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Frequency-Domain Regularized Adversarial Alignment for Transferable Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs

arXiv.org Machine Learning

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) remain vulnerable to transfer-based targeted attacks, where perturbations optimized on open-source surrogate encoders can generalize to closed-source MLLMs. A key challenge for improving adversarial transferability is to effectively capture the intrinsic visual focus shared across different models, such that perturbations align with transferable semantic cues rather than surrogate-specific behaviors. However, existing methods suffer from spatial-domain feature redundancy and surrogate-specific gradient signals, thereby hindering cross-model transferability. In this paper, we propose FRA-Attack, which addresses both challenges from a unified frequency-domain regularization perspective. For feature alignment, a high-pass DCT objective on patch features suppresses redundant global structures and concentrates the loss on the high-frequency band that carries the MLLMs' intrinsic visual focus. For gradient optimization, we introduce Frequency-domain Gradient Regularization (FGR), a \textit{model-agnostic} low-pass regularizer that modulates the surrogate gradient using only the geometric frequency coordinate, \textit{i.e.}, no surrogate-derived statistic is involved, so that FGR is model-agnostic by construction, removing surrogate-specific high-frequency artifacts while preserving transferable low-frequency directions. Together, the two components form a unified frequency-domain treatment of transferability. Extensive experiments on $15$ flagship MLLMs across $7$ vendors show that FRA-Attack achieves superior cross-model transferability, particularly with state-of-the-art performance on GPT-5.4, Claude-Opus-4.6 and Gemini-3-flash.



the Fine tuning Process of on Poisoned

Neural Information Processing Systems

In this section, we show our empirical observations obtained from fine-tuning PLMs on poisoned494 datasets. Specifically, we demonstrate that the backdoor triggers are easier to learn from the lower495 layers than the features corresponding to the main task. This observation plays a pivotal role in496 designing and understanding our defense algorithm. In our experiment, we focus on the SST-2497 dataset [30] and consider the widely adopted word-level backdoor trigger and the more stealthy498 style-level trigger. For the word-level trigger, we follow the approach in prior work [25] and adopt the499 meaningless word "bb" as the trigger to minimize its impact on the original text's semantic meaning.500



Malicious client Benign client Subspace distributionModel distribution

Neural Information Processing Systems

This poison-coupling the modifies poison-coupling paper the presents training effect Lockdo ef protocol in fect. FL, wn, which Lockdo by an isolating isolated significantly wn follo subspace the ws de training three grades training ke the subspaces y procedures.



344ef5151be171062f42f03e69663ecf-Paper.pdf

Neural Information Processing Systems

Neural Transducer (e.g., RNN-T) has been widely used in automatic speech recognition (ASR) due to its capabilities of efficiently modeling monotonic alignments between input and output sequences and naturally supporting streaming inputs. Considering that monotonic alignments are also critical to text to speech (TTS) synthesis and streaming TTS is also an important application scenario, in this work, we explore the possibility of applying Transducer to TTS and more. However, it is challenging because it is difficult to trade off the emission (continuous melspectrogram prediction) probability and transition (ASRTransducer predicts blank token to indicate transition to next input) probability when calculating the output probability lattice in Transducer, and it is not easy to learn the alignments between text and speech through the output probability lattice. We propose SpeechTransducer (Speech-T for short), a Transformer based Transducer model that 1) uses a new forward algorithm to separate the transition prediction from the continuous mel-spectrogram prediction when calculating the output probability lattice, and uses a diagonal constraint in the probability lattice to help the alignment learning; 2) supports both full-sentence or streaming TTS by adjusting the look-ahead context; and 3) further supports both TTS and ASR together for the first time, which enjoys several advantages including fewer parameters as well as streaming synthesis and recognition in a single model. Experiments on LJSpeech datasets demonstrate that Speech-T 1) is more robust than the attention based autoregressive TTS model due to its inherent monotonic alignments between text and speech; 2) naturally supports streaming TTS with good voice quality; and 3) enjoys the benefit of joint modeling TTS and ASR in a single network.


8cbe9ce23f42628c98f80fa0fac8b19a-Supplemental.pdf

Neural Information Processing Systems

After training for 200 epochs, we achieve the attack success rate (ASR) of99.97% and the natural accuracy on clean data (ACC)of93.73%. Blend attack [6]: We first generate a trigger pattern where each pixel value is sampled from auniform distribution in[0,255]asshowninFigure 6(c). Input-aware Attack (IAB) [30]: The dynamic trigger varies across samples as shown in Figure 6(d). We apply two types of target label selection. Clean-labelAttack(CLB)[42]: The trigger is a3 3checkerboard at the four corners of images as shown in Figure 7(b).