Digital pathology and microscopy image analysis are widely employed in the segmentation of digitally scanned IHC slides, primarily to identify cancer and pinpoint regions of interest (ROI) indicative of tumor presence. However, current ROI segmentation models are either stain-specific or suffer from the issues of stain and scanner variance due to different staining protocols or modalities across multiple labs. Also, tissues like Ductal Carcinoma in Situ (DCIS), acini, etc. are often classified as Tumors due to their structural similarities and color compositions. In this paper, we proposed a novel convolutional neural network (CNN) based Multi-class Tissue Segmentation model for histopathology whole-slide Breast slides which classify tumors and segments other tissue regions such as Ducts, acini, DCIS, Squamous epithelium, Blood Vessels, Necrosis, etc. as a separate class. Our unique pixel-aligned non-linear merge across spatial resolutions empowers models with both local and global fields of view for accurate detection of various classes. Our proposed model is also able to separate bad regions such as folds, artifacts, blurry regions, bubbles, etc. from tissue regions using multi-level context from different resolutions of WSI. Multi-phase iterative training with context-aware augmentation and increasing noise was used to efficiently train a multi-stain generic model with partial and noisy annotations from 513 slides. Our training pipeline used 12 million patches generated using context-aware augmentations which made our model stain and scanner invariant across data sources. To extrapolate stain and scanner invariance, our model was evaluated on 23000 patches which were for a completely new stain (Hematoxylin and Eosin) from a completely new scanner (Motic) from a different lab. The mean IOU was 0.72 which is on par with model performance on other data sources and scanners.

Model explanations improve the transparency of black-box machine learning (ML) models and their decisions; however, they can also be exploited to carry out privacy threats such as membership inference attacks (MIA). Existing works have only analyzed MIA in a single "what if" interaction scenario between an adversary and the target ML model; thus, it does not discern the factors impacting the capabilities of an adversary in launching MIA in repeated interaction settings. Additionally, these works rely on assumptions about the adversary's knowledge of the target model's structure and, thus, do not guarantee the optimality of the predefined threshold required to distinguish the members from non-members. In this paper, we delve into the domain of explanation-based threshold attacks, where the adversary endeavors to carry out MIA attacks by leveraging the variance of explanations through iterative interactions with the system comprising of the target ML model and its corresponding explanation method. We model such interactions by employing a continuous-time stochastic signaling game framework. In our framework, an adversary plays a stopping game, interacting with the system (having imperfect information about the type of an adversary, i.e., honest or malicious) to obtain explanation variance information and computing an optimal threshold to determine the membership of a datapoint accurately. First, we propose a sound mathematical formulation to prove that such an optimal threshold exists, which can be used to launch MIA. Then, we characterize the conditions under which a unique Markov perfect equilibrium (or steady state) exists in this dynamic system. By means of a comprehensive set of simulations of the proposed game model, we assess different factors that can impact the capability of an adversary to launch MIA in such repeated interaction settings.

Generative large language models (LLMs) with instruct training such as GPT-4 can follow human-provided instruction prompts and generate human-like responses to these prompts. Apart from natural language responses, they have also been found to be effective at generating formal artifacts such as code, plans, and logical specifications from natural language prompts. Despite their remarkably improved accuracy, these models are still known to produce factually incorrect or contextually inappropriate results despite their syntactic coherence - a phenomenon often referred to as hallucination. This limitation makes it difficult to use these models to synthesize formal artifacts that are used in safety-critical applications. Unlike tasks such as text summarization and question-answering, bugs in code, plan, and other formal artifacts produced by LLMs can be catastrophic. We posit that we can use the satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers as deductive reasoning engines to analyze the generated solutions from the LLMs, produce counterexamples when the solutions are incorrect, and provide that feedback to the LLMs exploiting the dialog capability of instruct-trained LLMs. This interaction between inductive LLMs and deductive SMT solvers can iteratively steer the LLM to generate the correct response. In our experiments, we use planning over the domain of blocks as our synthesis task for evaluating our approach. We use GPT-4, GPT3.5 Turbo, Davinci, Curie, Babbage, and Ada as the LLMs and Z3 as the SMT solver. Our method allows the user to communicate the planning problem in natural language; even the formulation of queries to SMT solvers is automatically generated from natural language. Thus, the proposed technique can enable non-expert users to describe their problems in natural language, and the combination of LLMs and SMT solvers can produce provably correct solutions.

