Humor is prevalent in online communications and it often relies on more than one modality (e.g., cartoons and memes). Interpreting humor in multimodal settings requires drawing on diverse types of knowledge, including metaphorical, sociocultural, and commonsense knowledge. However, identifying the most useful knowledge remains an open question. We introduce \method{}, a method inspired by the information bottleneck principle that elicits relevant world knowledge from vision and language models which is iteratively refined for generating an explanation of the humor in an unsupervised manner. Our experiments on three datasets confirm the advantage of our method over a range of baselines. Our method can further be adapted in the future for additional tasks that can benefit from eliciting and conditioning on relevant world knowledge and open new research avenues in this direction.

RLHF-aligned LMs have shown unprecedented ability on both benchmarks and long-form text generation, yet they struggle with one foundational task: next-token prediction. As RLHF models become agent models aimed at interacting with humans, they seem to lose their world modeling -- the ability to predict what comes next in arbitrary documents, which is the foundational training objective of the Base LMs that RLHF adapts. Besides empirically demonstrating this trade-off, we propose a potential explanation: to perform coherent long-form generation, RLHF models restrict randomness via implicit blueprints. In particular, RLHF models concentrate probability on sets of anchor spans that co-occur across multiple generations for the same prompt, serving as textual scaffolding but also limiting a model's ability to generate documents that do not include these spans. We study this trade-off on the most effective current agent models, those aligned with RLHF, while exploring why this may remain a fundamental trade-off between models that act and those that predict, even as alignment techniques improve.

The current winning recipe for automatic summarization is using proprietary large-scale language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT as is, or imitation learning from them as teacher models. While increasingly ubiquitous dependence on such large-scale language models is convenient, there remains an important question of whether small-scale models could have achieved competitive results, if we were to seek an alternative learning method -- that allows for a more cost-efficient, controllable, yet powerful summarizer. We present InfoSumm, a novel framework to distill a powerful summarizer based on the information-theoretic objective for summarization, without relying on either the LLM's capability or human-written references. To achieve this, we first propose a novel formulation of the desiderata of summarization (saliency, faithfulness and brevity) through the lens of mutual information between the original document and the summary. Based on this formulation, we start off from Pythia-2.8B as the teacher model, which is not yet capable of summarization, then self-train the model to optimize for the information-centric measures of ideal summaries. Distilling from the improved teacher, we arrive at a compact but powerful summarizer with only 568M parameters that performs competitively against ChatGPT, without ever relying on ChatGPT's capabilities. Extensive analysis demonstrates that our approach outperforms in-domain supervised models in human evaluation, let alone state-of-the-art unsupervised methods, and wins over ChatGPT in controllable summarization.

Instruction following vision-language (VL) models offer a flexible interface that supports a broad range of multimodal tasks in a zero-shot fashion. However, interfaces that operate on full images do not directly enable the user to "point to" and access specific regions within images. This capability is important not only to support reference-grounded VL benchmarks, but also, for practical applications that require precise within-image reasoning. We build Localized Visual Commonsense models, which allow users to specify (multiple) regions as input. We train our model by sampling localized commonsense knowledge from a large language model (LLM): specifically, we prompt an LLM to collect commonsense knowledge given a global literal image description and a local literal region description automatically generated by a set of VL models. With a separately trained critic model that selects high-quality examples, we find that training on the localized commonsense corpus can successfully distill existing VL models to support a reference-as-input interface. Empirical results and human evaluations in a zero-shot setup demonstrate that our distillation method results in more precise VL models of reasoning compared to a baseline of passing a generated referring expression to an LLM.

We present NovaCOMET, an open commonsense knowledge model, that combines the best aspects of knowledge and general task models. Compared to previous knowledge models, NovaCOMET allows open-format relations enabling direct application to reasoning tasks; compared to general task models like Flan-T5, it explicitly centers knowledge, enabling superior performance for commonsense reasoning. NovaCOMET leverages the knowledge of opaque proprietary models to create an open knowledge pipeline. First, knowledge is symbolically distilled into NovATOMIC, a publicly-released discrete knowledge graph which can be audited, critiqued, and filtered. Next, we train NovaCOMET on NovATOMIC by fine-tuning an open-source pretrained model. NovaCOMET uses an open-format training objective, replacing the fixed relation sets of past knowledge models, enabling arbitrary structures within the data to serve as inputs or outputs. The resulting generation model, optionally augmented with human annotation, matches or exceeds comparable open task models like Flan-T5 on a range of commonsense generation tasks. NovaCOMET serves as a counterexample to the contemporary focus on instruction tuning only, demonstrating a distinct advantage to explicitly modeling commonsense knowledge as well.

