Advanced AI applications have become increasingly available to a broad audience, e.g., as centrally managed large language models (LLMs). Such centralization is both a risk and a performance bottleneck - Edge AI promises to be a solution to these problems. However, its decentralized approach raises additional challenges regarding security and safety. In this paper, we argue that both of these aspects are critical for Edge AI, and even more so, their integration. Concretely, we survey security and safety threats, summarize existing countermeasures, and collect open challenges as a call for more research in this area.

In the pooled data problem we are given $n$ agents with hidden state bits, either $0$ or $1$. The hidden states are unknown and can be seen as the underlying ground truth $\sigma$. To uncover that ground truth, we are given a querying method that queries multiple agents at a time. Each query reports the sum of the states of the queried agents. Our goal is to learn the hidden state bits using as few queries as possible. So far, most literature deals with exact reconstruction of all hidden state bits. We study a more relaxed variant in which we allow a small fraction of agents to be classified incorrectly. This becomes particularly relevant in the noisy variant of the pooled data problem where the queries' results are subject to random noise. In this setting, we provide a doubly regular test design that assigns agents to queries. For this design we analyze an approximate reconstruction algorithm that estimates the hidden bits in a greedy fashion. We give a rigorous analysis of the algorithm's performance, its error probability, and its approximation quality. As a main technical novelty, our analysis is uniform in the degree of noise and the sparsity of $\sigma$. Finally, simulations back up our theoretical findings and provide strong empirical evidence that our algorithm works well for realistic sample sizes.