This position paper argues for two claims regarding AI testing and evaluation. First, to remain informative about deployment behaviour, evaluations need account for the possibility that AI systems understand their circumstances and reason strategically. Second, game-theoretic analysis can inform evaluation design by formalising and scrutinising the reasoning in evaluation-based safety cases. Drawing on examples from existing AI systems, a review of relevant research, and formal strategic analysis of a stylised evaluation scenario, we present evidence for these claims and motivate several research directions.

The claim that the AI community, or society at large, should'democratize AI' has attracted considerable critical attention and controversy. Two core problems have arisen and remain unsolved: conceptual disagreement persists about what democratizing AI means; normative disagreement persists over whether democratizing AI is ethically and politically desirable. We identify eight common AI democratization traps: democratization-skeptical arguments that seem plausible at first glance, but turn out to be misconceptions. We develop arguments about how to resist each trap. We conclude that, while AI democratization may well have drawbacks, we should be cautious about dismissing AI democratization prematurely and for the wrong reasons. We offer a constructive roadmap for developing alternative conceptual and normative approaches to democratizing AI that successfully avoid the traps.

We argue that the machine learning value chain is structurally unsustainable due to an economic data processing inequality: each state in the data cycle from inputs to model weights to synthetic outputs refines technical signal but strips economic equity from data generators. We show, by analyzing seventy-three public data deals, that the majority of value accrues to aggregators, with documented creator royalties rounding to zero and widespread opacity of deal terms. This is not just an economic welfare concern: as data and its derivatives become economic assets, the feedback loop that sustains current learning algorithms is at risk. We identify three structural faults--missing provenance, asymmetric bargaining power, and nondynamic pricing--as the operational machinery of this inequality. In our analysis, we trace these problems along the machine learning value chain and propose an Equitable Data-Value Exchange (EDVEX) Framework to enable a minimal market that benefits all participants. Finally, we outline research directions where our community can make concrete contributions to data deals and contextualize our position with related and orthogonal viewpoints.

Modern deep learning applications require increasingly more compute to train state-of-the-art models. To address this demand, large corporations and institutions use dedicated High-Performance Computing clusters, whose construction and maintenance are both environmentally costly and well beyond the budget of most organizations. As a result, some research directions become the exclusive domain of a few large industrial and even fewer academic actors. To alleviate this disparity, smaller groups may pool their computational resources and run collaborative experiments that benefit all participants. This paradigm, known as grid-or volunteer computing, has seen successful applications in numerous scientific areas. However, using this approach for machine learning is difficult due to high latency, asymmetric bandwidth, and several challenges unique to volunteer computing. In this work, we carefully analyze these constraints and propose a novel algorithmic framework designed specifically for collaborative training. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach for SwAV and ALBERT pretraining in realistic conditions and achieve performance comparable to traditional setups at a fraction of the cost. Finally, we provide a detailed report of successful collaborative language model pretraining with 40 participants.

Supervised machine learning describes the practice of fitting a parameterized model to labeled input-output data. Supervised machine learning methods have demonstrated promise in learning efficient surrogate models that can (partially) replace expensive high-fidelity models, making many-query analyses, such as optimization, uncertainty quantification, and inference, tractable. However, when training data must be obtained through the evaluation of an expensive model or experiment, the amount of training data that can be obtained is often limited, which can make learned surrogate models unreliable. However, in many engineering and scientific settings, cheaper \emph{low-fidelity} models may be available, for example arising from simplified physics modeling or coarse grids. These models may be used to generate additional low-fidelity training data. The goal of \emph{multifidelity} machine learning is to use both high- and low-fidelity training data to learn a surrogate model which is cheaper to evaluate than the high-fidelity model, but more accurate than any available low-fidelity model. This work proposes a new multifidelity training approach for Gaussian process regression which uses low-fidelity data to define additional features that augment the input space of the learned model. The approach unites desirable properties from two separate classes of existing multifidelity GPR approaches, cokriging and autoregressive estimators. Numerical experiments on several test problems demonstrate both increased predictive accuracy and reduced computational cost relative to the state of the art.

Online social platforms increasingly rely on crowd-sourced systems to label misleading content at scale, but these systems must both aggregate users' evaluations and decide whose evaluations to trust. To address the latter, many platforms audit users by rewarding agreement with the final aggregate outcome, a design we term consensus-based auditing. We analyze the consequences of this design in X's Community Notes, which in September 2022 adopted consensus-based auditing that ties users' eligibility for participation to agreement with the eventual platform outcome. We find evidence of strategic conformity: minority contributors' evaluations drift toward the majority and their participation share falls on controversial topics, where independent signals matter most. We formalize this mechanism in a behavioral model in which contributors trade off private beliefs against anticipated penalties for disagreement. Motivated by these findings, we propose a two-stage auditing and aggregation algorithm that weights contributors by the stability of their past residuals rather than by agreement with the majority. The method first accounts for differences across content and contributors, and then measures how predictable each contributor's evaluations are relative to the latent-factor model. Contributors whose evaluations are consistently informative receive greater influence in aggregation, even when they disagree with the prevailing consensus. In the Community Notes data, this approach improves out-of-sample predictive performance while avoiding penalization of disagreement.

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