Safety cases - clear, assessable arguments for the safety of a system in a given context - are a widely-used technique across various industries for showing a decision-maker (e.g. boards, customers, third parties) that a system is safe. In this paper, we cover how and why frontier AI developers might also want to use safety cases. We then argue that writing and reviewing safety cases would substantially assist in the fulfilment of many of the Frontier AI Safety Commitments. Finally, we outline open research questions on the methodology, implementation, and technical details of safety cases.

As LLM agents gain a greater capacity to cause harm, AI developers might increasingly rely on control measures such as monitoring to justify that they are safe. We sketch how developers could construct a "control safety case", which is a structured argument that models are incapable of subverting control measures in order to cause unacceptable outcomes. As a case study, we sketch an argument that a hypothetical LLM agent deployed internally at an AI company won't exfiltrate sensitive information. The sketch relies on evidence from a "control evaluation,"' where a red team deliberately designs models to exfiltrate data in a proxy for the deployment environment. The safety case then hinges on several claims: (1) the red team adequately elicits model capabilities to exfiltrate data, (2) control measures remain at least as effective in deployment, and (3) developers conservatively extrapolate model performance to predict the probability of data exfiltration in deployment. This safety case sketch is a step toward more concrete arguments that can be used to show that a dangerously capable LLM agent is safe to deploy.

This report introduces a new family of multimodal models, Gemini, that exhibit remarkable capabilities across image, audio, video, and text understanding. The Gemini family consists of Ultra, Pro, and Nano sizes, suitable for applications ranging from complex reasoning tasks to on-device memory-constrained use-cases. Evaluation on a broad range of benchmarks shows that our most-capable Gemini Ultra model advances the state of the art in 30 of 32 of these benchmarks - notably being the first model to achieve human-expert performance on the well-studied exam benchmark MMLU, and improving the state of the art in every one of the 20 multimodal benchmarks we examined. We believe that the new capabilities of Gemini models in cross-modal reasoning and language understanding will enable a wide variety of use cases and we discuss our approach toward deploying them responsibly to users.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

\emph{Circuit analysis} is a promising technique for understanding the internal mechanisms of language models. However, existing analyses are done in small models far from the state of the art. To address this, we present a case study of circuit analysis in the 70B Chinchilla model, aiming to test the scalability of circuit analysis. In particular, we study multiple-choice question answering, and investigate Chinchilla's capability to identify the correct answer \emph{label} given knowledge of the correct answer \emph{text}. We find that the existing techniques of logit attribution, attention pattern visualization, and activation patching naturally scale to Chinchilla, allowing us to identify and categorize a small set of `output nodes' (attention heads and MLPs). We further study the `correct letter' category of attention heads aiming to understand the semantics of their features, with mixed results. For normal multiple-choice question answers, we significantly compress the query, key and value subspaces of the head without loss of performance when operating on the answer labels for multiple-choice questions, and we show that the query and key subspaces represent an `Nth item in an enumeration' feature to at least some extent. However, when we attempt to use this explanation to understand the heads' behaviour on a more general distribution including randomized answer labels, we find that it is only a partial explanation, suggesting there is more to learn about the operation of `correct letter' heads on multiple choice question answering.

Language models often pre-train on large unsupervised text corpora, then fine-tune on additional task-specific data. However, typical fine-tuning schemes do not prioritize the examples that they tune on. We show that, if you can prioritize informative training data, you can achieve better performance while using fewer labels. To do this we augment a language model with an epinet: a small additional network that helps to estimate model uncertainty and forms an \textit{epistemic neural network} (ENN). ENNs are neural networks that can know what they don't know. Using an epinet to prioritize uncertain data, we can fine-tune BERT on GLUE tasks to the same performance while using 2x less data than training without prioritization. We also investigate performance in synthetic neural network generative models designed to build understanding. In each setting, using an epinet outperforms heuristic active learning schemes.

We present speculative sampling, an algorithm for accelerating transformer decoding by enabling the generation of multiple tokens from each transformer call. Our algorithm relies on the observation that the latency of parallel scoring of short continuations, generated by a faster but less powerful draft model, is comparable to that of sampling a single token from the larger target model. This is combined with a novel modified rejection sampling scheme which preserves the distribution of the target model within hardware numerics. We benchmark speculative sampling with Chinchilla, a 70 billion parameter language model, achieving a 2-2.5x decoding speedup in a distributed setup, without compromising the sample quality or making modifications to the model itself.

Recent work has shown that asking language models to generate reasoning steps improves performance on many reasoning tasks. When moving beyond prompting, this raises the question of how we should supervise such models: outcome-based approaches which supervise the final result, or process-based approaches which supervise the reasoning process itself? Differences between these approaches might naturally be expected not just in final-answer errors but also in reasoning errors, which can be difficult to detect and are problematic in many real-world domains such as education. We run the first comprehensive comparison between process- and outcome-based approaches trained on a natural language task, GSM8K. We find that pure outcome-based supervision produces similar final-answer error rates with less label supervision. However, for correct reasoning steps we find it necessary to use process-based supervision or supervision from learned reward models that emulate process-based feedback. In total, we improve the previous best results from 16.8% $\to$ 12.7% final-answer error and 14.0% $\to$ 3.4% reasoning error among final-answer-correct solutions.

Language Models (LMs) often cannot be deployed because of their potential to harm users in hard-to-predict ways. Prior work identifies harmful behaviors before deployment by using human annotators to hand-write test cases. However, human annotation is expensive, limiting the number and diversity of test cases. In this work, we automatically find cases where a target LM behaves in a harmful way, by generating test cases ("red teaming") using another LM. We evaluate the target LM's replies to generated test questions using a classifier trained to detect offensive content, uncovering tens of thousands of offensive replies in a 280B parameter LM chatbot. We explore several methods, from zero-shot generation to reinforcement learning, for generating test cases with varying levels of diversity and difficulty. Furthermore, we use prompt engineering to control LM-generated test cases to uncover a variety of other harms, automatically finding groups of people that the chatbot discusses in offensive ways, personal and hospital phone numbers generated as the chatbot's own contact info, leakage of private training data in generated text, and harms that occur over the course of a conversation. Overall, LM-based red teaming is one promising tool (among many needed) for finding and fixing diverse, undesirable LM behaviors before impacting users.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.