c50c42f853db0f1f5b4195358b6d97de-Supplemental-Conference.pdf

Let us imagine that the grand coalition is formed by one party joining the coalition at a time. Given an order of parties (i.e., a permutationπ of N), party i joins the coalitionPiπ which denotes all parties precedingi in π. It is well-known that the Shapley value, despite its fairness, is not replication robustness in data valuation [1]. This is because the two desirable properties for fairness: symmetry and efficiency violate the replication robustness. In this work, we are interested in maintaining both the efficiency and the symmetry properties of an allocation scheme. Let us consider the case that in the grand coalitionN+, there exists a partyi+ N that is a replication of another party i N \i+ (i.e., Di = Di+).