While extreme-scale language models have demonstrated exceptional performance on a variety of language tasks, the degree of control over these language models through pure prompting can often be limited. Directly fine-tuning such language models can be effective for tailoring them, but it can be either extremely costly (e.g., GPT-3) or not even feasible for the broader community (e.g., GPT-4). We propose Inference-time Policy Adapters (IPA), which efficiently tailors a language model such as GPT-3 without fine-tuning it. IPA guides a large base model during decoding time through a lightweight policy adapter trained to optimize an arbitrary user objective with reinforcement learning. On five challenging text generation tasks, such as toxicity reduction and lexically constrained generation, IPA consistently brings significant improvements over off-the-shelf language models. It outperforms competitive baseline methods, sometimes even including expensive fine-tuning. In particular, tailoring GPT-2 with IPA can outperform GPT-3, while tailoring GPT-3 with IPA brings a major performance boost over GPT-3 (and sometimes even over GPT-4). Our promising results highlight the potential of IPA as a lightweight alternative to tailoring extreme-scale language models.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Transformer large language models (LLMs) have sparked admiration for their exceptional performance on tasks that demand intricate multi-step reasoning. Yet, these models simultaneously show failures on surprisingly trivial problems. This begs the question: Are these errors incidental, or do they signal more substantial limitations? In an attempt to demystify transformer LLMs, we investigate the limits of these models across three representative compositional tasks -- multi-digit multiplication, logic grid puzzles, and a classic dynamic programming problem. These tasks require breaking problems down into sub-steps and synthesizing these steps into a precise answer. We formulate compositional tasks as computation graphs to systematically quantify the level of complexity, and break down reasoning steps into intermediate sub-procedures. Our empirical findings suggest that transformer LLMs solve compositional tasks by reducing multi-step compositional reasoning into linearized subgraph matching, without necessarily developing systematic problem-solving skills. To round off our empirical study, we provide theoretical arguments on abstract multi-step reasoning problems that highlight how autoregressive generations' performance can rapidly decay with\,increased\,task\,complexity.

Data scarcity has been a long standing issue in the field of open-domain social dialogue. To quench this thirst, we present SODA: the first publicly available, million-scale high-quality social dialogue dataset. By contextualizing social commonsense knowledge from a knowledge graph, we are able to distill an exceptionally broad spectrum of social interactions from a large language model. Human evaluation shows that conversations in SODA are more consistent, specific, and (surprisingly) natural than those in prior human-authored datasets. Using SODA, we train COSMO: a generalizable conversation model that is significantly more natural and consistent on unseen datasets than best-performing conversation models (e.g., GODEL, BlenderBot-1, Koala, Vicuna). Experiments reveal COSMO is sometimes even preferred to the original human-written gold responses. Additionally, our results shed light on the distinction between knowledge-enriched conversations and natural social chitchats. We plan to make our data, model, and code public.

Ambiguity is an intrinsic feature of natural language. Managing ambiguity is a key part of human language understanding, allowing us to anticipate misunderstanding as communicators and revise our interpretations as listeners. As language models (LMs) are increasingly employed as dialogue interfaces and writing aids, handling ambiguous language is critical to their success. We characterize ambiguity in a sentence by its effect on entailment relations with another sentence, and collect AmbiEnt, a linguist-annotated benchmark of 1,645 examples with diverse kinds of ambiguity. We design a suite of tests based on AmbiEnt, presenting the first evaluation of pretrained LMs to recognize ambiguity and disentangle possible meanings. We find that the task remains extremely challenging, including for GPT-4, whose generated disambiguations are considered correct only 32% of the time in human evaluation, compared to 90% for disambiguations in our dataset. Finally, to illustrate the value of ambiguity-sensitive tools, we show that a multilabel NLI model can flag political claims in the wild that are misleading due to ambiguity. We encourage the field to rediscover the importance of ambiguity for NLP.