This paper presents Visual Evaluative AI, a decision and the hypothesis-driven paradigm aid that provides positive and negative evidence from image data for a given hypothesis. This tool finds high-level human concepts in an image and generates the Weight of Evidence (WoE) for each hypothesis in the decision-making process. We apply and evaluate this tool in the skin cancer domain by building a web-based application that allows users to upload a dermatoscopic image, select a hypothesis and analyse their decisions by evaluating the provided evidence. Further, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Visual Evaluative AI on different concept-based explanation approaches.

Prior research on AI-assisted human decision-making has explored several different explainable AI (XAI) approaches. A recent paper has proposed a paradigm shift calling for hypothesis-driven XAI through a conceptual framework called evaluative AI that gives people evidence that supports or refutes hypotheses without necessarily giving a decision-aid recommendation. In this paper we describe and evaluate an approach for hypothesis-driven XAI based on the Weight of Evidence (WoE) framework, which generates both positive and negative evidence for a given hypothesis. Through human behavioural experiments, we show that our hypothesis-driven approach increases decision accuracy, reduces reliance compared to a recommendation-driven approach and an AI-explanation-only baseline, but with a small increase in under-reliance compared to the recommendation-driven approach. Further, we show that participants used our hypothesis-driven approach in a materially different way to the two baselines.

Displaying confidence scores in human-AI interaction has been shown to help build trust between humans and AI systems. However, most existing research uses only the confidence score as a form of communication. As confidence scores are just another model output, users may want to understand why the algorithm is confident to determine whether to accept the confidence score. In this paper, we show that counterfactual explanations of confidence scores help study participants to better understand and better trust a machine learning model's prediction. We present two methods for understanding model confidence using counterfactual explanation: (1) based on counterfactual examples; and (2) based on visualisation of the counterfactual space. Both increase understanding and trust for study participants over a baseline of no explanation, but qualitative results show that they are used quite differently, leading to recommendations of when to use each one and directions of designing better explanations.

In the absence of prescribed coordination, it is often necessary for individual agents to synthesize their own plans, taking into account not only their own capabilities and beliefs about the world but also their beliefs about other agents, including what each of the agents will come to believe as the consequence of the actions of others. To illustrate, consider the scenario where Larry and Moe meet on a regular basis at the local diner to swap the latest gossip. Larry has come to know that Nancy (Larry's daughter) has just received a major promotion in her job, but unbeknownst to him, Moe has already learned this bit of information through the grapevine. Before they speak, both believe Nancy is getting a promotion, Larry believes Moe is unaware of this (and consequently wishes to share the news), and Moe assumes Larry must already be aware of the promotion but is unaware of Moe's own knowledge of the situation. Very quickly we can see how the nesting of (potentially incorrect) belief can be a complicated and interesting setting to model. In this paper, we examine the problem of synthesizing plans in such settings. In particular, given a finite set of agents, each with: (1) (possibly incomplete and incorrect) beliefs about the world and about the beliefs of other agents; and (2) differing capabilities including the ability to perform actions whose outcomes are unknown to other agents; we are interested in synthesizing a plan to achieve a goal condition. Planning is at the belief level and as such, while we consider the execution of actions that can change the state of the world (ontic actions) as well as an agent's state of knowledge or belief (epistemic or more accurately doxastic actions, including communication actions), all outcomes are with respect to belief.

This paper investigates the prospects of using directive explanations to assist people in achieving recourse of machine learning decisions. Directive explanations list which specific actions an individual needs to take to achieve their desired outcome. If a machine learning model makes a decision that is detrimental to an individual (e.g. denying a loan application), then it needs to both explain why it made that decision and also explain how the individual could obtain their desired outcome (if possible). At present, this is often done using counterfactual explanations, but such explanations generally do not tell individuals how to act. We assert that counterfactual explanations can be improved by explicitly providing people with actions they could use to achieve their desired goal. This paper makes two contributions. First, we present the results of an online study investigating people's perception of directive explanations. Second, we propose a conceptual model to generate such explanations. Our online study showed a significant preference for directive explanations ($p<0.001$). However, the participants' preferred explanation type was affected by multiple factors, such as individual preferences, social factors, and the feasibility of the directives. Our findings highlight the need for a human-centred and context-specific approach for creating directive explanations.

