We focus on repeated coordination games of non-identical interest where agents do not know the game structure up front and receive noisy payoffs. We design efficient near-optimal algorithms forboth the perfect monitoring and the imperfect monitoring setting(where the agents only observe their own payoffs and the joint actions).

Multiagent learning is a key problem in AI. In the presence of multiple Nash equilibria, even agents with non-conflicting interests may not be able to learn an optimal coordination policy. The problem is exaccerbated if the agents do not know the game and independently receive noisy payoffs. So, multiagent reinforfcement learning involves two interrelated problems: identifying the game and learning to play.

Multiagent learning is a key problem in AI. In the presence of multiple Nash equilibria, even agents with non-conflicting interests may not be able to learn an optimal coordination policy. The problem is exaccerbated if the agents do not know the game and independently receive noisy payoffs. So, multiagent reinforfcement learning involves two interrelated problems: identifying the game and learning to play.

Multiagent learning is a key problem in AI. In the presence of multiple Nashequilibria, even agents with non-conflicting interests may not be able to learn an optimal coordination policy. The problem is exaccerbated ifthe agents do not know the game and independently receive noisy payoffs. So, multiagent reinforfcement learning involves two interrelated problems:identifying the game and learning to play.