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Collaborating Authors

 Liu, Xiangyu


RoChBert: Towards Robust BERT Fine-tuning for Chinese

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Despite of the superb performance on a wide range of tasks, pre-trained language models (e.g., BERT) have been proved vulnerable to adversarial texts. In this paper, we present RoChBERT, a framework to build more Robust BERT-based models by utilizing a more comprehensive adversarial graph to fuse Chinese phonetic and glyph features into pre-trained representations during fine-tuning. Inspired by curriculum learning, we further propose to augment the training dataset with adversarial texts in combination with intermediate samples. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RoChBERT outperforms previous methods in significant ways: (i) robust -- RoChBERT greatly improves the model robustness without sacrificing accuracy on benign texts. Specifically, the defense lowers the success rates of unlimited and limited attacks by 59.43% and 39.33% respectively, while remaining accuracy of 93.30%; (ii) flexible -- RoChBERT can easily extend to various language models to solve different downstream tasks with excellent performance; and (iii) efficient -- RoChBERT can be directly applied to the fine-tuning stage without pre-training language model from scratch, and the proposed data augmentation method is also low-cost.


A Cooperative-Competitive Multi-Agent Framework for Auto-bidding in Online Advertising

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In online advertising, auto-bidding has become an essential tool for advertisers to optimize their preferred ad performance metrics by simply expressing the high-level campaign objectives and constraints. Previous works consider the design of auto-bidding agents from the single-agent view without modeling the mutual influence between agents. In this paper, we instead consider this problem from the perspective of a distributed multi-agent system, and propose a general Multi-Agent reinforcement learning framework for Auto-Bidding, namely MAAB, to learn the auto-bidding strategies. First, we investigate the competition and cooperation relation among auto-bidding agents, and propose temperature-regularized credit assignment for establishing a mixed cooperative-competitive paradigm. By carefully making a competition and cooperation trade-off among the agents, we can reach an equilibrium state that guarantees not only individual advertiser's utility but also the system performance (social welfare). Second, due to the observed collusion behaviors of bidding low prices underlying the cooperation, we further propose bar agents to set a personalized bidding bar for each agent, and then to alleviate the degradation of revenue. Third, to deploy MAAB to the large-scale advertising system with millions of advertisers, we propose a mean-field approach. By grouping advertisers with the same objective as a mean auto-bidding agent, the interactions among advertisers are greatly simplified, making it practical to train MAAB efficiently. Extensive experiments on the offline industrial dataset and Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate that our approach outperforms several baseline methods in terms of social welfare and guarantees the ad platform's revenue.


Unifying Behavioral and Response Diversity for Open-ended Learning in Zero-sum Games

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of diverse policies via open-ended learning is an attractive solution, which can generate auto-curricula to avoid being exploited. However, in conventional open-ended learning algorithms, there are no widely accepted definitions for diversity, making it hard to construct and evaluate the diverse policies. In this work, we summarize previous concepts of diversity and work towards offering a unified measure of diversity in multi-agent open-ended learning to include all elements in Markov games, based on both Behavioral Diversity (BD) and Response Diversity (RD). At the trajectory distribution level, we re-define BD in the state-action space as the discrepancies of occupancy measures. For the reward dynamics, we propose RD to characterize diversity through the responses of policies when encountering different opponents. We also show that many current diversity measures fall in one of the categories of BD or RD but not both. With this unified diversity measure, we design the corresponding diversity-promoting objective and population effectivity when seeking the best responses in open-ended learning. We validate our methods in both relatively simple games like matrix game, non-transitive mixture model, and the complex \textit{Google Research Football} environment. The population found by our methods reveals the lowest exploitability, highest population effectivity in matrix game and non-transitive mixture model, as well as the largest goal difference when interacting with opponents of various levels in \textit{Google Research Football}.


Neural Auction: End-to-End Learning of Auction Mechanisms for E-Commerce Advertising

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In e-commerce advertising, it is crucial to jointly consider various performance metrics, e.g., user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. Traditional auction mechanisms, such as GSP and VCG auctions, can be suboptimal due to their fixed allocation rules to optimize a single performance metric (e.g., revenue or social welfare). Recently, data-driven auctions, learned directly from auction outcomes to optimize multiple performance metrics, have attracted increasing research interests. However, the procedure of auction mechanisms involves various discrete calculation operations, making it challenging to be compatible with continuous optimization pipelines in machine learning. In this paper, we design \underline{D}eep \underline{N}eural \underline{A}uctions (DNAs) to enable end-to-end auction learning by proposing a differentiable model to relax the discrete sorting operation, a key component in auctions. We optimize the performance metrics by developing deep models to efficiently extract contexts from auctions, providing rich features for auction design. We further integrate the game theoretical conditions within the model design, to guarantee the stability of the auctions. DNAs have been successfully deployed in the e-commerce advertising system at Taobao. Experimental evaluation results on both large-scale data set as well as online A/B test demonstrated that DNAs significantly outperformed other mechanisms widely adopted in industry.