Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has focused on producing responses that meet human expectations and align with shared values - a process coined alignment. However, aligning LLMs remains challenging due to the inherent disconnect between the complexity of human values and the narrow nature of the technological approaches designed to address them. Current alignment methods often lead to misspecified objectives, reflecting the broader issue of incomplete contracts, the impracticality of specifying a contract between a model developer, and the model that accounts for every scenario in LLM alignment. In this paper, we argue that improving LLM alignment requires incorporating insights from societal alignment frameworks, including social, economic, and contractual alignment, and discuss potential solutions drawn from these domains. Given the role of uncertainty within societal alignment frameworks, we then investigate how it manifests in LLM alignment. We end our discussion by offering an alternative view on LLM alignment, framing the underspecified nature of its objectives as an opportunity rather than perfect their specification. Beyond technical improvements in LLM alignment, we discuss the need for participatory alignment interface designs.

When prompted to think step-by-step, language models (LMs) produce a chain of thought (CoT), a sequence of reasoning steps that the model supposedly used to produce its prediction. However, despite much work on CoT prompting, it is unclear if CoT reasoning is faithful to the models' parameteric beliefs. We introduce a framework for measuring parametric faithfulness of generated reasoning, and propose Faithfulness by Unlearning Reasoning steps (FUR), an instance of this framework. FUR erases information contained in reasoning steps from model parameters. We perform experiments unlearning CoTs of four LMs prompted on four multi-choice question answering (MCQA) datasets. Our experiments show that FUR is frequently able to change the underlying models' prediction by unlearning key steps, indicating when a CoT is parametrically faithful. Further analysis shows that CoTs generated by models post-unlearning support different answers, hinting at a deeper effect of unlearning. Importantly, CoT steps identified as important by FUR do not align well with human notions of plausbility, emphasizing the need for specialized alignment

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

Understanding the extent to which Chain-of-Thought (CoT) generations align with a large language model's (LLM) internal computations is critical for deciding whether to trust an LLM's output. As a proxy for CoT faithfulness, Lanham et al. (2023) propose a metric that measures a model's dependence on its CoT for producing an answer. Within a single family of proprietary models, they find that LLMs exhibit a scaling-then-inverse-scaling relationship between model size and their measure of faithfulness, and that a 13 billion parameter model exhibits increased faithfulness compared to models ranging from 810 million to 175 billion parameters in size. We evaluate whether these results generalize as a property of all LLMs. We replicate the experimental setup in their section focused on scaling experiments with three different families of models and, under specific conditions, successfully reproduce the scaling trends for CoT faithfulness they report. However, after normalizing the metric to account for a model's bias toward certain answer choices, unfaithfulness drops significantly for smaller less-capable models. This normalized faithfulness metric is also strongly correlated ($R^2$=0.74) with accuracy, raising doubts about its validity for evaluating faithfulness.

Are the longstanding robustness issues in NLP resolved by today's larger and more performant models? To address this question, we conduct a thorough investigation using 19 models of different sizes spanning different architectural choices and pretraining objectives. We conduct evaluations using (a) OOD and challenge test sets, (b) CheckLists, (c) contrast sets, and (d) adversarial inputs. Our analysis reveals that not all OOD tests provide further insight into robustness. Evaluating with CheckLists and contrast sets shows significant gaps in model performance; merely scaling models does not make them sufficiently robust. Finally, we point out that current approaches for adversarial evaluations of models are themselves problematic: they can be easily thwarted, and in their current forms, do not represent a sufficiently deep probe of model robustness. We conclude that not only is the question of robustness in NLP as yet unresolved, but even some of the approaches to measure robustness need to be reassessed.

