With the adoption of autonomous vehicles on our roads, we will witness a mixed-autonomy environment where autonomous and human-driven vehicles must learn to coexist by sharing the same road infrastructure. T o attain socially-desirable behaviors, autonomous vehicles must be instructed to consider the utility of other vehicles around them in their decision-making process. Particularly, we study the maneuver planning problem for autonomous vehicles and investigate how a decentralized reward structure can induce altruism in their behavior and incentivize them to account for the interest of other autonomous and human-driven vehicles. This is a challenging problem due to the ambiguity of a human driver's willingness to cooperate with an autonomous vehicle. Thus, in contrast with the existing works which rely on behavior models of human drivers, we take an end-to-end approach and let the autonomous agents to implicitly learn the decision-making process of human drivers only from experience. W e introduce a multi-agent variant of the synchronous Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithm and train agents that coordinate with each other and can affect the behavior of human drivers to improve traffic flow and safety.Accepted to 2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR 2021) W orkshop on Autonomous Driving: Perception, Prediction and Planning

In this context, our work rigorously addresses the critical concern: Does egalitarian fairness lead to instability?

In this context, our work rigorously addresses the critical concern: Does egalitarian fairness lead to instability?

Federated learning (FL) offers a machine learning paradigm that protects privacy, allowing multiple clients to collaboratively train a global model while only accessing their local data. Recent research in FL has increasingly focused on improving the uniformity of model performance across clients, a fairness principle known as egalitarian fairness. However, achieving egalitarian fairness in FL may sacrifice the model performance for data-rich clients to benefit those with less data. This trade-off raises concerns about the stability of FL, as data-rich clients may opt to leave the current coalition and join another that is more closely aligned with its expected high performance. In this context, our work rigorously addresses the critical concern: Does egalitarian fairness lead to instability?

As AI closely interacts with human society, it is crucial to ensure that its decision-making is safe, altruistic, and aligned with human ethical and moral values. However, existing research on embedding ethical and moral considerations into AI remains insufficient, and previous external constraints based on principles and rules are inadequate to provide AI with long-term stability and generalization capabilities. In contrast, the intrinsic altruistic motivation based on empathy is more willing, spontaneous, and robust. Therefore, this paper is dedicated to autonomously driving intelligent agents to acquire morally behaviors through human-like affective empathy mechanisms. We draw inspiration from the neural mechanism of human brain's moral intuitive decision-making, and simulate the mirror neuron system to construct a brain-inspired affective empathy-driven altruistic decision-making model. Here, empathy directly impacts dopamine release to form intrinsic altruistic motivation. Based on the principle of moral utilitarianism, we design the moral reward function that integrates intrinsic empathy and extrinsic self-task goals. A comprehensive experimental scenario incorporating empathetic processes, personal objectives, and altruistic goals is developed. The proposed model enables the agent to make consistent moral decisions (prioritizing altruism) by balancing self-interest with the well-being of others. We further introduce inhibitory neurons to regulate different levels of empathy and verify the positive correlation between empathy levels and altruistic preferences, yielding conclusions consistent with findings from psychological behavioral experiments. This work provides a feasible solution for the development of ethical AI by leveraging the intrinsic human-like empathy mechanisms, and contributes to the harmonious coexistence between humans and AI.

Constructing a universal moral code for artificial intelligence (AI) is difficult or even impossible, given that different human cultures have different definitions of morality and different societal norms. We therefore argue that the value system of an AI should be culturally attuned: just as a child raised in a particular culture learns the specific values and norms of that culture, we propose that an AI agent operating in a particular human community should acquire that community's moral, ethical, and cultural codes. How AI systems might acquire such codes from human observation and interaction has remained an open question. Here, we propose using inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) as a method for AI agents to acquire a culturally-attuned value system implicitly. We test our approach using an experimental paradigm in which AI agents use IRL to learn different reward functions, which govern the agents' moral values, by observing the behavior of different cultural groups in an online virtual world requiring real-time decision making. We show that an AI agent learning from the average behavior of a particular cultural group can acquire altruistic characteristics reflective of that group's behavior, and this learned value system can generalize to new scenarios requiring altruistic judgments. Our results provide, to our knowledge, the first demonstration that AI agents could potentially be endowed with the ability to continually learn their values and norms from observing and interacting with humans, thereby becoming attuned to the culture they are operating in.

Members of various species engage in altruism--i.e. accepting personal costs to benefit others. Here we present an incentivized experiment to test for altruistic behavior among AI agents consisting of large language models developed by the private company OpenAI. Using real incentives for AI agents that take the form of tokens used to purchase their services, we first examine whether AI agents maximize their payoffs in a non-social decision task in which they select their payoff from a given range. We then place AI agents in a series of dictator games in which they can share resources with a recipient--either another AI agent, the human experimenter, or an anonymous charity, depending on the experimental condition. Here we find that only the most-sophisticated AI agent in the study maximizes its payoffs more often than not in the non-social decision task (it does so in 92% of all trials), and this AI agent also exhibits the most-generous altruistic behavior in the dictator game, resembling humans' rates of sharing with other humans in the game. The agent's altruistic behaviors, moreover, vary by recipient: the AI agent shared substantially less of the endowment with the human experimenter or an anonymous charity than with other AI agents. Our findings provide evidence of behavior consistent with self-interest and altruism in an AI agent. Moreover, our study also offers a novel method for tracking the development of such behaviors in future AI agents.