We study the problem of efficiently generating differentially private synthetic data that approximate the statistical properties of an underlying sensitive dataset. In recent years, there has been a growing line of work that approaches this problem using first-order optimization techniques. However, such techniques are restricted to optimizing differentiable objectives only, severely limiting the types of analyses that can be conducted. For example, first-order mechanisms have been primarily successful in approximating statistical queries only in the form of marginals for discrete data domains. In some cases, one can circumvent such issues by relaxing the task's objective to maintain differentiability. However, even when possible, these approaches impose a fundamental limitation in which modifications to the minimization problem become additional sources of error. Therefore, we propose Private-GSD, a private genetic algorithm based on zeroth-order optimization heuristics that do not require modifying the original objective. As a result, it avoids the aforementioned limitations of first-order optimization. We empirically evaluate Private-GSD against baseline algorithms on data derived from the American Community Survey across a variety of statistics--otherwise known as statistical queries--both for discrete and real-valued attributes. We show that Private-GSD outperforms the state-of-the-art methods on non-differential queries while matching accuracy in approximating differentiable ones.

One of the central problems in auction design is developing an incentive-compatible mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's expected revenue. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, recently, there has been much progress on finding the optimal mechanism through deep learning. However, these works either focus on a fixed set of bidders and items, or restrict the auction to be symmetric. In this work, we overcome such limitations by factoring \emph{public} contextual information of bidders and items into the auction learning framework. We propose $\mathtt{CITransNet}$, a context-integrated transformer-based neural network for optimal auction design, which maintains permutation-equivariance over bids and contexts while being able to find asymmetric solutions. We show by extensive experiments that $\mathtt{CITransNet}$ can recover the known optimal solutions in single-item settings, outperform strong baselines in multi-item auctions, and generalize well to cases other than those in training.