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Obtaining Partition Crossover masks using Statistical Linkage Learning for solving noised optimization problems with hidden variable dependency structure

Przewozniczek, M. W., Frej, B., Komarnicki, M. M., Prusik, M., Tinós, R.

arXiv.org Machine Learning

In optimization problems, some variable subsets may have a joint non-linear or non-monotonical influence on the function value. Therefore, knowledge of variable dependencies may be crucial for effective optimization, and many state-of-the-art optimizers leverage it to improve performance. However, some real-world problem instances may be the subject of noise of various origins. In such a case, variable dependencies relevant to optimization may be hard or impossible to tell using dependency checks sufficient for problems without noise, making highly effective operators, e.g., Partition Crossover (PX), useless. Therefore, we use Statistical Linkage Learning (SLL) to decompose problems with noise and propose a new SLL-dedicated mask construction algorithm. We prove that if the quality of the SLL-based decomposition is sufficiently high, the proposed clustering algorithm yields masks equivalent to PX masks for the noise-free instances. The experiments show that the optimizer using the proposed mechanisms remains equally effective despite the noise level and outperforms state-of-the-art optimizers for the problems with high noise.



Prior-Free Dynamic Auctions with Low Regret Buyers

Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan

Neural Information Processing Systems

We study the problem of how to repeatedly sell to a buyer running a no-regret,mean-based algorithm. Previous work [Braverman et al., 2018] shows that it ispossible to design effective mechanisms in such a setting that extract almost allof the economic surplus, but these mechanisms require the buyer's values each








Learning Optimal Reserve Price against Non-myopic Bidders

Jinyan Liu, Zhiyi Huang, Xiangning Wang

Neural Information Processing Systems

We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bidstrategically inorder togaininfuture rounds even if the single-round auctions are truthful.