A declarative action model is a compact representation of the state transitions of dynamic systems that generalizes over world objects. The specification of declarative action models is often a complex hand-crafted task. In this paper we formulate declarative action models via state constraints, and present the learning of such models as a combinatorial search. The comprehensive framework presented here allows us to connect the learning of declarative action models to well-known problem solving tasks. In addition, our framework allows us to characterize the existing work in the literature according to four dimensions: (1) the target action models, in terms of the state transitions they define; (2) the available learning examples; (3) the functions used to guide the learning process, and to evaluate the quality of the learned action models; (4) the learning algorithm. Last, the paper lists relevant successful applications of the learning of declarative actions models and discusses some open challenges with the aim of encouraging future research work.

A New AI Evaluation Cosmos: Ready to Play the Game?

We report on a series of new platforms and events dealing with AI evaluation that may change the way in which AI systems are compared and their progress is measured. The introduction of a more diverse and challenging set of tasks in these platforms can feed AI research in the years to come, shaping the notion of success and the directions of the field. However, the playground of tasks and challenges presented there may misdirect the field without some meaningful structure and systematic guidelines for its organization and use. Anticipating this issue, we also report on several initiatives and workshops that are putting the focus on analyzing the similarity and dependencies between tasks, their difficulty, what capabilities they really measure and – ultimately – on elaborating new concepts and tools that can arrange tasks and benchmarks into a meaningful taxonomy.

When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a particular action, if this punctually solves the conflict, or it can resort to execute a different plan if the agent's payoff significantly diminishes due to the action deferral. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic approach to non-cooperative planning that helps predict before execution what plan schedules agents will adopt so that the set of strategies of all agents constitute a Nash equilibrium. We perform some experiments and discuss the solutions obtained with our game-theoretical approach, analyzing how the conflicts between the plans determine the strategic behavior of the agents.