We present a comprehensive evaluation of the robustness and explainability of ResNet-like models in the context of Unintended Radiated Emission (URE) classification and suggest a new approach leveraging Neural Stochastic Differential Equations (SDEs) to address identified limitations. We provide an empirical demonstration of the fragility of ResNet-like models to Gaussian noise perturbations, where the model performance deteriorates sharply and its F1-score drops to near insignificance at 0.008 with a Gaussian noise of only 0.5 standard deviation. We also highlight a concerning discrepancy where the explanations provided by ResNet-like models do not reflect the inherent periodicity in the input data, a crucial attribute in URE detection from stable devices. In response to these findings, we propose a novel application of Neural SDEs to build models for URE classification that are not only robust to noise but also provide more meaningful and intuitive explanations. Neural SDE models maintain a high F1-score of 0.93 even when exposed to Gaussian noise with a standard deviation of 0.5, demonstrating superior resilience to ResNet models. Neural SDE models successfully recover the time-invariant or periodic horizontal bands from the input data, a feature that was conspicuously missing in the explanations generated by ResNet-like models. This advancement presents a small but significant step in the development of robust and interpretable models for real-world URE applications where data is inherently noisy and assurance arguments demand interpretable machine learning predictions.

This paper formally models the strategic repeated interactions between a system, comprising of a machine learning (ML) model and associated explanation method, and an end-user who is seeking a prediction/label and its explanation for a query/input, by means of game theory. In this game, a malicious end-user must strategically decide when to stop querying and attempt to compromise the system, while the system must strategically decide how much information (in the form of noisy explanations) it should share with the end-user and when to stop sharing, all without knowing the type (honest/malicious) of the end-user. This paper formally models this trade-off using a continuous-time stochastic Signaling game framework and characterizes the Markov perfect equilibrium state within such a framework.

Deep neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable to membership inference attacks wherein the attacker aims to detect whether specific input data were used to train the model. These attacks can potentially leak private or proprietary data. We present a new extension of Fano's inequality and employ it to theoretically establish that the probability of success for a membership inference attack on a deep neural network can be bounded using the mutual information between its inputs and its activations. This enables the use of mutual information to measure the susceptibility of a DNN model to membership inference attacks. In our empirical evaluation, we show that the correlation between the mutual information and the susceptibility of the DNN model to membership inference attacks is 0.966, 0.996, and 0.955 for CIFAR-10, SVHN and GTSRB models, respectively.

We demonstrate how a target model's generalization gap leads directly to an effective deterministic black box membership inference attack (MIA). This provides an upper bound on how secure a model can be to MIA based on a simple metric. Moreover, this attack is shown to be optimal in the expected sense given access to only certain likely obtainable metrics regarding the network's training and performance. Experimentally, this attack is shown to be comparable in accuracy to state-of-art MIAs in many cases.

Attribution methods have been developed to explain the decision of a machine learning model on a given input. We use the Integrated Gradient method for finding attributions to define the causal neighborhood of an input by incrementally masking high attribution features. We study the robustness of machine learning models on benign and adversarial inputs in this neighborhood. Our study indicates that benign inputs are robust to the masking of high attribution features but adversarial inputs generated by the state-of-the-art adversarial attack methods such as DeepFool, FGSM, CW and PGD, are not robust to such masking. Further, our study demonstrates that this concentration of high-attribution features responsible for the incorrect decision is more pronounced in physically realizable adversarial examples. This difference in attribution of benign and adversarial inputs can be used to detect adversarial examples. Such a defense approach is independent of training data and attack method, and we demonstrate its effectiveness on digital and physically realizable perturbations.