We propose communication pattern logic. A communication pattern describes how processes or agents inform each other, independently of the information content. The full-information protocol in distributed computing is the special case wherein all agents inform each other. We study this protocol in distributed computing models where communication might fail: an agent is certain about the messages it receives, but it may be uncertain about the messages other agents have received. In a dynamic epistemic logic with distributed knowledge and with modalities for communication patterns, the latter are interpreted by updating Kripke models. We propose an axiomatization of communication pattern logic, and we show that collective bisimilarity (comparing models on their distributed knowledge) is preserved when updating models with communication patterns. We can also interpret communication patterns by updating simplicial complexes, a well-known topological framework for distributed computing. We show that the different semantics correspond, and propose collective bisimulation between simplicial complexes.

We introduce Boolean Observation Games, a subclass of multi-player finite strategic games with incomplete information and qualitative objectives. In Boolean observation games, each player is associated with a finite set of propositional variables of which only it can observe the value, and it controls whether and to whom it can reveal that value. It does not control the given, fixed, value of variables. Boolean observation games are a generalization of Boolean games, a well-studied subclass of strategic games but with complete information, and wherein each player controls the value of its variables. In Boolean observation games player goals describe multi-agent knowledge of variables. As in classical strategic games, players choose their strategies simultaneously and therefore observation games capture aspects of both imperfect and incomplete information. They require reasoning about sets of outcomes given sets of indistinguishable valuations of variables. What a Nash equilibrium is, depends on an outcome relation between such sets. We present various outcome relations, including a qualitative variant of ex-post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which, given an outcome relation, Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist. We also study the complexity of checking for the existence of Nash equilibria and of verifying if a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. We further study the subclass of Boolean observation games with `knowing whether' goal formulas, for which the satisfaction does not depend on the value of variables. We show that each such Boolean observation game corresponds to a Boolean game and vice versa, by a different correspondence, and that both correspondences are precise in terms of existence of Nash equilibria.

A gossip protocol is a procedure for sharing secrets in a network. The basic action in a gossip protocol is a telephone call wherein the calling agents exchange all the secrets they know. An agent who knows all secrets is an expert. The usual termination condition is that all agents are experts. Instead, we explore protocols wherein the termination condition is that all agents know that all agents are experts. We call such agents super experts. Additionally, we model that agents who are super experts do not make and do not answer calls. Such agents are called engaged agents. We also model that such gossip protocols are common knowledge among the agents. We investigate conditions under which protocols terminate, both in the synchronous case, where there is a global clock, and in the asynchronous case, where there is not. We show that a commonly known protocol with engaged agents may terminate faster than the same protocol without engaged agents.

We propose a logic of asynchronous announcements, where truthful announcements are publicly sent but individually received by agents. Additional to epistemic modalities, the logic therefore contains two types of dynamic modalities, for sending messages and for receiving messages. The semantics defines truth relative to the current state of reception of messages for all agents. This means that knowledge need not be truthful, because some messages may not have been received by the knowing agent. Messages that are announcements may also result in partial synchronization, namely when an agent learns from receiving an announcement that other announcements must already have been received by other agents. We give detailed examples of the semantics, and prove several semantic results, including that: after an announcement an agent knows that a proposition is true, if and only if on condition of the truth of that announcement, the agent knows that after that announcement and after any number of other agents also receiving it, the proposition is true. We show that on multi-agent epistemic models, each formula in asynchronous announcement logic is equivalent to a formula in epistemic logic.

A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula (that is false and) that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy's logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically defined categories, on iterated announcements, including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization. We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge (instead of belief), and for lying as private announcements (instead of public announcements) to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts.

Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may contain too much information. A proper notion of bisimulation is required that characterises them. We define that notion of bisimulation and prove the required characterisations: on the class of image-finite and preimage-finite models (with respect to the plausibility relation), two pointed Kripke models are modally equivalent in either of the three logics, if and only if they are bisimilar. As a result, the information content of such a model can be similarly expressed in the logic of conditional belief, or the logic of degrees of belief, or that of safe belief. This, we found a surprising result. Still, that does not mean that the logics are equally expressive: the logics of conditional and degrees of belief are incomparable, the logics of degrees of belief and safe belief are incomparable, while the logic of safe belief is more expressive than the logic of conditional belief. In view of the result on bisimulation characterisation, this is an equally surprising result. We hope our insights may contribute to the growing community of formal epistemology and on the relation between qualitative and quantitative modelling.

In this paper we present {\em refinement modal logic}. A refinement is like a bisimulation, except that from the three relational requirements only `atoms' and `back' need to be satisfied. Our logic contains a new operator 'all' in addition to the standard modalities 'box' for each agent. The operator 'all' acts as a quantifier over the set of all refinements of a given model. As a variation on a bisimulation quantifier, this refinement operator or refinement quantifier 'all' can be seen as quantifying over a variable not occurring in the formula bound by it. The logic combines the simplicity of multi-agent modal logic with some powers of monadic second-order quantification. We present a sound and complete axiomatization of multi-agent refinement modal logic. We also present an extension of the logic to the modal mu-calculus, and an axiomatization for the single-agent version of this logic. Examples and applications are also discussed: to software verification and design (the set of agents can also be seen as a set of actions), and to dynamic epistemic logic. We further give detailed results on the complexity of satisfiability, and on succinctness.

Knowing whether a proposition is true means knowing that it is true or knowing that it is false. In this paper, we study logics with a modal operator Kw for knowing whether but without a modal operator K for knowing that. This logic is not a normal modal logic, because we do not have Kw (phi -> psi) -> (Kw phi -> Kw psi). Knowing whether logic cannot define many common frame properties, and its expressive power less than that of basic modal logic over classes of models without reflexivity. These features make axiomatizing knowing whether logics non-trivial. We axiomatize knowing whether logic over various frame classes. We also present an extension of knowing whether logic with public announcement operators and we give corresponding reduction axioms for that. We compare our work in detail to two recent similar proposals.

We propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a 'lie that phi' (where phi is a formula in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a state transformer relative to the formula phi. The states that are being transformed are pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs of other agents or the belief consequences of the lies of other agents. We distinguish (i) an outside observer who is lying to an agent that is modelled in the system, from (ii) one agent who is lying to another agent, and where both are modelled in the system. For either case, we further distinguish (iii) the agent who believes everything that it is told (even at the price of inconsistency), from (iv) the agent who only believes what it is told if that is consistent with its current beliefs, and from (v) the agent who believes everything that it is told by consistently revising its current beliefs. The logics have complete axiomatizations, which can most elegantly be shown by way of their embedding in what is known as action model logic or the extension of that logic to belief revision.