Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

A multi-layer deep Gaussian process (DGP) model is a hierarchical composition of GP models with a greater expressive power. Exact DGP inference is intractable, which has motivated the recent development of deterministic and stochastic approximation methods. Unfortunately, the deterministic approximation methods yield a biased posterior belief while the stochastic one is computationally costly. This paper presents an implicit posterior variational inference (IPVI) framework for DGPs that can ideally recover an unbiased posterior belief and still preserve time efficiency. Inspired by generative adversarial networks, our IPVI framework achieves this by casting the DGP inference problem as a two-player game in which a Nash equilibrium, interestingly, coincides with an unbiased posterior belief. This consequently inspires us to devise a best-response dynamics algorithm to search for a Nash equilibrium (i.e., an unbiased posterior belief). Empirical evaluation shows that IPVI outperforms the state-of-the-art approximation methods for DGPs.

We study a variant of online linear optimization where the player receives a hint about the loss function at the beginning of each round. The hint is given in the form of a vector that is weakly correlated with the loss vector on that round. We show that the player can benefit from such a hint if the set of feasible actions is sufficiently round. Specifically, if the set is strongly convex, the hint can be used to guarantee a regret of O(log(T)), and if the set is q-uniformly convex for q (2, 3), the hint can be used to guarantee a regret of o( T). In contrast, we establish Ω( T) lower bounds on regret when the set of feasible actions is a polyhedron.

We consider the problem of repeated bidding in online advertising auctions when some side information (e.g.

We study a variant of online linear optimization where the player receives a hint about the loss function at the beginning of each round. The hint is given in the form of a vector that is weakly correlated with the loss vector on that round. We show that the player can benefit from such a hint if the set of feasible actions is sufficiently round. Specifically, if the set is strongly convex, the hint can be used to guarantee a regret of O(log(T)), and if the set is q-uniformly convex for q (2, 3), the hint can be used to guarantee a regret of o( T). In contrast, we establish Ω( T) lower bounds on regret when the set of feasible actions is a polyhedron.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/