Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) cooperative autonomous driving holds great promise for improving safety by addressing the perception and prediction uncertainties inherent in single-agent systems. However, traditional cooperative methods are constrained by rigid collaboration protocols and limited generalization to unseen interactive scenarios. While LLM-based approaches offer generalized reasoning capabilities, their challenges in spatial planning and unstable inference latency hinder their direct application in cooperative driving. To address these limitations, we propose CoLMDriver, the first full-pipeline LLM-based cooperative driving system, enabling effective language-based negotiation and real-time driving control. CoLMDriver features a parallel driving pipeline with two key components: (i) an LLM-based negotiation module under an actor-critic paradigm, which continuously refines cooperation policies through feedback from previous decisions of all vehicles; and (ii) an intention-guided waypoint generator, which translates negotiation outcomes into executable waypoints. Additionally, we introduce InterDrive, a CARLA-based simulation benchmark comprising 10 challenging interactive driving scenarios for evaluating V2V cooperation. Experimental results demonstrate that CoLMDriver significantly outperforms existing approaches, achieving an 11% higher success rate across diverse highly interactive V2V driving scenarios. Code will be released on https://github.com/cxliu0314/CoLMDriver.

This paper studies the vulnerabilities of transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) to jailbreaking attacks, focusing specifically on the optimization-based Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) strategy. We first observe a positive correlation between the effectiveness of attacks and the internal behaviors of the models. For instance, attacks tend to be less effective when models pay more attention to system prompts designed to ensure LLM safety alignment. Building on this discovery, we introduce an enhanced method that manipulates models' attention scores to facilitate LLM jailbreaking, which we term AttnGCG. Empirically, AttnGCG shows consistent improvements in attack efficacy across diverse LLMs, achieving an average increase of ~7% in the Llama-2 series and ~10% in the Gemma series. Our strategy also demonstrates robust attack transferability against both unseen harmful goals and black-box LLMs like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Moreover, we note our attention-score visualization is more interpretable, allowing us to gain better insights into how our targeted attention manipulation facilitates more effective jailbreaking. We release the code at https://github.com/UCSC-VLAA/AttnGCG-attack.

This work focuses on the potential of Vision LLMs (VLLMs) in visual reasoning. Different from prior studies, we shift our focus from evaluating standard performance to introducing a comprehensive safety evaluation suite, covering both out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization and adversarial robustness. For the OOD evaluation, we present two novel VQA datasets, each with one variant, designed to test model performance under challenging conditions. In exploring adversarial robustness, we propose a straightforward attack strategy for misleading VLLMs to produce visual-unrelated responses. Moreover, we assess the efficacy of two jailbreaking strategies, targeting either the vision or language component of VLLMs. Our evaluation of 21 diverse models, ranging from open-source VLLMs to GPT-4V, yields interesting observations: 1) Current VLLMs struggle with OOD texts but not images, unless the visual information is limited; and 2) These VLLMs can be easily misled by deceiving vision encoders only, and their vision-language training often compromise safety protocols. We release this safety evaluation suite at https://github.com/UCSC-VLAA/vllm-safety-benchmark.