Voting rules may fail to implement the will of the society when only some voters actively participate, and/or in the presence of sybil (fake or duplicate) voters. Here we aim to address social choice in the presence of sybils and voter abstention. To do so we assume the status-quo (Reality) as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study Reality Enforcing voting rules, which add virtual votes in support of the status-quo. We measure the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status-quo, respectively) in a variety of domains, and show that the Reality Enforcing voting rule is optimal in this respect.

We present a unifying framework encompassing many social choice settings. Viewing each social choice setting as voting in a suitable metric space, we consider a general model of social choice over metric spaces, in which---similarly to the spatial model of elections---each voter specifies an ideal element of the metric space. The ideal element functions as a vote, where each voter prefers elements that are closer to her ideal element. But it also functions as a proposal, thus making all participants equal not only as voters but also as proposers. We consider Condorcet aggregation and a continuum of solution concepts, ranging from minimizing the sum of distances to minimizing the maximum distance. We study applications of the abstract model to various social choice settings, including single-winner elections, committee elections, participatory budgeting, and participatory legislation. For each setting, we compare each solution concept to known voting rules and study various properties of the resulting voting rules. Our framework provides expressive aggregation for a broad range of social choice settings while remaining simple for voters, and may enable a unified and integrated implementation for all these settings, as well as unified extensions such as sybil-resiliency, proxy voting, and deliberative decision making.

While most of humanity is suddenly on the net, the value of this singularity is hampered by the lack of credible digital identities: Social networking, person-to-person transactions, democratic conduct, cooperation and philanthropy are all hampered by the profound presence of fake identities, as illustrated by Facebook's removal of 5.4Bn fake accounts since the beginning of 2019. Here, we introduce the fundamental notion of a \emph{genuine personal identifier}---a globally unique and singular identifier of a person---and present a foundation for a decentralized, grassroots, bottom-up process in which every human being may create, own, and protect the privacy of a genuine personal identifier. The solution employs mutual sureties among owners of personal identifiers, resulting in a mutual-surety graph reminiscent of a web-of-trust. Importantly, this approach is designed for a distributed realization, possibly using distributed ledger technology, and does not depend on the use or storage of biometric properties. For the solution to be complete, additional components are needed, notably a mechanism that encourages honest behavior and a sybil-resilient governance system.