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Smosh Games puts its spin on The Traitors in two supersized Werewolf episodes
Look Up Say More Mashable's Best: E-readers, robovacs, laptops, earbuds, smart home and more Mashable Selects Trending Now Gift Ideas For Everyone On Your List Safety Net Mashable @Home In My Bag Versus Creator Playbook Getting Technical with Mashable All Series Smosh Games puts its spin on'The Traitors' in two supersized'Werewolf' episodes Smosh Games director Spencer Agnew dives deep into the channel's ambitious Werewolf project. Belen Edwards is an Entertainment Reporter at Mashable. She covers movies and TV with a focus on fantasy and science fiction, adaptations, animation, and more nerdy goodness. She is a member of the Critics Choice Association and the Television Critics Association, as well as a Tomatometer-approved critic. When Smosh Games plays the social deduction game, or variations on it, the vibes are of cousins gathering in a basement during a family holiday party.
MetaDefense: Defending Finetuning-based Jailbreak Attack Before and During Generation
This paper introduces MetaDefense, a novel framework for defending against finetuning-based jailbreak attacks in large language models (LLMs). We observe that existing defense mechanisms fail to generalize to harmful queries disguised by unseen attack templates, despite LLMs being capable of distinguishing disguised harmful queries in the embedding space. Based on these insights, we propose a two-stage defense approach: (i) pre-generation defense that detects harmful queries before response generation begins, and (ii) mid-generation defense that monitors partial responses during generation to prevent outputting more harmful content. Our MetaDefense trains the LLM to predict the harmfulness of both queries and partial responses using specialized prompts, enabling early termination of potentially harmful interactions.
'We May Have a Crisis on Our Hands': The Unregulated Rise of Emotionally Intelligent AI
'We May Have a Crisis on Our Hands': The Unregulated Rise of Emotionally Intelligent AI Pillay is an editorial fellow at TIME. Pillay is an editorial fellow at TIME. At least once a month, two-thirds of people who regularly use AI turn to their bots for advice on sensitive personal issues and emotional support. Many people now report trusting their chatbots more than their elected representatives, civil servants, faith leaders--and the companies building AI. That's according to data from 70 countries, gathered by the Collective Intelligence Project (CIP).
Inside San Francisco's new AI school: is this the future of US education?
Experts have raised questions about whether an app-based curriculum can serve all learners equally. Experts have raised questions about whether an app-based curriculum can serve all learners equally. Inside San Francisco's new AI school: is this the future of US education? In the world's tech innovation epicenter, an "AI-powered" private school has made headlines for unabashedly embracing the technology. Alpha School San Francisco, which opened its doors to K-8 students this fall, is the newest outpost of a network of 14 nationwide private schools.
MetaDefense: Defending Finetuning-based Jailbreak Attack Before and During Generation
Jiang, Weisen, Pan, Sinno Jialin
This paper introduces MetaDefense, a novel framework for defending against finetuning-based jailbreak attacks in large language models (LLMs). We observe that existing defense mechanisms fail to generalize to harmful queries disguised by unseen attack templates, despite LLMs being capable of distinguishing disguised harmful queries in the embedding space. Based on these insights, we propose a two-stage defense approach: (i) pre-generation defense that detects harmful queries before response generation begins, and (ii) mid-generation defense that monitors partial responses during generation to prevent outputting more harmful content. Our MetaDefense trains the LLM to predict the harmfulness of both queries and partial responses using specialized prompts, enabling early termination of potentially harmful interactions. Extensive experiments across multiple LLM architectures (LLaMA-2-7B, Qwen-2.5-3B-Instruct, and LLaMA-3.2-3B-Instruct) demonstrate that MetaDefense significantly outperforms existing defense mechanisms, achieving robust defense against harmful queries with seen and unseen attack templates while maintaining competitive performance on benign tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/ws-jiang/MetaDefense.