Prevalent theories in cognitive science propose that humans understand and represent the knowledge of the world through causal relationships. In making sense of the world, we build causal models in our mind to encode cause-effect relations of events and use these to explain why new events happen. In this paper, we use causal models to derive causal explanations of behaviour of reinforcement learning agents. We present an approach that learns a structural causal model during reinforcement learning and encodes causal relationships between variables of interest. This model is then used to generate explanations of behaviour based on counterfactual analysis of the causal model. We report on a study with 120 participants who observe agents playing a real-time strategy game (Starcraft II) and then receive explanations of the agents' behaviour. We investigated: 1) participants' understanding gained by explanations through task prediction; 2) explanation satisfaction and 3) trust. Our results show that causal model explanations perform better on these measures compared to two other baseline explanation models.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) systems need to include an explanation model to communicate the internal decisions, behaviours and actions to the interacting humans. Successful explanation involves both cognitive and social processes. In this paper we focus on the challenge of meaningful interaction between an explainer and an explainee and investigate the structural aspects of an interactive explanation to propose an interaction protocol. We follow a bottom-up approach to derive the model by analysing transcripts of different explanation dialogue types with 398 explanation dialogues. We use grounded theory to code and identify key components of an explanation dialogue. We formalize the model using the agent dialogue framework (ADF) as a new dialogue type and then evaluate it in a human-agent interaction study with 101 dialogues from 14 participants. Our results show that the proposed model can closely follow the explanation dialogues of human-agent conversations.

To generate trust with their users, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) systems need to include an explanation model that can communicate the internal decisions, behaviours and actions to the interacting humans. Successful explanation involves both cognitive and social processes. In this paper we focus on the challenge of meaningful interaction between an explainer and an explainee and investigate the structural aspects of an explanation in order to propose a human explanation dialog model. We follow a bottom-up approach to derive the model by analysing transcripts of 398 different explanation dialog types. We use grounded theory to code and identify key components of which an explanation dialog consists. We carry out further analysis to identify the relationships between components and sequences and cycles that occur in a dialog. We present a generalized state model obtained by the analysis and compare it with an existing conceptual dialog model of explanation.

Proper epistemic knowledge bases (PEKBs) are syntactic knowledge bases that use multi-agent epistemic logic to represent nested multi-agent knowledge and belief. PEKBs have certain syntactic restrictions that lead to desirable computational properties; primarily, a PEKB is a conjunction of modal literals, and therefore contains no disjunction. Sound entailment can be checked in polynomial time, and is complete for a large set of arbitrary formulae in logics K n and KD n . In this paper, we extend PEKBs to deal with a restricted form of disjunction: 'knowing whether.' An agent i knows whether Q iff agent i knows Q or knows not Q; that is, []Q or []not(Q). In our experience, the ability to represent that an agent knows whether something holds is useful in many multi-agent domains. We represent knowing whether with a modal operator, and present sound polynomial-time entailment algorithms on PEKBs with the knowing whether operator in K n and KD n , but which are complete for a smaller class of queries than standard PEKBs.

Many AI applications involve the interaction of multiple autonomous agents, requiring those agents to reason about their own beliefs, as well as those of other agents. However, planning involving nested beliefs is known to be computationally challenging. In this work, we address the task of synthesizing plans that necessitate reasoning about the beliefs of other agents. We plan from the perspective of a single agent with the potential for goals and actions that involve nested beliefs, non-homogeneous agents, co-present observations, and the ability for one agent to reason as if it were another. We formally characterize our notion of planning with nested belief, and subsequently demonstrate how to automatically convert such problems into problems that appeal to classical planning technology. Our approach represents an important first step towards applying the well-established field of automated planning to the challenging task of planning involving nested beliefs of multiple agents.