We propose a novel policy gradient method for multi-agent reinforcement learning, which leverages two different variance-reduction techniques and does not require large batches over iterations. Specifically, we propose a momentum-based decentralized policy gradient tracking (MDPGT) where a new momentum-based variance reduction technique is used to approximate the local policy gradient surrogate with importance sampling, and an intermediate parameter is adopted to track two consecutive policy gradient surrogates. Moreover, MDPGT provably achieves the best available sample complexity of $\mathcal{O}(N^{-1}\epsilon^{-3})$ for converging to an $\epsilon$-stationary point of the global average of $N$ local performance functions (possibly nonconcave). This outperforms the state-of-the-art sample complexity in decentralized model-free reinforcement learning, and when initialized with a single trajectory, the sample complexity matches those obtained by the existing decentralized policy gradient methods. We further validate the theoretical claim for the Gaussian policy function. When the required error tolerance $\epsilon$ is small enough, MDPGT leads to a linear speed up, which has been previously established in decentralized stochastic optimization, but not for reinforcement learning. Lastly, we provide empirical results on a multi-agent reinforcement learning benchmark environment to support our theoretical findings.

Adoption of machine learning (ML)-enabled cyber-physical systems (CPS) are becoming prevalent in various sectors of modern society such as transportation, industrial, and power grids. Recent studies in deep reinforcement learning (DRL) have demonstrated its benefits in a large variety of data-driven decisions and control applications. As reliance on ML-enabled systems grows, it is imperative to study the performance of these systems under malicious state and actuator attacks. Traditional control systems employ resilient/fault-tolerant controllers that counter these attacks by correcting the system via error observations. However, in some applications, a resilient controller may not be sufficient to avoid a catastrophic failure. Ideally, a robust approach is more useful in these scenarios where a system is inherently robust (by design) to adversarial attacks. While robust control has a long history of development, robust ML is an emerging research area that has already demonstrated its relevance and urgency. However, the majority of robust ML research has focused on perception tasks and not on decision and control tasks, although the ML (specifically RL) models used for control applications are equally vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we show that a well-performing DRL agent that is initially susceptible to action space perturbations (e.g. actuator attacks) can be robustified against similar perturbations through adversarial training.

Robustness of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) algorithms towards adversarial attacks in real world applications such as those deployed in cyber-physical systems (CPS) are of increasing concern. Numerous studies have investigated the mechanisms of attacks on the RL agent's state space. Nonetheless, attacks on the RL agent's action space (AS) (corresponding to actuators in engineering systems) are equally perverse; such attacks are relatively less studied in the ML literature. In this work, we first frame the problem as an optimization problem of minimizing the cumulative reward of an RL agent with decoupled constraints as the budget of attack. We propose a white-box Myopic Action Space (MAS) attack algorithm that distributes the attacks across the action space dimensions. Next, we reformulate the optimization problem above with the same objective function, but with a temporally coupled constraint on the attack budget to take into account the approximated dynamics of the agent. This leads to the white-box Look-ahead Action Space (LAS) attack algorithm that distributes the attacks across the action and temporal dimensions. Our results shows that using the same amount of resources, the LAS attack deteriorates the agent's performance significantly more than the MAS attack. This reveals the possibility that with limited resource, an adversary can utilize the agent's dynamics to malevolently craft attacks that causes the agent to fail. Additionally, we leverage these attack strategies as a possible tool to gain insights on the potential vulnerabilities of DRL agents.