Given a value function v, the Shapley value is a solution to distributing the payoff v(N) to parties in N [14]. Given an order of parties (i.e., a permutation π of N), party i joins the coalition P The Shapley value is'fair' since it is the unique solution that satisfies several desirable properties as elaborated below. It ensures that all of v(N) are distributed to the parties. It implies parties with equal marginal contributions to any coalitions have the same payoff. A reward allocation scheme is replication-robust if a party cannot increase its rewards by replicating its data and participating in the collaboration as multiple parties.

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This paper investigates the problem of computing the equilibrium of competitive games, which is often modeled as a constrained saddle-point optimization problem with probability simplex constraints. Despite recent efforts in understanding the last-iterate convergence of extragradient methods in the unconstrained setting, the theoretical underpinnings of these methods in the constrained settings, especially those using multiplicative updates, remain highly inadequate, even when the objective function is bilinear. Motivated by the algorithmic role of entropy regularization in single-agent reinforcement learning and game theory, we develop provably efficient extragradient methods to find the quantal response equilibrium (QRE)--which are solutions to zero-sum two-player matrix games with entropy regularization--at a linear rate. The proposed algorithms can be implemented in a decentralized manner, where each player executes symmetric and multiplicative updates iteratively using its own payoff without observing the opponent's actions directly. In addition, by controlling the knob of entropy regularization, the proposed algorithms can locate an approximate Nash equilibrium of the unregularized matrix game at a sublinear rate without assuming the Nash equilibrium to be unique. Our methods also lead to efficient policy extragradient algorithms for solving entropy-regularized zero-sum Markov games at a linear rate. All of our convergence rates are nearly dimension-free, which are independent of the size of the state and action spaces up to logarithm factors, highlighting the positive role of entropy regularization for accelerating convergence.

Locally interpretable model agnostic explanations (LIME) method is one of the most popular methods used to explain black-box models at a per example level. Although many variants have been proposed, few provide a simple way to produce high fidelity explanations that are also stable and intuitive. In this work, we provide a novel perspective by proposing a model agnostic local explanation method inspired by the invariant risk minimization (IRM) principle - originally proposed for (global) out-of-distribution generalization - to provide such high fidelity explanations that are also stable and unidirectional across nearby examples. Our method is based on a game theoretic formulation where we theoretically show that our approach has a strong tendency to eliminate features where the gradient of the black-box function abruptly changes sign in the locality of the example we want to explain, while in other cases it is more careful and will choose a more conservative (feature) attribution, a behavior which can be highly desirable for recourse. Empirically, we show on tabular, image and text data that the quality of our explanations with neighborhoods formed using random perturbations are much better than LIME and in some cases even comparable to other methods that use realistic neighbors sampled from the data manifold. This is desirable given that learning a manifold to either create realistic neighbors or to project explanations is typically expensive or may even be impossible. Moreover, our algorithm is simple and efficient to train, and can ascertain stable input features for local decisions of a black-box without access to side information such as a (partial) causal graph as has been seen in some recent works.

In this paper, we investigate Nash-regret minimization in congestion games, a class of games with benign theoretical structure and broad real-world applications. We first propose a centralized algorithm based on the optimism in the face of uncertainty principle for congestion games with (semi-)bandit feedback, and obtain finite-sample guarantees. Then we propose a decentralized algorithm via a novel combination of the Frank-Wolfe method and G-optimal design. By exploiting the structure of the congestion game, we show the sample complexity of both algorithms depends only polynomially on the number of players and the number of facilities, but not the size of the action set, which can be exponentially large in terms of the number of facilities. We further define a new problem class, Markov congestion games, which allows us to model the non-stationarity in congestion games. We propose a centralized algorithm for Markov congestion games, whose sample complexity again has only polynomial dependence on all relevant problem parameters, but not the size of the action set.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are integrated into critical real-world applications, their strategic and logical reasoning abilities are increasingly crucial. This paper evaluates LLMs' reasoning abilities in competitive environments through game-theoretic tasks, e.g., board and card games that require pure logic and strategic reasoning to compete with opponents.