Many real life optimization problems contain both hard and soft constraints, as well as qualitative conditional preferences. However, there is no single formalism to specify all three kinds of information. We therefore propose a framework, based on both CP-nets and soft constraints, that handles both hard and soft constraints as well as conditional preferences efficiently and uniformly. We study the complexity of testing the consistency of preference statements, and show how soft constraints can faithfully approximate the semantics of conditional preference statements whilst improving the computational complexity

We review constraint-based approaches to handle preferences. We start by defining the main notions of constraint programming, then give various concepts of soft constraints and show how they can be used to model quantitative preferences. We then consider how soft constraints can be adapted to handle other forms of preferences, such as bipolar, qualitative, and temporal preferences. Finally, we describe how AI techniques such as abstraction, explanation generation, machine learning, and preference elicitation, can be useful in modelling and solving soft constraints.

We review constraint-based approaches to handle preferences. We start by defining the main notions of constraint programming, then give various concepts of soft constraints and show how they can be used to model quantitative preferences. We then consider how soft constraints can be adapted to handle other forms of preferences, such as bipolar, qualitative, and temporal preferences. Finally, we describe how AI techniques such as abstraction, explanation generation, machine learning, and preference elicitation, can be useful in modelling and solving soft constraints.

The notion of optimality naturally arises in many areas of applied mathematics and computer science concerned with decision making. Here we consider this notion in the context of three formalisms used for different purposes in reasoning about multi-agent systems: strategic games, CP-nets, and soft constraints. To relate the notions of optimality in these formalisms we introduce a natural qualitative modification of the notion of a strategic game. We show then that the optimal outcomes of a CP-net are exactly the Nash equilibria of such games. This allows us to use the techniques of game theory to search for optimal outcomes of CP-nets and vice-versa, to use techniques developed for CP-nets to search for Nash equilibria of the considered games. Then, we relate the notion of optimality used in the area of soft constraints to that used in a generalization of strategic games, called graphical games. In particular we prove that for a natural class of soft constraints that includes weighted constraints every optimal solution is both a Nash equilibrium and Pareto efficient joint strategy. For a natural mapping in the other direction we show that Pareto efficient joint strategies coincide with the optimal solutions of soft constraints.