Language models (LMs) tend to show human-like preferences on a number of syntactic phenomena, but the extent to which these are attributable to direct exposure to the phenomena or more general properties of language is unclear. We explore this with the English dative alternation (DO: "gave Y the X" vs. PO: "gave the X to Y"), using a controlled rearing paradigm wherein we iteratively train small LMs on systematically manipulated input. We focus on properties that affect the choice of alternant: length and animacy. Both properties are directly present in datives but also reflect more global tendencies for shorter elements to precede longer ones and animates to precede inanimates. First, by manipulating and ablating datives for these biases in the input, we show that direct evidence of length and animacy matters, but easy-first preferences persist even without such evidence. Then, using LMs trained on systematically perturbed datasets to manipulate global length effects (re-linearizing sentences globally while preserving dependency structure), we find that dative preferences can emerge from indirect evidence. We conclude that LMs' emergent syntactic preferences come from a mix of direct and indirect sources.

There has been recent interest in whether large language models (LLMs) can introspect about their own internal states. Such abilities would make LLMs more interpretable, and also validate the use of standard introspective methods in linguistics to evaluate grammatical knowledge in models (e.g., asking "Is this sentence grammatical?"). We systematically investigate emergent introspection across 21 open-source LLMs, in two domains where introspection is of theoretical interest: grammatical knowledge and word prediction. Crucially, in both domains, a model's internal linguistic knowledge can be theoretically grounded in direct measurements of string probability. We then evaluate whether models' responses to metalinguistic prompts faithfully reflect their internal knowledge. We propose a new measure of introspection: the degree to which a model's prompted responses predict its own string probabilities, beyond what would be predicted by another model with nearly identical internal knowledge. While both metalinguistic prompting and probability comparisons lead to high task accuracy, we do not find evidence that LLMs have privileged "self-access". Our findings complicate recent results suggesting that models can introspect, and add new evidence to the argument that prompted responses should not be conflated with models' linguistic generalizations.

Construction grammar posits that constructions (form-meaning pairings) are acquired through experience with language (the distributional learning hypothesis). But how much information about constructions does this distribution actually contain? Corpus-based analyses provide some answers, but text alone cannot answer counterfactual questions about what caused a particular word to occur. For that, we need computable models of the distribution over strings -- namely, pretrained language models (PLMs). Here we treat a RoBERTa model as a proxy for this distribution and hypothesize that constructions will be revealed within it as patterns of statistical affinity. We support this hypothesis experimentally: many constructions are robustly distinguished, including (i) hard cases where semantically distinct constructions are superficially similar, as well as (ii) schematic constructions, whose "slots" can be filled by abstract word classes. Despite this success, we also provide qualitative evidence that statistical affinity alone may be insufficient to identify all constructions from text. Thus, statistical affinity is likely an important, but partial, signal available to learners.

Linguistic evaluations of how well LMs generalize to produce or understand novel text often implicitly take for granted that natural languages are generated by symbolic rules. Grammaticality is thought to be determined by whether or not sentences obey such rules. Interpretation is believed to be compositionally generated by syntactic rules operating on meaningful words. Semantic parsing is intended to map sentences into formal logic. Failures of LMs to obey strict rules have been taken to reveal that LMs do not produce or understand language like humans. Here we suggest that LMs' failures to obey symbolic rules may be a feature rather than a bug, because natural languages are not based on rules. New utterances are produced and understood by a combination of flexible interrelated and context-dependent schemata or constructions. We encourage researchers to reimagine appropriate benchmarks and analyses that acknowledge the rich flexible generalizations that comprise natural languages.

It's 1968, and Norm and Claudette are having lunch. Norm is explaining his position that all human languages share deep underlying structure and has worked out careful theories showing how the surface forms of language can be derived from these underlying principles. Claudette, whose favorite movie is the recently released 2001: A Space Odyssey and who particularly loves the HAL character, wants to make machines that could talk with us in any human language. Claudette asks Norm whether Norm thinks his theories could be useful for building such a system. Norm says he is interested in human language and the human mind, found HAL creepy, and isn't sure why Claudette is so interested in building chatbots or what good would come of that. Nonetheless, they both agree that it seems likely that, if Norm's theories are right (and he sure thinks they are!), they could be used to work out the fundamental rules and operations underlying human language in general--and that should, in principle, prove useful for building Claudette's linguistic machines. Claudette is very open to this possibility: all she wants is a machine that talks and understands. She doesn't really care how it happens. Norm and Claudette have very different goals, but they enjoy their conversations and are optimistic that they can both help each other.

