We study the parameterized complexity of the optimal defense and optimal attack problems in voting. In both the problems, the input is a set of voter groups (every voter group is a set of votes) and two integers $k_a$ and $k_d$ corresponding to respectively the number of voter groups the attacker can attack and the number of voter groups the defender can defend. A voter group gets removed from the election if it is attacked but not defended. In the optimal defense problem, we want to know if it is possible for the defender to commit to a strategy of defending at most $k_d$ voter groups such that, no matter which $k_a$ voter groups the attacker attacks, the outcome of the election does not change. In the optimal attack problem, we want to know if it is possible for the attacker to commit to a strategy of attacking $k_a$ voter groups such that, no matter which $k_d$ voter groups the defender defends, the outcome of the election is always different from the original (without any attack) one.

Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. However, bribery with money is often illegal in elections. Motivated by this, we introduce the notion of frugal bribery and formulate two new pertinent computational problems which we call Frugal-bribery and Frugal- $bribery to capture bribery without money in elections. In the proposed model, the briber is frugal in nature and this is captured by her inability to bribe votes of a certain kind, namely, non-vulnerable votes. In the Frugal-bribery problem, the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only vulnerable votes. In the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem, the vulnerable votes have prices and the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only vulnerable votes, subject to a budget constraint of the briber. We further formulate two natural variants of the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem namely Uniform-frugal-{dollar}bribery and Nonuniform-frugal-{dollar}bribery where the prices of the vulnerable votes are, respectively, all the same or different. We study the computational complexity of the above problems for unweighted and weighted elections for several commonly used voting rules. We observe that, even if we have only a small number of candidates, the problems are intractable for all voting rules studied here for weighted elections, with the sole exception of the Frugal-bribery problem for the plurality voting rule. In contrast, we have polynomial time algorithms for the Frugal-bribery problem for plurality, veto, k-approval, k-veto, and plurality with runoff voting rules for unweighted elections. However, the Frugal-{dollar}bribery problem is intractable for all the voting rules studied here barring the plurality and the veto voting rules for unweighted elections.

In this paper we extend the classical notion of strong and weak backdoor sets for SAT and CSP by allowing that different instantiations of the backdoor variables result in instances that belong to different base classes; the union of the base classes forms a heterogeneous base class. Backdoor sets to heterogeneous base classes can be much smaller than backdoor sets to homogeneous ones, hence they are much more desirable but possibly harder to find. We draw a detailed complexity landscape for the problem of detecting strong and weak backdoor sets into heterogeneous base classes for SAT and CSP.

Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. We introduce and study two important special cases of the bribery problem, namely, FRUGAL-BRIBERY and FRUGAL-$BRIBERY where the briber is frugal in nature. By this, we mean that the briber is only able to influence voters who benefit from the suggestion of the briber. More formally, a voter is vulnerable if the outcome of the election improves according to her own preference when she accepts the suggestion of the briber. In the FRUGAL-BRIBERY problem, the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only the vulnerable votes. In the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problem, the vulnerable votes have prices and the goal is to make a certain candidate win the election by changing only the vulnerable votes, subject to a budget constraint. We show that both the FRUGAL-BRIBERY and the FRUGAL-$BRIBERY problems are intractable for many commonly used voting rules for weighted as well as unweighted elections. These intractability results demonstrate that bribery is a hard computational problem, in the sense that several special cases of this problem continue to be computationally intractable. This strengthens the view that bribery, although a possible attack on an election in principle, may be infeasible in practice.

Policy Iteration (PI) (Howard 1960) is a classical method for computing an optimal policy for a finite Markov Decision Problem (MDP). The method is conceptually simple: starting from some initial policy, “policy improvement” is repeatedly performed to obtain progressively dominating policies, until eventually, an optimal policy is reached. Being remarkably efficient in practice, PI is often favoured over alternative approaches such as Value Iteration and Linear Programming. Unfortunately, even after several decades of study, theoretical bounds on the complexity of PI remain unsatisfactory. For an MDP with n states and k actions, Mansour and Singh (1999) bound the number of iterations taken by Howard’s PI, the canonical variant of the method, by O ( k n / n ). This bound merely improves upon the trivial bound of kn by a linear factor. However, a randomised variant of PI introduced by Mansour and Singh (1999) does yield an exponential improvement, with its expected number of iterations bounded by O(((1 + 2/log 2 ( k )) k / 2) n ).With the objective of furnishing improved upper bounds for PI, we introduce two randomised procedures in this paper. Our first contribution is a routine to find a good initial policy for PI. After evaluating a number of randomly generated policies, this procedure applies a novel criterion to pick one to initialise PI. When PI is subsequently applied, we show that the expected number of policy evaluations—including both the initialisation and the improvement stages—remains bounded in expectation by O ( k n /2 ). The key construction employed in this routine is a total order on the set of policies. Our second contribution is a randomised action-switching rule for PI, which admits a bound of O((2 + ln( k – 1)) n ) on the expected number of iterations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the tightest complexity bound known for PI when k >= 3.  

The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators. A more realistic scenario is an incomplete information setting where the manipulators do not know the exact votes of the non- manipulators but may have some partial knowledge of the votes. In this paper, we study a setting where the manipulators know a partial order for each voter that is consistent with the vote of that voter. In this setting, we introduce and study two natural computational problems - (1) Weak Manipulation (WM) problem where the manipulators wish to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in at least one extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators; (2) Strong Manipulation (SM) problem where the manipulators wish to vote in a way that makes their preferred candidate win in all possible extensions of the partial votes of the non-manipulators. We study the computational complexity of the WM and the SM problems for commonly used voting rules such as plurality, veto, k-approval, k-veto, maximin, Copeland, and Bucklin. Our key finding is that, barring a few exceptions, manipulation becomes a significantly harder problem in the setting of incomplete votes.

Backdoor sets represent clever reasoning shortcuts through the search space for SAT and CSP. By instantiating the backdoor variables one reduces the given instance to several easy instances that belong to a tractable class.The overall time needed to solve the instance is exponential in the size of the backdoor set, hence it is a challenging problem to find a small backdoor set if one exists; over the last years this problem has been subject of intensive research. In this paper we extend the classical notion of a strong backdoor set by allowing that different instantiations of the backdoor variables result in instances that belong to different base classes; the union of the base classes forms a heterogeneous base class. Backdoor sets to heterogeneous base classes can be much smaller than backdoor sets to homogeneous ones, hence they are much more desirable but possibly harder to find. We draw a detailed complexity landscape for the problem of detecting strong backdoor sets into heterogeneous base classes for SAT and CSP. We provide algorithms that establish fixed-parameter tractability under natural parameterizations, and we contrast the tractability results with hardness results that pinpoint the theoretical limits. Our results apply to the current state-of-the-art of tractable classes of CSP and SAT that are definable by restricting the constraint language.