Search is an ability foundational in many important tasks, and recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) struggle to perform search robustly. It is unknown whether this inability is due to a lack of data, insufficient model parameters, or fundamental limitations of the transformer architecture. In this work, we use the foundational graph connectivity problem as a testbed to generate effectively limitless high-coverage data to train small transformers and test whether they can learn to perform search. We find that, when given the right training distribution, the transformer is able to learn to search. We analyze the algorithm that the transformer has learned through a novel mechanistic interpretability technique that enables us to extract the computation graph from the trained model. We find that for each vertex in the input graph, transformers compute the set of vertices reachable from that vertex. Each layer then progressively expands these sets, allowing the model to search over a number of vertices exponential in the number of layers. However, we find that as the input graph size increases, the transformer has greater difficulty in learning the task. This difficulty is not resolved even as the number of parameters is increased, suggesting that increasing model scale will not lead to robust search abilities. We also find that performing search in-context (i.e., chain-of-thought) does not resolve this inability to learn to search on larger graphs.

Large language models (LLMs) can solve arithmetic word problems with high accuracy, but little is known about how well they generalize to problems that are more complex than the ones on which they have been trained. Empirical investigations of such questions are impeded by two major flaws of current evaluations: (i) much of the evaluation data is contaminated, in the sense that it has already been seen during training, and (ii) benchmark datasets do not capture how problem proofs may be arbitrarily complex in various ways. As a step towards addressing these issues, we present a framework for evaluating LLMs on problems with arbitrarily complex arithmetic proofs, called MathGAP. MathGAP generates problems that follow fixed proof specifications -- along with chain-of-thought reasoning annotations -- enabling systematic studies on generalization with respect to arithmetic proof complexity. We apply MathGAP to analyze how in-context learning interacts with generalization to problems that have more complex proofs. We find that among the models tested, most show a significant decrease in performance as proofs get deeper and wider. This effect is more pronounced in complex, nonlinear proof structures, which are challenging even for GPT-4o. Surprisingly, providing in-context examples from the same distribution as the test set is not always beneficial for performance. In particular, zero-shot prompting as well as demonstrating a diverse range of examples that are less complex than the test data sometimes yield similar or higher accuracies.

Mechanistic interpretability (MI) is an emerging sub-field of interpretability that seeks to understand a neural network model by reverse-engineering its internal computations. Recently, MI has garnered significant attention for interpreting transformer-based language models (LMs), resulting in many novel insights yet introducing new challenges. However, there has not been work that comprehensively reviews these insights and challenges, particularly as a guide for newcomers to this field. To fill this gap, we present a comprehensive survey outlining fundamental objects of study in MI, techniques that have been used for its investigation, approaches for evaluating MI results, and significant findings and applications stemming from the use of MI to understand LMs. In particular, we present a roadmap for beginners to navigate the field and leverage MI for their benefit. Finally, we also identify current gaps in the field and discuss potential future directions.

Recent work shows that causal facts can be effectively extracted from LLMs through prompting, facilitating the creation of causal graphs for causal inference tasks. However, it is unclear if this success is limited to explicitly-mentioned causal facts in the pretraining data which the model can memorize. Thus, this work investigates: Can LLMs infer causal relations from other relational data in text? To disentangle the role of memorized causal facts vs inferred causal relations, we finetune LLMs on synthetic data containing temporal, spatial and counterfactual relations, and measure whether the LLM can then infer causal relations. We find that: (a) LLMs are susceptible to inferring causal relations from the order of two entity mentions in text (e.g. X mentioned before Y implies X causes Y); (b) if the order is randomized, LLMs still suffer from the post hoc fallacy, i.e. X occurs before Y (temporal relation) implies X causes Y. We also find that while LLMs can correctly deduce the absence of causal relations from temporal and spatial relations, they have difficulty inferring causal relations from counterfactuals, questioning their understanding of causality.

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are organized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose $200+$ concrete research questions.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. While unintuitive from a classic view of LMs, recent work has shown that the truth value of a statement can be elicited from the model's representations. This paper presents an explanation for why LMs appear to know the truth despite not being trained with truth labels. We hypothesize that the pretraining data is generated by groups of (un)truthful agents whose outputs share common features, and they form a (un)truthful persona. By training on this data, LMs can infer and represent the persona in its activation space. This allows the model to separate truth from falsehoods and controls the truthfulness of its generation. We show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that structures of the pretraining data are crucial for the model to infer the truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness. Large language models (LLMs) are pretrained on increasing amounts of data from the internet (Brown et al., 2020; Chowdhery et al., 2022)--a noisy corpus which contains both factual and incorrect statements about the world. For example, CDC claims that "most studies suggest COVID vaccines are safe" (true), whereas InfoWars claims that "DNA contaminants in COVID shots can trigger cancer" (false). Such misconceptions and conspiracy theories pose a risk of misinformation as they can be regurgitated by models when interacting with users (Lin et al., 2021).

There is increasing interest in employing large language models (LLMs) as cognitive models. For such purposes, it is central to understand which cognitive properties are well-modeled by LLMs, and which are not. In this work, we study the biases of LLMs in relation to those known in children when solving arithmetic word problems. Surveying the learning science literature, we posit that the problem-solving process can be split into three distinct steps: text comprehension, solution planning and solution execution. We construct tests for each one in order to understand which parts of this process can be faithfully modeled by current state-of-the-art LLMs. We generate a novel set of word problems for each of these tests, using a neuro-symbolic method that enables fine-grained control over the problem features. We find evidence that LLMs, with and without instruction-tuning, exhibit human-like biases in both the text-comprehension and the solution-planning steps of the solving process, but not during the final step which relies on the problem's arithmetic expressions (solution execution).

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to compositional proofs. However, they have difficulty generalizing to longer proofs, and they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

Recent advances in prompt engineering enable large language models (LLMs) to solve multi-hop logical reasoning problems with impressive accuracy. However, there is little existing work investigating the robustness of LLMs with few-shot prompting techniques. Therefore, we introduce a systematic approach to test the robustness of LLMs in multi-hop reasoning tasks via domain-agnostic perturbations. We include perturbations at multiple levels of abstractions (e.g. lexical perturbations such as typos, and semantic perturbations such as the inclusion of intermediate reasoning steps in the questions) to conduct behavioral analysis on the LLMs. Throughout our experiments, we find that models are more sensitive to certain perturbations such as replacing words with their synonyms. We also demonstrate that increasing the proportion of perturbed exemplars in the prompts improves the robustness of few-shot prompting methods.

Applying existing question answering (QA) systems to specialized domains like law and finance presents challenges that necessitate domain expertise. Although large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive language comprehension and in-context learning capabilities, their inability to handle very long inputs/contexts is well known. Tasks specific to these domains need significant background knowledge, leading to contexts that can often exceed the maximum length that existing LLMs can process. This study explores leveraging the semi-structured nature of legal and financial data to efficiently retrieve relevant context, enabling the use of LLMs for domain-specialized QA. The resulting system outperforms contemporary models and also provides useful explanations for the answers, encouraging the integration of LLMs into legal and financial NLP systems for future research.