Meding, Kristof
Machine Learners Should Acknowledge the Legal Implications of Large Language Models as Personal Data
Nolte, Henrik, Finck, Michèle, Meding, Kristof
Does GPT know you? The answer depends on your level of public recognition; however, if your information was available on a website, the answer is probably yes. All Large Language Models (LLMs) memorize training data to some extent. If an LLM training corpus includes personal data, it also memorizes personal data. Developing an LLM typically involves processing personal data, which falls directly within the scope of data protection laws. If a person is identified or identifiable, the implications are far-reaching: the AI system is subject to EU General Data Protection Regulation requirements even after the training phase is concluded. To back our arguments: (1.) We reiterate that LLMs output training data at inference time, be it verbatim or in generalized form. (2.) We show that some LLMs can thus be considered personal data on their own. This triggers a cascade of data protection implications such as data subject rights, including rights to access, rectification, or erasure. These rights extend to the information embedded with-in the AI model. (3.) This paper argues that machine learning researchers must acknowledge the legal implications of LLMs as personal data throughout the full ML development lifecycle, from data collection and curation to model provision on, e.g., GitHub or Hugging Face. (4.) We propose different ways for the ML research community to deal with these legal implications. Our paper serves as a starting point for improving the alignment between data protection law and the technical capabilities of LLMs. Our findings underscore the need for more interaction between the legal domain and the ML community.
It's complicated. The relationship of algorithmic fairness and non-discrimination regulations in the EU AI Act
Meding, Kristof
What constitutes a fair decision? This question is not only difficult for humans but becomes more challenging when Artificial Intelligence (AI) models are used. In light of discriminatory algorithmic behaviors, the EU has recently passed the AI Act, which mandates specific rules for AI models, incorporating both traditional legal non-discrimination regulations and machine learning based algorithmic fairness concepts. This paper aims to bridge these two different concepts in the AI Act through: First a high-level introduction of both concepts targeting legal and computer science-oriented scholars, and second an in-depth analysis of the AI Act's relationship between legal non-discrimination regulations and algorithmic fairness. Our analysis reveals three key findings: (1.), most non-discrimination regulations target only high-risk AI systems. (2.), the regulation of high-risk systems encompasses both data input requirements and output monitoring, though these regulations are often inconsistent and raise questions of computational feasibility. (3.) Regulations for General Purpose AI Models, such as Large Language Models that are not simultaneously classified as high-risk systems, currently lack specificity compared to other regulations. Based on these findings, we recommend developing more specific auditing and testing methodologies for AI systems. This paper aims to serve as a foundation for future interdisciplinary collaboration between legal scholars and computer science-oriented machine learning researchers studying discrimination in AI systems.
What constitutes a Deep Fake? The blurry line between legitimate processing and manipulation under the EU AI Act
Meding, Kristof, Sorge, Christoph
When does a digital image resemble reality? The relevance of this question increases as the generation of synthetic images -- so called deep fakes -- becomes increasingly popular. Deep fakes have gained much attention for a number of reasons -- among others, due to their potential to disrupt the political climate. In order to mitigate these threats, the EU AI Act implements specific transparency regulations for generating synthetic content or manipulating existing content. However, the distinction between real and synthetic images is -- even from a computer vision perspective -- far from trivial. We argue that the current definition of deep fakes in the AI act and the corresponding obligations are not sufficiently specified to tackle the challenges posed by deep fakes. By analyzing the life cycle of a digital photo from the camera sensor to the digital editing features, we find that: (1.) Deep fakes are ill-defined in the EU AI Act. The definition leaves too much scope for what a deep fake is. (2.) It is unclear how editing functions like Google's ``best take'' feature can be considered as an exception to transparency obligations. (3.) The exception for substantially edited images raises questions about what constitutes substantial editing of content and whether or not this editing must be perceptible by a natural person. Our results demonstrate that complying with the current AI Act transparency obligations is difficult for providers and deployers. As a consequence of the unclear provisions, there is a risk that exceptions may be either too broad or too limited. We intend our analysis to foster the discussion on what constitutes a deep fake and to raise awareness about the pitfalls in the current AI Act transparency obligations.
Fairness Hacking: The Malicious Practice of Shrouding Unfairness in Algorithms
Meding, Kristof, Hagendorff, Thilo
Fairness in machine learning (ML) is an ever-growing field of research due to the manifold potential for harm from algorithmic discrimination. To prevent such harm, a large body of literature develops new approaches to quantify fairness. Here, we investigate how one can divert the quantification of fairness by describing a practice we call "fairness hacking" for the purpose of shrouding unfairness in algorithms. This impacts end-users who rely on learning algorithms, as well as the broader community interested in fair AI practices. We introduce two different categories of fairness hacking in reference to the established concept of p-hacking. The first category, intra-metric fairness hacking, describes the misuse of a particular metric by adding or removing sensitive attributes from the analysis. In this context, countermeasures that have been developed to prevent or reduce p-hacking can be applied to similarly prevent or reduce fairness hacking. The second category of fairness hacking is inter-metric fairness hacking. Inter-metric fairness hacking is the search for a specific fair metric with given attributes. We argue that countermeasures to prevent or reduce inter-metric fairness hacking are still in their infancy. Finally, we demonstrate both types of fairness hacking using real datasets. Our paper intends to serve as a guidance for discussions within the fair ML community to prevent or reduce the misuse of fairness metrics, and thus reduce overall harm from ML applications.