Goto

Collaborating Authors

 EPFL, Lausanne


Non-Discriminatory Machine Learning Through Convex Fairness Criteria

AAAI Conferences

Biased decision making by machine learning systems is increasingly recognized as an important issue. Recently, techniques have been proposed to learn non-discriminatory clas- sifiers by enforcing constraints in the training phase. Such constraints are either non-convex in nature (posing computational difficulties) or don’t have a clear probabilistic interpretation. Moreover, the techniques offer little understanding of the more subjective notion of fairness. In this paper, we introduce a novel technique to achieve non-discrimination without sacrificing convexity and probabilistic interpretation. Our experimental analysis demonstrates the success of the method on popular real datasets including ProPublica’s COMPAS dataset. We also propose a new notion of fairness for machine learning and show that our technique satisfies this subjective fairness criterion.


Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Resource Allocation

AAAI Conferences

We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems. (Bhaskar 2000) proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, 1-resource allocation games: Agents start by symmetrically randomizing their actions, and as soon as they each choose different actions, they start to follow a potentially asymmetric "convention" that prescribes their actions from then on. We extend the concept of convention to the general case of infinitely repeated resource allocation games with N agents and C resources. We show that for any convention, there exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium which implements it. We present two conventions: bourgeois, where agents stick to the first allocation; and market, where agents pay for the use of resources, and observe a global coordination signal which allows them to alternate between different allocations. We define price of anonymity of a convention as the ratio between the maximum social payoff of any (asymmetric) strategy profile and the expected social payoff of the convention. We show that while the price of anonymity of the bourgeois convention is infinite, the market convention decreases this price by reducing the conflict between the agents.