Large neural networks can now generate jokes, but do they really "understand" humor? We challenge AI models with three tasks derived from the New Yorker Cartoon Caption Contest: matching a joke to a cartoon, identifying a winning caption, and explaining why a winning caption is funny. These tasks encapsulate progressively more sophisticated aspects of "understanding" a cartoon; key elements are the complex, often surprising relationships between images and captions and the frequent inclusion of indirect and playful allusions to human experience and culture. We investigate both multimodal and language-only models: the former are challenged with the cartoon images directly, while the latter are given multifaceted descriptions of the visual scene to simulate human-level visual understanding. We find that both types of models struggle at all three tasks. For example, our best multimodal models fall 30 accuracy points behind human performance on the matching task, and, even when provided ground-truth visual scene descriptors, human-authored explanations are preferred head-to-head over the best machine-authored ones (few-shot GPT-4) in more than 2/3 of cases. We release models, code, leaderboard, and corpus, which includes newly-gathered annotations describing the image's locations/entities, what's unusual in the scene, and an explanation of the joke.

The full power of human language-based communication cannot be realized without negation. All human languages have some form of negation. Despite this, negation remains a challenging phenomenon for current natural language understanding systems. To facilitate the future development of models that can process negation effectively, we present CONDAQA, the first English reading comprehension dataset which requires reasoning about the implications of negated statements in paragraphs. We collect paragraphs with diverse negation cues, then have crowdworkers ask questions about the implications of the negated statement in the passage. We also have workers make three kinds of edits to the passage -- paraphrasing the negated statement, changing the scope of the negation, and reversing the negation -- resulting in clusters of question-answer pairs that are difficult for models to answer with spurious shortcuts. CONDAQA features 14,182 question-answer pairs with over 200 unique negation cues and is challenging for current state-of-the-art models. The best performing model on CONDAQA (UnifiedQA-v2-3b) achieves only 42% on our consistency metric, well below human performance which is 81%. We release our dataset, along with fully-finetuned, few-shot, and zero-shot evaluations, to facilitate the development of future NLP methods that work on negated language.

Explainable NLP (ExNLP) has increasingly focused on collecting human-annotated explanations. These explanations are used downstream in three ways: as data augmentation to improve performance on a predictive task, as a loss signal to train models to produce explanations for their predictions, and as a means to evaluate the quality of model-generated explanations. In this review, we identify three predominant classes of explanations (highlights, free-text, and structured), organize the literature on annotating each type, point to what has been learned to date, and give recommendations for collecting ExNLP datasets in the future.

Humans give contrastive explanations that explain why an observed event happened rather than some other counterfactual event (the contrast case). Despite the important role that contrastivity plays in how people generate and evaluate explanations, this property is largely missing from current methods for explaining NLP models. We present Minimal Contrastive Editing (MiCE), a method for generating contrastive explanations of model predictions in the form of edits to inputs that change model outputs to the contrast case. Our experiments across three tasks -- binary sentiment classification, topic classification, and multiple-choice question answering -- show that MiCE is able to produce edits that are not only contrastive, but also minimal and fluent, consistent with human contrastive edits. We demonstrate how MiCE edits can be used for two use cases in NLP system development -- uncovering dataset artifacts and debugging incorrect model predictions -- and thereby illustrate that generating contrastive explanations is a promising research direction for model interpretability.

Trust is a central component of the interaction between people and AI, in that 'incorrect' levels of trust may cause misuse, abuse or disuse of the technology. But what, precisely, is the nature of trust in AI? What are the prerequisites and goals of the cognitive mechanism of trust, and how can we cause these prerequisites and goals, or assess whether they are being satisfied in a given interaction? This work aims to answer these questions. We discuss a model of trust inspired by, but not identical to, sociology's interpersonal trust (i.e., trust between people). This model rests on two key properties of the vulnerability of the user and the ability to anticipate the impact of the AI model's decisions. We incorporate a formalization of 'contractual trust', such that trust between a user and an AI is trust that some implicit or explicit contract will hold, and a formalization of 'trustworthiness' (which detaches from the notion of trustworthiness in sociology), and with it concepts of 'warranted' and 'unwarranted' trust. We then present the possible causes of warranted trust as intrinsic reasoning and extrinsic behavior, and discuss how to design trustworthy AI, how to evaluate whether trust has manifested, and whether it is warranted. Finally, we elucidate the connection between trust and XAI using our formalization.