Poursabzi-Sangdeh, Forough
Introducing v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark from MLCommons
Vidgen, Bertie, Agrawal, Adarsh, Ahmed, Ahmed M., Akinwande, Victor, Al-Nuaimi, Namir, Alfaraj, Najla, Alhajjar, Elie, Aroyo, Lora, Bavalatti, Trupti, Bartolo, Max, Blili-Hamelin, Borhane, Bollacker, Kurt, Bomassani, Rishi, Boston, Marisa Ferrara, Campos, Siméon, Chakra, Kal, Chen, Canyu, Coleman, Cody, Coudert, Zacharie Delpierre, Derczynski, Leon, Dutta, Debojyoti, Eisenberg, Ian, Ezick, James, Frase, Heather, Fuller, Brian, Gandikota, Ram, Gangavarapu, Agasthya, Gangavarapu, Ananya, Gealy, James, Ghosh, Rajat, Goel, James, Gohar, Usman, Goswami, Sujata, Hale, Scott A., Hutiri, Wiebke, Imperial, Joseph Marvin, Jandial, Surgan, Judd, Nick, Juefei-Xu, Felix, Khomh, Foutse, Kailkhura, Bhavya, Kirk, Hannah Rose, Klyman, Kevin, Knotz, Chris, Kuchnik, Michael, Kumar, Shachi H., Kumar, Srijan, Lengerich, Chris, Li, Bo, Liao, Zeyi, Long, Eileen Peters, Lu, Victor, Luger, Sarah, Mai, Yifan, Mammen, Priyanka Mary, Manyeki, Kelvin, McGregor, Sean, Mehta, Virendra, Mohammed, Shafee, Moss, Emanuel, Nachman, Lama, Naganna, Dinesh Jinenhally, Nikanjam, Amin, Nushi, Besmira, Oala, Luis, Orr, Iftach, Parrish, Alicia, Patlak, Cigdem, Pietri, William, Poursabzi-Sangdeh, Forough, Presani, Eleonora, Puletti, Fabrizio, Röttger, Paul, Sahay, Saurav, Santos, Tim, Scherrer, Nino, Sebag, Alice Schoenauer, Schramowski, Patrick, Shahbazi, Abolfazl, Sharma, Vin, Shen, Xudong, Sistla, Vamsi, Tang, Leonard, Testuggine, Davide, Thangarasa, Vithursan, Watkins, Elizabeth Anne, Weiss, Rebecca, Welty, Chris, Wilbers, Tyler, Williams, Adina, Wu, Carole-Jean, Yadav, Poonam, Yang, Xianjun, Zeng, Yi, Zhang, Wenhui, Zhdanov, Fedor, Zhu, Jiacheng, Liang, Percy, Mattson, Peter, Vanschoren, Joaquin
This paper introduces v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark, which has been created by the MLCommons AI Safety Working Group. The AI Safety Benchmark has been designed to assess the safety risks of AI systems that use chat-tuned language models. We introduce a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which for v0.5 covers only a single use case (an adult chatting to a general-purpose assistant in English), and a limited set of personas (i.e., typical users, malicious users, and vulnerable users). We created a new taxonomy of 13 hazard categories, of which 7 have tests in the v0.5 benchmark. We plan to release version 1.0 of the AI Safety Benchmark by the end of 2024. The v1.0 benchmark will provide meaningful insights into the safety of AI systems. However, the v0.5 benchmark should not be used to assess the safety of AI systems. We have sought to fully document the limitations, flaws, and challenges of v0.5. This release of v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark includes (1) a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which comprises use cases, types of systems under test (SUTs), language and context, personas, tests, and test items; (2) a taxonomy of 13 hazard categories with definitions and subcategories; (3) tests for seven of the hazard categories, each comprising a unique set of test items, i.e., prompts. There are 43,090 test items in total, which we created with templates; (4) a grading system for AI systems against the benchmark; (5) an openly available platform, and downloadable tool, called ModelBench that can be used to evaluate the safety of AI systems on the benchmark; (6) an example evaluation report which benchmarks the performance of over a dozen openly available chat-tuned language models; (7) a test specification for the benchmark.
Aligning Offline Metrics and Human Judgments of Value for Code Generation Models
Dibia, Victor, Fourney, Adam, Bansal, Gagan, Poursabzi-Sangdeh, Forough, Liu, Han, Amershi, Saleema
Large language models have demonstrated great potential to assist programmers in generating code. For such human-AI pair programming scenarios, we empirically demonstrate that while generated code is most often evaluated in terms of their functional correctness (i.e., whether generations pass available unit tests), correctness does not fully capture (e.g., may underestimate) the productivity gains these models may provide. Through a user study with N = 49 experienced programmers, we show that while correctness captures high-value generations, programmers still rate code that fails unit tests as valuable if it reduces the overall effort needed to complete a coding task. Finally, we propose a hybrid metric that combines functional correctness and syntactic similarity and show that it achieves a 14% stronger correlation with value and can therefore better represent real-world gains when evaluating and comparing models.
Manipulating and Measuring Model Interpretability
Poursabzi-Sangdeh, Forough, Goldstein, Daniel G., Hofman, Jake M., Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman, Wallach, Hanna
Despite a growing body of research focused on creating interpretable machine learning methods, there have been few empirical studies verifying whether interpretable methods achieve their intended effects on end users. We present a framework for assessing the effects of model interpretability on users via pre-registered experiments in which participants are shown functionally identical models that vary in factors thought to influence interpretability. Using this framework, we ran a sequence of large-scale randomized experiments, varying two putative drivers of interpretability: the number of features and the model transparency (clear or black-box). We measured how these factors impact trust in model predictions, the ability to simulate a model, and the ability to detect a model's mistakes. We found that participants who were shown a clear model with a small number of features were better able to simulate the model's predictions. However, we found no difference in multiple measures of trust and found that clear models did not improve the ability to correct mistakes. These findings suggest that interpretability research could benefit from more emphasis on empirically verifying that interpretable models achieve all their intended effects.