Helyar, Alec
Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models
Guan, Melody Y., Joglekar, Manas, Wallace, Eric, Jain, Saachi, Barak, Boaz, Helyar, Alec, Dias, Rachel, Vallone, Andrea, Ren, Hongyu, Wei, Jason, Chung, Hyung Won, Toyer, Sam, Heidecke, Johannes, Beutel, Alex, Glaese, Amelia
Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) are safety trained using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to mitigate harmful, undesirable, or otherwise disallowed outputs [2]-[4]. Despite ongoing advances in these methods, today's models still exhibit safety shortcomings: they can be tricked into revealing harmful content, often refuse legitimate requests, and remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks [5]-[8]. We argue that many of these failures arise from two limitations in modern safety training. First, LLMs must respond instantly to user requests using a fixed amount of compute, without deliberation even for complex safety scenarios. Second, LLMs must infer underlying safety standards indirectly from large sets of labeled examples, rather than directly learning the safety specifications that govern them. This reliance on implicit, pattern-based learning leads to poor data efficiency and makes it challenging for models to generalize when facing unfamiliar scenarios or adversarial attacks. We propose deliberative alignment, a training approach that teaches LLMs to explicitly reason through safety specifications before producing an answer. By applying this method to OpenAI's o-series models [1], we enable them to use chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to examine user prompts, identify relevant policy guidelines, and generate safer responses (e.g., Figure 1).
OpenAI o1 System Card
OpenAI, null, :, null, Jaech, Aaron, Kalai, Adam, Lerer, Adam, Richardson, Adam, El-Kishky, Ahmed, Low, Aiden, Helyar, Alec, Madry, Aleksander, Beutel, Alex, Carney, Alex, Iftimie, Alex, Karpenko, Alex, Passos, Alex Tachard, Neitz, Alexander, Prokofiev, Alexander, Wei, Alexander, Tam, Allison, Bennett, Ally, Kumar, Ananya, Saraiva, Andre, Vallone, Andrea, Duberstein, Andrew, Kondrich, Andrew, Mishchenko, Andrey, Applebaum, Andy, Jiang, Angela, Nair, Ashvin, Zoph, Barret, Ghorbani, Behrooz, Rossen, Ben, Sokolowsky, Benjamin, Barak, Boaz, McGrew, Bob, Minaiev, Borys, Hao, Botao, Baker, Bowen, Houghton, Brandon, McKinzie, Brandon, Eastman, Brydon, Lugaresi, Camillo, Bassin, Cary, Hudson, Cary, Li, Chak Ming, de Bourcy, Charles, Voss, Chelsea, Shen, Chen, Zhang, Chong, Koch, Chris, Orsinger, Chris, Hesse, Christopher, Fischer, Claudia, Chan, Clive, Roberts, Dan, Kappler, Daniel, Levy, Daniel, Selsam, Daniel, Dohan, David, Farhi, David, Mely, David, Robinson, David, Tsipras, Dimitris, Li, Doug, Oprica, Dragos, Freeman, Eben, Zhang, Eddie, Wong, Edmund, Proehl, Elizabeth, Cheung, Enoch, Mitchell, Eric, Wallace, Eric, Ritter, Erik, Mays, Evan, Wang, Fan, Such, Felipe Petroski, Raso, Filippo, Leoni, Florencia, Tsimpourlas, Foivos, Song, Francis, von Lohmann, Fred, Sulit, Freddie, Salmon, Geoff, Parascandolo, Giambattista, Chabot, Gildas, Zhao, Grace, Brockman, Greg, Leclerc, Guillaume, Salman, Hadi, Bao, Haiming, Sheng, Hao, Andrin, Hart, Bagherinezhad, Hessam, Ren, Hongyu, Lightman, Hunter, Chung, Hyung Won, Kivlichan, Ian, O'Connell, Ian, Osband, Ian, Gilaberte, Ignasi Clavera, Akkaya, Ilge, Kostrikov, Ilya, Sutskever, Ilya, Kofman, Irina, Pachocki, Jakub, Lennon, James, Wei, Jason, Harb, Jean, Twore, Jerry, Feng, Jiacheng, Yu, Jiahui, Weng, Jiayi, Tang, Jie, Yu, Jieqi, Candela, