Interactions between the government officials and civilians affect public wellbeing and the state legitimacy that is necessary for the functioning of democratic society. Police officers, the most visible and contacted agents of the state, interact with the public more than 20 million times a year during traffic stops. Today, these interactions are regularly recorded by body-worn cameras (BWCs), which are lauded as a means to enhance police accountability and improve police-public interactions. However, the timely analysis of these recordings is hampered by a lack of reliable automated tools that can enable the analysis of these complex and contested police-public interactions. This article proposes an approach to developing new multi-perspective, multimodal machine learning (ML) tools to analyze the audio, video, and transcript information from this BWC footage. Our approach begins by identifying the aspects of communication most salient to different stakeholders, including both community members and police officers. We move away from modeling approaches built around the existence of a single ground truth and instead utilize new advances in soft labeling to incorporate variation in how different observers perceive the same interactions. We argue that this inclusive approach to the conceptualization and design of new ML tools is broadly applicable to the study of communication and development of analytic tools across domains of human interaction, including education, medicine, and the workplace.

Many strategic actions carry a "contagious" component beyond the immediate locale of the effort itself. Viral marketing and peacekeeping operations have both been observed to have a spreading effect. In this work, we use counterinsurgency as our illustrative domain. Defined as the effort to block the spread of support for an insurgency, such operations lack the manpower to defend the entire population and must focus on the opinions of a subset of local leaders. As past researchers of security resource allocation have done, we propose using game theory to develop such policies and model the interconnected network of leaders as a graph. Unlike this past work in security games, actions in these domains possess a probabilistic, non-local impact. To address this new class of security games, recent research has used novel heuristic oracles in a double oracle formulation to generate mixed strategies. However, these heuristic oracles were evaluated only on runtime and quality scaling with the graphsize. Given the complexity of the problem, numerous other problem features and metrics must be considered to better inform practical application of such techniques. Thus, this work provides a thorough experimental analysis including variations of the contagion probability average and standard deviation. We extend the previous analysis to also examine the size of the action set constructed in the algorithms and the final mixed strategies themselves. Our results indicate that game instances featuring smaller graphs and low contagion probabilities converge slowly while games with larger graphs and medium contagion probabilities converge most quickly.

Game theoretic predictions about equilibrium behavior depend upon assumptions of inflexibility of belief, of accord between belief and choice, and of choice across situations that share a game-theoretic structure. However, researchers rarely possess any knowledge of the actual beliefs of subjects, and rarely compare how a subject behaves in settings that share game-theoretic structure but that differ in other respects. Our within-subject experiments utilize a belief elicitation mechanism, roughly similar to a prediction market, in a laboratory setting to identify subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices and beliefs. These experiments additionally allow us to compare choices in different settings that have similar game-theoretic structure. We find first, as have others,that subjects’ choices in the Trust and related games are significantly different from the strategies that derive from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium principles. We show that, for individual subjects, there is considerable flexibility of choice and belief across similar tasks and that the relationship between belief and choice is similarly flexible. To improve our ability to predict human behavior, we must take account of the flexible nature of human belief and choice