Jiang, Shuyu
Prompt Packer: Deceiving LLMs through Compositional Instruction with Hidden Attacks
Jiang, Shuyu, Chen, Xingshu, Tang, Rui
Recently, Large language models (LLMs) with powerful general capabilities have been increasingly integrated into various Web applications, while undergoing alignment training to ensure that the generated content aligns with user intent and ethics. Unfortunately, they remain the risk of generating harmful content like hate speech and criminal activities in practical applications. Current approaches primarily rely on detecting, collecting, and training against harmful prompts to prevent such risks. However, they typically focused on the "superficial" harmful prompts with a solitary intent, ignoring composite attack instructions with multiple intentions that can easily elicit harmful content in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we introduce an innovative technique for obfuscating harmful instructions: Compositional Instruction Attacks (CIA), which refers to attacking by combination and encapsulation of multiple instructions. CIA hides harmful prompts within instructions of harmless intentions, making it impossible for the model to identify underlying malicious intentions. Furthermore, we implement two transformation methods, known as T-CIA and W-CIA, to automatically disguise harmful instructions as talking or writing tasks, making them appear harmless to LLMs. We evaluated CIA on GPT-4, ChatGPT, and ChatGLM2 with two safety assessment datasets and two harmful prompt datasets. It achieves an attack success rate of 95%+ on safety assessment datasets, and 83%+ for GPT-4, 91%+ for ChatGPT (gpt-3.5-turbo backed) and ChatGLM2-6B on harmful prompt datasets. Our approach reveals the vulnerability of LLMs to such compositional instruction attacks that harbor underlying harmful intentions, contributing significantly to LLM security development. Warning: this paper may contain offensive or upsetting content!
RAUCG: Retrieval-Augmented Unsupervised Counter Narrative Generation for Hate Speech
Jiang, Shuyu, Tang, Wenyi, Chen, Xingshu, Tanga, Rui, Wang, Haizhou, Wang, Wenxian
The Counter Narrative (CN) is a promising approach to combat online hate speech (HS) without infringing on freedom of speech. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in automatically generating CNs using natural language generation techniques. However, current automatic CN generation methods mainly rely on expert-authored datasets for training, which are time-consuming and labor-intensive to acquire. Furthermore, these methods cannot directly obtain and extend counter-knowledge from external statistics, facts, or examples. To address these limitations, we propose Retrieval-Augmented Unsupervised Counter Narrative Generation (RAUCG) to automatically expand external counter-knowledge and map it into CNs in an unsupervised paradigm. Specifically, we first introduce an SSF retrieval method to retrieve counter-knowledge from the multiple perspectives of stance consistency, semantic overlap rate, and fitness for HS. Then we design an energy-based decoding mechanism by quantizing knowledge injection, countering and fluency constraints into differentiable functions, to enable the model to build mappings from counter-knowledge to CNs without expert-authored CN data. Lastly, we comprehensively evaluate model performance in terms of language quality, toxicity, persuasiveness, relevance, and success rate of countering HS, etc. Experimental results show that RAUCG outperforms strong baselines on all metrics and exhibits stronger generalization capabilities, achieving significant improvements of +2.0% in relevance and +4.5% in success rate of countering metrics. Moreover, RAUCG enabled GPT2 to outperform T0 in all metrics, despite the latter being approximately eight times larger than the former. Warning: This paper may contain offensive or upsetting content!