Large language models (LLMs) have shown incredible proficiency in performing tasks that require semantic understanding of natural language instructions. Recently, many works have further expanded this capability to perceive multimodal audio and text inputs, but their capabilities are often limited to specific fine-tuned tasks such as automatic speech recognition and translation. We therefore develop SpeechVerse, a robust multi-task training and curriculum learning framework that combines pre-trained speech and text foundation models via a small set of learnable parameters, while keeping the pre-trained models frozen during training. The models are instruction finetuned using continuous latent representations extracted from the speech foundation model to achieve optimal zero-shot performance on a diverse range of speech processing tasks using natural language instructions. We perform extensive benchmarking that includes comparing our model performance against traditional baselines across several datasets and tasks. Furthermore, we evaluate the model's capability for generalized instruction following by testing on out-of-domain datasets, novel prompts, and unseen tasks. Our empirical experiments reveal that our multi-task SpeechVerse model is even superior to conventional task-specific baselines on 9 out of the 11 tasks.

Integrated Speech and Large Language Models (SLMs) that can follow speech instructions and generate relevant text responses have gained popularity lately. However, the safety and robustness of these models remains largely unclear. In this work, we investigate the potential vulnerabilities of such instruction-following speech-language models to adversarial attacks and jailbreaking. Specifically, we design algorithms that can generate adversarial examples to jailbreak SLMs in both white-box and black-box attack settings without human involvement. Additionally, we propose countermeasures to thwart such jailbreaking attacks. Our models, trained on dialog data with speech instructions, achieve state-of-the-art performance on spoken question-answering task, scoring over 80% on both safety and helpfulness metrics. Despite safety guardrails, experiments on jailbreaking demonstrate the vulnerability of SLMs to adversarial perturbations and transfer attacks, with average attack success rates of 90% and 10% respectively when evaluated on a dataset of carefully designed harmful questions spanning 12 different toxic categories. However, we demonstrate that our proposed countermeasures reduce the attack success significantly.