This study investigates GPT-4's assessment of its performance in healthcare applications. A simple prompting technique was used to prompt the LLM with questions taken from the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) questionnaire and it was tasked to evaluate its confidence score before posing the question and after asking the question. The questionnaire was categorized into two groups-questions with feedback (WF) and questions with no feedback(NF) post-question. The model was asked to provide absolute and relative confidence scores before and after each question. The experimental findings were analyzed using statistical tools to study the variability of confidence in WF and NF groups. Additionally, a sequential analysis was conducted to observe the performance variation for the WF and NF groups. Results indicate that feedback influences relative confidence but doesn't consistently increase or decrease it. Understanding the performance of LLM is paramount in exploring its utility in sensitive areas like healthcare. This study contributes to the ongoing discourse on the reliability of AI, particularly of LLMs like GPT-4, within healthcare, offering insights into how feedback mechanisms might be optimized to enhance AI-assisted medical education and decision support.

Pearl opened the door to formally defining actual causation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X=x causes Y=y iff X=x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y=y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition of actual causation, the most prominent of which are due to Halpern & Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl's first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions of actual causation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern & Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern & Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition of actual causation.

Recent formal approaches towards causality have made the concept ready for incorporation into the technical world. However, causality reasoning is computationally hard; and no general algorithmic approach exists that efficiently infers the causes for effects. Thus, checking causality in the context of complex, multi-agent, and distributed socio-technical systems is a significant challenge. Therefore, we conceptualize an intelligent and novel algorithmic approach towards checking causality in acyclic causal models with binary variables, utilizing the optimization power in the solvers of the Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT). We present two SAT encodings, and an empirical evaluation of their efficiency and scalability. We show that causality is computed efficiently in less than 5 seconds for models that consist of more than 4000 variables.

Halpern and Pearl introduced a definition of actual causality; Eiter and Lukasiewicz showed that computing whether X = x is a cause of Y = y is NP-complete in binary models (where all variables can take on only two values) and Σ^P_2 -complete in general models. In the final version of their paper, Halpern and Pearl slightly modified the definition of actual cause, in order to deal with problems pointed out by Hopkins and Pearl. As we show, this modification has a nontrivial impact on the complexity of computing whether {X} = {x} is a cause of Y = y. To characterize the complexity, a new family D_k^P , k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., of complexity classes is introduced, which generalises the class DP introduced by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (DP is just D_1^P). We show that the complexity of computing causality under the updated definition is D_2^P -complete. Chockler and Halpern extended the definition of causality by introducing notions of responsibility and blame, and characterized the complexity of determining the degree of responsibility and blame using the original definition of causality. Here, we completely characterize the complexity using the updated definition of causality. In contrast to the results on causality, we show that moving to the updated definition does not result in a difference in the complexity of computing responsibility and blame.

Causal models defined in terms of structural equations have proved to be quite a powerful way of representing knowledge regarding causality. However, a number of authors have given examples that seem to show that the Halpern-Pearl (HP) definition of causality gives intuitively unreasonable answers. Here it is shown that, for each of these examples, we can give two stories consistent with the description in the example, such that intuitions regarding causality are quite different for each story. By adding additional variables, we can disambiguate the stories. Moreover, in the resulting causal models, the HP definition of causality gives the intuitively correct answer. It is also shown that, by adding extra variables, a modification to the original HP definition made to deal with an example of Hopkins and Pearl may not be necessary. Given how much can be done by adding extra variables, there might be a concern that the notion of causality is somewhat unstable. Can adding extra variables in a "conservative" way (i.e., maintaining all the relations between the variables in the original model) cause the answer to the question "Is X=x a cause of Y=y" to alternate between "yes" and "no"? It is shown that we can have such alternation infinitely often, but if we take normality into consideration, we cannot. Indeed, under appropriate normality assumptions. adding an extra variable can change the answer from "yes" to "no", but after that, it cannot cannot change back to "yes".

However, as is well known, the but-for test is not always sufficient to determine causality. Consider the following The original Halpern-Pearl definition of causality well-known example, taken from [Paul and Hall, 2013]: [Halpern and Pearl, 2001] was updated in the journal Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them version of the paper [Halpern and Pearl, 2005] at a bottle. Suzy's rock gets there first, shattering to deal with some problems pointed out by Hopkins the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, and Pearl [2003]. Here the definition is modified Billy's would have shattered the bottle had it not yet again, in a way that (a) leads to a simpler definition, been preempted by Suzy's throw.

Halpern and Pearl introduced a definition of actual causality; Eiter and Lukasiewicz showed that computing whether X = x is a cause of Y = y is NP-complete in binary models (where all variables can take on only two values) and \Sigma^P_2-complete in general models. In the final version of their paper, Halpern and Pearl slightly modified the definition of actual cause, in order to deal with problems pointed by Hopkins and Pearl. As we show, this modification has a nontrivial impact on the complexity of computing actual cause. To characterize the complexity, a new family D_k^P , k = 1,2,3,..., of complexity classes is introduced, which generalizes the class D^P introduced by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (DP is just D^P_1). We show that the complexity of computing causality under the updated definition is D^P_2 -complete. Chockler and Halpern extended the definition of causality by introducing notions of responsibility and blame. The complexity of determining the degree of responsibility and blame using the original definition of causality was completely characterized. Again, we show that changing the definition of causality affects the complexity, and completely characterize it using the updated definition.

We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals.We show that the definitions yield a plausible and elegant account ofcausation that handles well examples which have caused problems forother definitions and resolves major difficulties in the traditionalaccount. In a companion paper, we show how the definition of causality can beused to give an elegant definition of (causal) explanation.

We propose a new definition of actual cause, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions and resolves major difficulties in the traditional account.