Robertson, Paul
Qualitative Reasoning about Cyber Intrusions
Robertson, Paul (DOLL Inc.) | Laddaga, Robert (Vanderbilt University) | Goldman, Robert (SIFT) | Burstein, Mark (SIFT) | Cerys, Daniel (DOLL Inc.)
In this paper we discuss work performed in an ambitious DARPA funded cyber security effort. The broad approach taken by the project was for the network to be self-aware and to self-adapt in order to dodge attacks. In critical systems, it is not always the best or practical thing, to shut down the network under attack. The paper describes the qualitative trust modeling and diagnosis system that maintains a model of trust for networked resources using a combination of two basic ideas: Conditional trust (based on conditional preference (CP-Nets) and the principle of maximum entropy (PME)). We describe Monte-Carlo simulations of using adaptive security based on our trust model. The results of the simulations show the trade-off, under ideal conditions, between additional resource provisioning and attack mitigation.
Active Perception for Cyber Intrusion Detection and Defense
Benton, J. (Smart Information Flow Technologies, LLC) | Goldman, Robert P. (Smart Information Flow Technologies, LLC) | Burstein, Mark (Smart information Flow Technologies, LLC) | Mueller, Joseph (Smart information Flow Technologies, LLC) | Robertson, Paul (DOLL Labs) | Cerys, Dan (DOLL Labs) | Hoffman, Andreas (DOLL Labs) | Bobrow, Rusty (Bobrow Computational Intelligence, LLC)
Most modern network-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) passively monitor network traffic to identify possible attacks through known vectors. Though useful, this approach has widely known high false positive rates, often causing administrators to suffer from a "cry wolf effect," where they ignore all warnings because so many have been false. In this paper, we focus on a method to reduce this effect using an idea borrowed from computer vision and neuroscience called active perception. Our approach is informed by theoretical ideas from decision theory and recent research results in neuroscience. The active perception agent allocates computational and sensing resources to (approximately) optimize its Value of Information. To do this, it draws on models to direct sensors towards phenomena of greatest interest to inform decisions about cyber defense actions. By identifying critical network assets, the organization's mission measures self-interest (and value of information). This model enables the system to follow leads from inexpensive, inaccurate alerts with targeted use of expensive, accurate sensors. This allows the deployment of sensors to build structured interpretations of situations. From these, an organization can meet mission-centered decision-making requirements with calibrated responses proportional to the likelihood of true detection and degree of threat.