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Collaborating Authors

 Weinstein, Ari


Human-centered mechanism design with Democratic AI

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Building artificial intelligence (AI) that aligns with human values is an unsolved problem. Here, we developed a human-in-the-loop research pipeline called Democratic AI, in which reinforcement learning is used to design a social mechanism that humans prefer by majority. A large group of humans played an online investment game that involved deciding whether to keep a monetary endowment or to share it with others for collective benefit. Shared revenue was returned to players under two different redistribution mechanisms, one designed by the AI and the other by humans. The AI discovered a mechanism that redressed initial wealth imbalance, sanctioned free riders, and successfully won the majority vote. By optimizing for human preferences, Democratic AI may be a promising method for value-aligned policy innovation.


Bandit-Based Planning and Learning in Continuous-Action Markov Decision Processes

AAAI Conferences

Recent research leverages results from the continuous-armed bandit literature to create a reinforcement-learning algorithm for continuous state and action spaces. Initially proposed in a theoretical setting, we provide the first examination of the empirical properties of the algorithm. Through experimentation, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this planning method when coupled with exploration and model learning and show that, in addition to its formal guarantees, the approach is very competitive with other continuous-action reinforcement learners.