In a graph bisection problem, we are given a graph $G$ with two equally-sized unlabeled communities, and the goal is to recover the vertices in these communities. A popular heuristic, known as spectral clustering, is to output an estimated community assignment based on the eigenvector corresponding to the second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian of $G$. Spectral algorithms can be shown to provably recover the cluster structure for graphs generated from certain probabilistic models, such as the Stochastic Block Model (SBM). However, spectral clustering is known to be non-robust to model mis-specification. Techniques based on semidefinite programming have been shown to be more robust, but they incur significant computational overheads. In this work, we study the robustness of spectral algorithms against semirandom adversaries. Informally, a semirandom adversary is allowed to ``helpfully'' change the specification of the model in a way that is consistent with the ground-truth solution. Our semirandom adversaries in particular are allowed to add edges inside clusters or increase the probability that an edge appears inside a cluster. Semirandom adversaries are a useful tool to determine the extent to which an algorithm has overfit to statistical assumptions on the input. On the positive side, we identify classes of semirandom adversaries under which spectral bisection using the _unnormalized_ Laplacian is strongly consistent, i.e., it exactly recovers the planted partitioning. On the negative side, we show that in these classes spectral bisection with the _normalized_ Laplacian outputs a partitioning that makes a classification mistake on a constant fraction of the vertices. Finally, we demonstrate numerical experiments that complement our theoretical findings.

We prove that the Minimum Description Length learning rule exhibits tempered overfitting. We obtain tempered agnostic finite sample learning guarantees and characterize the asymptotic behavior in the presence of random label noise.

A backdoor data poisoning attack is an adversarial attack wherein the attacker injects several watermarked, mislabeled training examples into a training set. The watermark does not impact the test-time performance of the model on typical data; however, the model reliably errs on watermarked examples. To gain a better foundational understanding of backdoor data poisoning attacks, we present a formal theoretical framework within which one can discuss backdoor data poisoning attacks for classification problems. We then use this to analyze important statistical and computational issues surrounding these attacks. On the statistical front, we identify a parameter we call the memorization capacity that captures the intrinsic vulnerability of a learning problem to a backdoor attack. This allows us to argue about the robustness of several natural learning problems to backdoor attacks. Our results favoring the attacker involve presenting explicit constructions of backdoor attacks, and our robustness results show that some natural problem settings cannot yield successful backdoor attacks. From a computational standpoint, we show that under certain assumptions, adversarial training can detect the presence of backdoors in a training set. We then show that under similar assumptions, two closely related problems we call backdoor filtering and robust generalization are nearly equivalent. This implies that it is both asymptotically necessary and sufficient to design algorithms that can identify watermarked examples in the training set in order to obtain a learning algorithm that both generalizes well to unseen data and is robust to backdoors.