This gave birth to learning-augmented algorithms, which use these predictions to go beyond the standard long-standing worst-case limitations. The design of such algorithms requires establishing good tradeoffs between consistency and robustness, i.e. having improved performance when the predictions are accurate, and not behaving poorly

With more than 4.5 million patent documents, HUPD is two to three times larger than comparable corpora.

However, the exact formula for front-door adjustment depends on the structure of the graph, which is difficult to learn in practice.

The Industry I Offered to Take Less Money to Get Hired. In a rough hiring market, a growing number of younger, female job seekers have begun "lowballing" their salary expectations. I know this because I did it myself. If it feels impossible to get hired in today's job market, it's because it is. Greenhouse, a hiring software firm, estimates that when someone applies for a job, they now have a 0.4 percent chance of being hired--meaning you have a better chance of getting into Harvard than securing employment.

Algorithmic monoculture arises when many decision-makers rely on the same algorithm to evaluate applicants. An emerging body of work investigates possible harms of this kind of homogeneity, but has been limited by the challenge of incorporating market effects in which the preferences and behavior of many applicants and decision-makers jointly interact to determine outcomes.Addressing this challenge, we introduce a tractable theoretical model of algorithmic monoculture in a two-sided matching market with many participants. We use the model to analyze outcomes under monoculture (when decision-makers all evaluate applicants using a common algorithm) and under polyculture (when decision-makers evaluate applicants independently). All else equal, monoculture (1) selects less-preferred applicants when noise is well-behaved, (2) matches more applicants to their top choice, though individual applicants may be worse off depending on their value to decision-makers and risk tolerance, and (3) is more robust to disparities in the number of applications submitted.

We consider a selection problem where sequentially arrived applicants apply for a limited number of positions/jobs. At each time step, a decision maker accepts or rejects the given applicant using a pre-trained supervised learning model until all the vacant positions are filled. In this paper, we discuss whether the fairness notions (e.g., equal opportunity, statistical parity, etc.) that are commonly used in classification problems are suitable for the sequential selection problems. In particular, we show that even with a pre-trained model that satisfies the common fairness notions, the selection outcomes may still be biased against certain demographic groups. This observation implies that the fairness notions used in classification problems are not suitable for a selection problem where the applicants compete for a limited number of positions. We introduce a new fairness notion, ``Equal Selection (ES),'' suitable for sequential selection problems and propose a post-processing approach to satisfy the ES fairness notion. We also consider a setting where the applicants have privacy concerns, and the decision maker only has access to the noisy version of sensitive attributes. In this setting, we can show that the \textit{perfect} ES fairness can still be attained under certain conditions.

We study the problem of online learning with primary and secondary losses. For example, a recruiter making decisions of which job applicants to hire might weigh false positives and false negatives equally (the primary loss) but the applicants might weigh false negatives much higher (the secondary loss). We consider the following question: Can we combine ``expert advice'' to achieve low regret with respect to the primary loss, while at the same time performing {\em not much worse than the worst expert} with respect to the secondary loss? Unfortunately, we show that this goal is unachievable without any bounded variance assumption on the secondary loss. More generally, we consider the goal of minimizing the regret with respect to the primary loss and bounding the secondary loss by a linear threshold. On the positive side, we show that running any switching-limited algorithm can achieve this goal if all experts satisfy the assumption that the secondary loss does not exceed the linear threshold by $o(T)$ for any time interval. If not all experts satisfy this assumption, our algorithms can achieve this goal given access to some external oracles which determine when to deactivate and reactivate experts.

Each year millions of people seek help for their legal problems by calling a legal aid program hotline, walking into a legal aid office, or using a lawyer referral service. The first step to match them to the right help is to identify the legal problem the applicant is experiencing. Misdirection has consequences. Applicants may miss a deadline, experience physical abuse, lose housing or lose custody of children while waiting to connect to the right legal help. We introduce and evaluate the FETCH classifier for legal issue classification and describe two methods for improving accuracy: a hybrid LLM/ML ensemble classification method, and the automatic generation of follow-up questions to enrich the initial problem narrative. We employ a novel data set of 419 real-world queries to a nonprofit lawyer referral service. Ultimately, we show classification accuracy (hits@2) of 97.37\% using a mix of inexpensive models, exceeding the performance of the current state-of-the-art GPT-5 model. Our approach shows promise in significantly reducing the cost of guiding users of the legal system to the right resource for their problem while achieving high accuracy.