Benchmarks are important tools for tracking the rapid advancements in large language model (LLM) capabilities. However, benchmarks are not keeping pace in difficulty: LLMs now achieve over 90\% accuracy on popular benchmarks like MMLU, limiting informed measurement of state-of-the-art LLM capabilities. In response, we introduce Humanity's Last Exam (HLE), a multi-modal benchmark at the frontier of human knowledge, designed to be the final closed-ended academic benchmark of its kind with broad subject coverage. HLE consists of 3,000 questions across dozens of subjects, including mathematics, humanities, and the natural sciences. HLE is developed globally by subject-matter experts and consists of multiple-choice and short-answer questions suitable for automated grading. Each question has a known solution that is unambiguous and easily verifiable, but cannot be quickly answered via internet retrieval. State-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate low accuracy and calibration on HLE, highlighting a significant gap between current LLM capabilities and the expert human frontier on closed-ended academic questions. To inform research and policymaking upon a clear understanding of model capabilities, we publicly release HLE at https://lastexam.ai.

This paper provides a theoretical framework that validates and explains the results in the work with Bei Zhou experimentally finding that AlphaZero-style reinforcement learning algorithms struggle to learn optimal play in NIM, a canonical impartial game proposed as an AI challenge by Harvey Friedman in 2017. Our analysis resolves a controversy around these experimental results, which revealed unexpected difficulties in learning NIM despite its mathematical simplicity compared to games like chess and Go. Our key contributions are as follows: We prove that by incorporating recent game history, these limited AlphaZero models can, in principle, achieve optimal play in NIM. We introduce a novel search strategy where roll-outs preserve game-theoretic values during move selection, guided by a specialised policy network. We provide constructive proofs showing that our approach enables optimal play within the \(\text{AC}^0\) complexity class despite the theoretical limitations of these networks. This research demonstrates how constrained neural networks when properly designed, can achieve sophisticated decision-making even in domains where their basic computational capabilities appear insufficient.

While AlphaZero-style reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms excel in various board games, in this paper we show that they face challenges on impartial games where players share pieces. We present a concrete example of a game - namely the children's game of Nim - and other impartial games that seem to be a stumbling block for AlphaZero-style and similar self-play reinforcement learning algorithms. Our work is built on the challenges posed by the intricacies of data distribution on the ability of neural networks to learn parity functions, exacerbated by the noisy labels issue. Our findings are consistent with recent studies showing that AlphaZero-style algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and adversarial perturbations, showing the difficulty of learning to master the games in all legal states. We show that Nim can be learned on small boards, but the learning progress of AlphaZero-style algorithms dramatically slows down when the board size increases. Intuitively, the difference between impartial games like Nim and partisan games like Chess and Go can be explained by the fact that if a small part of the board is covered for impartial games it is typically not possible to predict whether the position is won or lost as there is often zero correlation between the visible part of a partly blanked-out position and its correct evaluation. This situation starkly contrasts partisan games where a partly blanked-out board position typically provides abundant or at least non-trifle information about the value of the fully uncovered position.