proposes using blockchain and AI technology for real-time spending transparency, while Adams advocates corporate audits and redirecting billions toward education, housing and healthcare for working-class Californians. Cohen improved financial report timeliness but fell short on promised audits of homelessness programs, the DMV and Employment Development Department. The state's fiscal watchdog oversees the intake and outtake of public funds and audits departments across the state.

We provide practical, efficient, and nonparametric methods for auditing the fairness of deployed classification and regression models. Whereas previous work relies on a fixed-sample size, our methods are sequential and allow for the continuous monitoring of incoming data, making them highly amenable to tracking the fairness of real-world systems. We also allow the data to be collected by a probabilistic policy as opposed to sampled uniformly from the population. This enables auditing to be conducted on data gathered for another purpose. Moreover, this policy may change over time and different policies may be used on different subpopulations. Finally, our methods can handle distribution shift resulting from either changes to the model or changes in the underlying population. Our approach is based on recent progress in anytime-valid inference and game-theoretic statistics--the "testing by betting" framework in particular. These connections ensure that our methods are interpretable, fast, and easy to implement. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach on three benchmark fairness datasets.

Adaptive specification search generates statistically significant backtests even under martingale-difference nulls. We introduce a falsification audit testing complete predictive workflows against synthetic reference classes, including zero-predictability environments and microstructure placebos. Workflows generating significant walk-forward evidence in these environments are falsified. For passing workflows, we quantify selection-induced performance inflation using an absolute magnitude gap linking optimized in-sample evidence to disjoint walk-forward realizations, adjusted for effective multiplicity. Simulations validate extreme-value scaling under correlated searches and demonstrate detection power under genuine structure. Empirical case studies confirm that many apparent findings represent methodological artifacts rather than genuine predictability.

Financial statement auditing is conducted under a risk-based evidence approach to obtain reasonable assurance. In practice, auditors often perform additional sampling or related procedures when an initial sample does not provide a sufficient basis for a conclusion. Across jurisdictions, current standards and practice manuals acknowledge such extensions, while the statistical design of sequential audit procedures has not been fully explored. This study formulates audit sampling with additional, sequentially collected items as a sequential testing problem for a finite population under sampling without replacement. We define null and alternative hypotheses in terms of a tolerable deviation rate, specify stopping and decision rules, and formulate exact sequential boundary conditions in terms of finite-population error probabilities. For practical implementation, we calibrate those boundaries by Monte Carlo simulation at least-favorable deviation rates. The exact design yields ex ante control of decision error probabilities, and the simulation-based implementation approximates that design while allowing the computation of expected stopping times. The framework is most naturally suited to attribute auditing and deviation-rate auditing, especially tests of controls, and it can be extended to one-sided, two-stage, and truncated designs.

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems are built on massive swathes of public web data, assembled into corpora such as C4, RefinedWeb, and Dolma. To our knowledge, we conduct the first, large-scale, longitudinal audit of the consent protocols for the web domains underlying AI training corpora. Our audit of 14,000 web domains provides an expansive view of crawlable web data and how codified data use preferences are changing over time. We observe a proliferation of AI-specific clauses to limit use, acute differences in restrictions on AI developers, as well as general inconsistencies between websites' expressed intentions in their Terms of Service and their robots.txt. We diagnose these as symptoms of ineffective web protocols, not designed to cope with the widespread re-purposing of the internet for AI.