In online advertising, uncertainty calibration aims to adjust a ranking model's probability predictions to better approximate the true likelihood of an event, e.g., a click or a conversion. However, existing calibration approaches may lack the ability to effectively model complex nonlinear relations, consider context features, and achieve balanced performance across different data subsets. To tackle these challenges, we introduce a novel model called Monotonic Calibration Networks, featuring three key designs: a monotonic calibration function (MCF), an order-preserving regularizer, and a field-balance regularizer. The nonlinear MCF is capable of naturally modeling and universally approximating the intricate relations between uncalibrated predictions and the posterior probabilities, thus being much more expressive than existing methods. MCF can also integrate context features using a flexible model architecture, thereby achieving context awareness. The order-preserving and field-balance regularizers promote the monotonic relationship between adjacent bins and the balanced calibration performance on data subsets, respectively. Experimental results on both public and industrial datasets demonstrate the superior performance of our method in generating well-calibrated probability predictions.

Recent studies revealed that deep neural networks (DNNs) are exposed to backdoor threats when training with third-party resources (such as training samples or backbones). The backdoored model has promising performance in predicting benign samples, whereas its predictions can be maliciously manipulated by adversaries based on activating its backdoors with pre-defined trigger patterns. Currently, most of the existing backdoor attacks were conducted on the image classification under the targeted manner. In this paper, we reveal that these threats could also happen in object detection, posing threatening risks to many mission-critical applications ($e.g.$, pedestrian detection and intelligent surveillance systems). Specifically, we design a simple yet effective poison-only backdoor attack in an untargeted manner, based on task characteristics. We show that, once the backdoor is embedded into the target model by our attack, it can trick the model to lose detection of any object stamped with our trigger patterns. We conduct extensive experiments on the benchmark dataset, showing its effectiveness in both digital and physical-world settings and its resistance to potential defenses.