NLSR: Neuron-Level Safety Realignment of Large Language Models Against Harmful Fine-Tuning
Yi, Xin, Zheng, Shunfan, Wang, Linlin, de Melo, Gerard, Wang, Xiaoling, He, Liang
The emergence of finetuning-as-a-service has revealed a new vulnerability in large language models (LLMs). A mere handful of malicious data uploaded by users can subtly manipulate the finetuning process, resulting in an alignment-broken model. Existing methods to counteract fine-tuning attacks typically require substantial computational resources. Even with parameter-efficient techniques like LoRA, gradient updates remain essential. To address these challenges, we propose \textbf{N}euron-\textbf{L}evel \textbf{S}afety \textbf{R}ealignment (\textbf{NLSR}), a training-free framework that restores the safety of LLMs based on the similarity difference of safety-critical neurons before and after fine-tuning. The core of our framework is first to construct a safety reference model from an initially aligned model to amplify safety-related features in neurons. We then utilize this reference model to identify safety-critical neurons, which we prepare as patches. Finally, we selectively restore only those neurons that exhibit significant similarity differences by transplanting these prepared patches, thereby minimally altering the fine-tuned model. Extensive experiments demonstrate significant safety enhancements in fine-tuned models across multiple downstream tasks, while greatly maintaining task-level accuracy. Our findings suggest regions of some safety-critical neurons show noticeable differences after fine-tuning, which can be effectively corrected by transplanting neurons from the reference model without requiring additional training. The code will be available at \url{https://github.com/xinykou/NLSR}
ICLGuard: Controlling In-Context Learning Behavior for Applicability Authorization
Si, Wai Man, Backes, Michael, Zhang, Yang
In-context learning (ICL) is a recent advancement in the capabilities of large language models (LLMs). This feature allows users to perform a new task without updating the model. Concretely, users can address tasks during the inference time by conditioning on a few input-label pair demonstrations along with the test input. It is different than the conventional fine-tuning paradigm and offers more flexibility. However, this capability also introduces potential issues. For example, users may use the model on any data without restriction, such as performing tasks with improper or sensitive content, which might violate the model policy or conflict with the model owner's interests. As a model owner, it is crucial to establish a mechanism to control the model's behavior under ICL, depending on the model owner's requirements for various content. To this end, we introduce the concept of "applicability authorization" tailored for LLMs, particularly for ICL behavior, and propose a simple approach, ICLGuard. It is a fine-tuning framework designed to allow the model owner to regulate ICL behavior on different data. ICLGuard preserves the original LLM and fine-tunes only a minimal set of additional trainable parameters to "guard" the LLM. Empirical results show that the guarded LLM can deactivate its ICL ability on target data without affecting its ICL ability on other data and its general functionality across all data.
Certified Robustness for Large Language Models with Self-Denoising
Zhang, Zhen, Zhang, Guanhua, Hou, Bairu, Fan, Wenqi, Li, Qing, Liu, Sijia, Zhang, Yang, Chang, Shiyu
Although large language models (LLMs) have achieved great success in vast real-world applications, their vulnerabilities towards noisy inputs have significantly limited their uses, especially in high-stake environments. In these contexts, it is crucial to ensure that every prediction made by large language models is stable, i.e., LLM predictions should be consistent given minor differences in the input. This largely falls into the study of certified robust LLMs, i.e., all predictions of LLM are certified to be correct in a local region around the input. Randomized smoothing has demonstrated great potential in certifying the robustness and prediction stability of LLMs. However, randomized smoothing requires adding noise to the input before model prediction, and its certification performance depends largely on the model's performance on corrupted data. As a result, its direct application to LLMs remains challenging and often results in a small certification radius. To address this issue, we take advantage of the multitasking nature of LLMs and propose to denoise the corrupted inputs with LLMs in a self-denoising manner. Different from previous works like denoised smoothing, which requires training a separate model to robustify LLM, our method enjoys far better efficiency and flexibility. Our experiment results show that our method outperforms the existing certification methods under both certified robustness and empirical robustness. The codes are available at https://github.com/UCSB-NLP-Chang/SelfDenoise.
Two-in-One: A Model Hijacking Attack Against Text Generation Models
Si, Wai Man, Backes, Michael, Zhang, Yang, Salem, Ahmed
Machine learning has progressed significantly in various applications ranging from face recognition to text generation. However, its success has been accompanied by different attacks. Recently a new attack has been proposed which raises both accountability and parasitic computing risks, namely the model hijacking attack. Nevertheless, this attack has only focused on image classification tasks. In this work, we broaden the scope of this attack to include text generation and classification models, hence showing its broader applicability. More concretely, we propose a new model hijacking attack, Ditto, that can hijack different text classification tasks into multiple generation ones, e.g., language translation, text summarization, and language modeling. We use a range of text benchmark datasets such as SST-2, TweetEval, AGnews, QNLI, and IMDB to evaluate the performance of our attacks. Our results show that by using Ditto, an adversary can successfully hijack text generation models without jeopardizing their utility.
Active Example Selection for In-Context Learning
Zhang, Yiming, Feng, Shi, Tan, Chenhao
With a handful of demonstration examples, large-scale language models show strong capability to perform various tasks by in-context learning from these examples, without any fine-tuning. We demonstrate that in-context learning performance can be highly unstable across samples of examples, indicating the idiosyncrasies of how language models acquire information. We formulate example selection for in-context learning as a sequential decision problem, and propose a reinforcement learning algorithm for identifying generalizable policies to select demonstration examples. For GPT-2, our learned policies demonstrate strong abilities of generalizing to unseen tasks in training, with a $5.8\%$ improvement on average. Examples selected from our learned policies can even achieve a small improvement on GPT-3 Ada. However, the improvement diminishes on larger GPT-3 models, suggesting emerging capabilities of large language models.