From an automated planning perspective the problem of practical mobile robot control in realistic environments poses many important and contrary challenges. On the one hand, the planning process must be lightweight, robust, and timely. Over the lifetime of the robot it must always respond quickly with new plans that accommodate exogenous events, changing objectives, and the underlying unpredictability of the environment. On the other hand, in order to promote efficient behaviours the planning process must perform computationally expensive reasoning about contingencies and possible revisions of subjective beliefs according to quantitatively modelled uncertainty in acting and sensing. Towards addressing these challenges, we develop a continual planning approach that switches between using a fast satisficing "classical" planner, to decide on the overall strategy, and decision-theoretic planning to solve small abstract subproblems where deeper consideration of the sensing model is both practical, and can significantly impact overall performance. We evaluate our approach in large problems from a realistic robot exploration domain.

The most prominent way to establish trust between buyers and sellers on online auction sites are reputation mechanisms. Two drawbacks of this approach are the reliance on the seller being long-lived and the susceptibility to whitewashing. In this paper, we introduce so-called escrow mechanisms that avoid these problems by installing a trusted intermediary which forwards the payment to the seller only if the buyer acknowledges that the good arrived in the promised condition. We address the incentive issues that arise and design an escrow mechanism that is incentive-compatible, efficient, interim individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced. In contrast to previous work on trust and reputation, our approach does not rely on knowing the sellers' cost functions or the distribution of buyer valuations.

The most prominent way to establish trust in online markets such as eBay are reputation systems that publish buyer feedback about a seller’s past behavior. These systems, however, critically rely on assumptions that are rarely met in realworld marketplaces: first, it is assumed that there are no reporting costs and no benefits from lying so that buyers honestly report their private experiences. Second, it is assumed that every seller is long-lived, i.e. will continue to trade on the marketplace indefinitely and, third, it is assumed that sellers cannot whitewash, i.e. create new accounts once an old one is ran down. In my thesis, I address all of these assumptions and design incentive-compatible trust mechanisms with minimal common knowledge requirements.