This paper offers a roadmap for the development of scalable aligned artificial intelligence (AI) from first principle descriptions of natural intelligence. In brief, a possible path toward scalable aligned AI rests upon enabling artificial agents to learn a good model of the world that includes a good model of our preferences. For this, the main objective is creating agents that learn to represent the world and other agents' world models; a problem that falls under structure learning (a.k.a. causal representation learning). We expose the structure learning and alignment problems with this goal in mind, as well as principles to guide us forward, synthesizing various ideas across mathematics, statistics, and cognitive science. 1) We discuss the essential role of core knowledge, information geometry and model reduction in structure learning, and suggest core structural modules to learn a wide range of naturalistic worlds. 2) We outline a way toward aligned agents through structure learning and theory of mind. As an illustrative example, we mathematically sketch Asimov's Laws of Robotics, which prescribe agents to act cautiously to minimize the ill-being of other agents. We supplement this example by proposing refined approaches to alignment. These observations may guide the development of artificial intelligence in helping to scale existing -- or design new -- aligned structure learning systems.

Training reinforcement learning (RL) agents using scalar reward signals is often infeasible when an environment has sparse and non-Markovian rewards. Moreover, handcrafting these reward functions before training is prone to misspecification, especially when the environment's dynamics are only partially known. This paper proposes a novel pipeline for learning non-Markovian task specifications as succinct finite-state `task automata' from episodes of agent experience within unknown environments. We leverage two key algorithmic insights. First, we learn a product MDP, a model composed of the specification's automaton and the environment's MDP (both initially unknown), by treating the product MDP as a partially observable MDP and using the well-known Baum-Welch algorithm for learning hidden Markov models. Second, we propose a novel method for distilling the task automaton (assumed to be a deterministic finite automaton) from the learnt product MDP. Our learnt task automaton enables the decomposition of a task into its constituent sub-tasks, which improves the rate at which an RL agent can later synthesise an optimal policy. It also provides an interpretable encoding of high-level environmental and task features, so a human can readily verify that the agent has learnt coherent tasks with no misspecifications. In addition, we take steps towards ensuring that the learnt automaton is environment-agnostic, making it well-suited for use in transfer learning. Finally, we provide experimental results compared with two baselines to illustrate our algorithm's performance in different environments and tasks.

We consider the problem of incentivising desirable behaviours in multi-agent systems by way of taxation schemes. Our study employs the concurrent games model: in this model, each agent is primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of a goal, expressed as a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formula; secondarily, agents seek to minimise costs, where costs are imposed based on the actions taken by agents in different states of the game. In this setting, we consider an external principal who can influence agents' preferences by imposing taxes (additional costs) on the actions chosen by agents in different states. The principal imposes taxation schemes to motivate agents to choose a course of action that will lead to the satisfaction of their goal, also expressed as an LTL formula. However, taxation schemes are limited in their ability to influence agents' preferences: an agent will always prefer to satisfy its goal rather than otherwise, no matter what the costs. The fundamental question that we study is whether the principal can impose a taxation scheme such that, in the resulting game, the principal's goal is satisfied in at least one or all runs of the game that could arise by agents choosing to follow game-theoretic equilibrium strategies. We consider two different types of taxation schemes: in a static scheme, the same tax is imposed on a state-action profile pair in all circumstances, while in a dynamic scheme, the principal can choose to vary taxes depending on the circumstances. We investigate the main game-theoretic properties of this model as well as the computational complexity of the relevant decision problems.

We introduce and study a computational version of the principal-agent problem -- a classic problem in Economics that arises when a principal desires to contract an agent to carry out some task, but has incomplete information about the agent or their subsequent actions. The key challenge in this setting is for the principal to design a contract for the agent such that the agent's preferences are then aligned with those of the principal. We study this problem using a variation of Boolean games, where multiple players each choose valuations for Boolean variables under their control, seeking the satisfaction of a personal goal, given as a Boolean logic formula. In our setting, the principal can only observe some subset of these variables, and the principal chooses a contract which rewards players on the basis of the assignments they make for the variables that are observable to the principal. The principal's challenge is to design a contract so that, firstly, the principal's goal is achieved in some or all Nash equilibrium choices, and secondly, that the principal is able to verify that their goal is satisfied. In this paper, we formally define this problem and completely characterise the computational complexity of the most relevant decision problems associated with it.