Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has become a powerful framework for improving complex problem-solving capabilities in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). However, the verbose nature of textual reasoning introduces significant inefficiencies. In this work, we propose $\textbf{Heima}$ (as hidden llama), an efficient reasoning framework that leverages reasoning CoTs at hidden latent space. We design the Heima Encoder to condense each intermediate CoT into a compact, higher-level hidden representation using a single thinking token, effectively minimizing verbosity and reducing the overall number of tokens required during the reasoning process. Meanwhile, we design corresponding Heima Decoder with traditional Large Language Models (LLMs) to adaptively interpret the hidden representations into variable-length textual sequence, reconstructing reasoning processes that closely resemble the original CoTs. Experimental results across diverse reasoning MLLM benchmarks demonstrate that Heima model achieves higher generation efficiency while maintaining or even better zero-shot task accuracy. Moreover, the effective reconstruction of multimodal reasoning processes with Heima Decoder validates both the robustness and interpretability of our approach.

Assistive embodied agents that can be instructed in natural language to perform tasks in open-world environments have the potential to significantly impact labor tasks like manufacturing or in-home care -- benefiting the lives of those who come to depend on them. In this work, we consider how this benefit might be hijacked by local modifications in the appearance of the agent's operating environment. Specifically, we take the popular Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) task as a representative setting and develop a whitebox adversarial attack that optimizes a 3D attack object's appearance to induce desired behaviors in pretrained VLN agents that observe it in the environment. We demonstrate that the proposed attack can cause VLN agents to ignore their instructions and execute alternative actions after encountering the attack object -- even for instructions and agent paths not considered when optimizing the attack. For these novel settings, we find our attacks can induce early-termination behaviors or divert an agent along an attacker-defined multi-step trajectory. Under both conditions, environmental attacks significantly reduce agent capabilities to successfully follow user instructions.