AI presents a novel tool for deciphering the motivations behind human behaviors. We show that by varying prompts to a large language model, we can elicit a full range of human behaviors in a variety of different scenarios in terms of classic economic games. Then by analyzing which prompts are needed to elicit which behaviors, we can infer (decipher) the motivations behind the human behaviors. We also show how one can analyze the prompts to reveal relationships between the classic economic games, providing new insight into what different economic scenarios induce people to think about. We also show how this deciphering process can be used to understand differences in the behavioral tendencies of different populations.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) in diverse applications requires a thorough understanding of their decision-making strategies and behavioral patterns. As a supplement to a recent study on the behavioral Turing test, this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of five leading LLM-based chatbot families as they navigate a series of behavioral economics games. By benchmarking these AI chatbots, we aim to uncover and document both common and distinct behavioral patterns across a range of scenarios. The findings provide valuable insights into the strategic preferences of each LLM, highlighting potential implications for their deployment in critical decision-making roles.

We administer a Turing Test to AI Chatbots. We examine how Chatbots behave in a suite of classic behavioral games that are designed to elicit characteristics such as trust, fairness, risk-aversion, cooperation, \textit{etc.}, as well as how they respond to a traditional Big-5 psychological survey that measures personality traits. ChatGPT-4 exhibits behavioral and personality traits that are statistically indistinguishable from a random human from tens of thousands of human subjects from more than 50 countries. Chatbots also modify their behavior based on previous experience and contexts ``as if'' they were learning from the interactions, and change their behavior in response to different framings of the same strategic situation. Their behaviors are often distinct from average and modal human behaviors, in which case they tend to behave on the more altruistic and cooperative end of the distribution. We estimate that they act as if they are maximizing an average of their own and partner's payoffs.