Math is constructed by people for people: just as natural language corpora reflect not just propositions but the communicative goals of language users, the math data that models are trained on reflects not just idealized mathematical entities but rich communicative intentions. While there are important advantages to treating math in a purely symbolic manner, we here hypothesize that there are complementary benefits to treating math as situated linguistic communication and that language models are well suited for this goal, in ways that are not fully appreciated. We illustrate these points with two case studies. First, we ran an experiment in which we found that language models interpret the equals sign in a humanlike way--generating systematically different word problems for the same underlying equation arranged in different ways. Second, we found that language models prefer proofs to be ordered in naturalistic ways, even though other orders would be logically equivalent. We advocate for AI systems that learn from and represent the communicative intentions latent in human-generated math. Mathematical propositions are first of all English sentences; not only English sentences, but each mathematical proposition has a resemblance to certain non-mathematical propositions.

The variations between in-group and out-group speech (intergroup bias) are subtle and could underlie many social phenomena like stereotype perpetuation and implicit bias. In this paper, we model the intergroup bias as a tagging task on English sports comments from forums dedicated to fandom for NFL teams. We curate a unique dataset of over 6 million game-time comments from opposing perspectives (the teams in the game), each comment grounded in a non-linguistic description of the events that precipitated these comments (live win probabilities for each team). Expert and crowd annotations justify modeling the bias through tagging of implicit and explicit referring expressions and reveal the rich, contextual understanding of language and the world required for this task. For large-scale analysis of intergroup variation, we use LLMs for automated tagging, and discover that some LLMs perform best when prompted with linguistic descriptions of the win probability at the time of the comment, rather than numerical probability. Further, large-scale tagging of comments using LLMs uncovers linear variations in the form of referent across win probabilities that distinguish in-group and out-group utterances. Code and data are available at https://github.com/venkatasg/intergroup-nfl .

English allows for both compounds (e.g., London-made) and phrasal paraphrases (e.g., made in London). While these constructions have roughly the same truth-conditional meaning, we hypothesize that the compound allows less freedom to express the nature of the semantic relationship between the participle and the pre-participle nominal. We thus predict that the pre-participle slot is more constrained than the equivalent position in the phrasal construction. We test this prediction in a large corpus by measuring the entropy of corresponding nominal slots, conditional on the participle used. That is, we compare the entropy of $\alpha$ in compound construction slots like $\alpha$-[V]ed to the entropy of $\alpha$ in phrasal constructions like [V]ed by $\alpha$ for a given verb V. As predicted, there is significantly lower entropy in the compound construction than in the phrasal construction. We consider how these predictions follow from more general grammatical properties and processing factors.

Language models learn rare syntactic phenomena, but it has been argued that they rely on rote memorization, as opposed to grammatical generalization. Training on a corpus of human-scale in size (100M words), we iteratively trained transformer language models on systematically manipulated corpora and then evaluated their learning of a particular rare grammatical phenomenon: the English Article+Adjective+Numeral+Noun (AANN) construction (``a beautiful five days''). We first compared how well this construction was learned on the default corpus relative to a counterfactual corpus in which the AANN sentences were removed. AANNs were still learned better than systematically perturbed variants of the construction. Using additional counterfactual corpora, we suggest that this learning occurs through generalization from related constructions (e.g., ``a few days''). An additional experiment showed that this learning is enhanced when there is more variability in the input. Taken together, our results provide an existence proof that models learn rare grammatical phenomena by generalization from less rare phenomena. Code available at https://github.com/kanishkamisra/aannalysis

Do Large Language Models (LLMs) make human-like linguistic generalizations? Dentella et al. (5) (DGL) prompt several LLMs ("Is the following sentence grammatically correct in English?") to elicit grammaticality judgments of 80 English sentences, concluding that LLMs demonstrate a "yes-response bias" and a "failure to distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences". We re-evaluate LLM performance using well-established practices and find that DGL's data in fact provide evidence for just how well LLMs capture human linguistic judgments. Children learn to produce well-formed sentences without necessarily being able to articulate the underlying grammatical rules, a distinction long noted in linguistics (e.g., 1; 6; 3). DGL blur this distinction: their task requires not just grammatical competence, but also knowing what "grammatically correct" means.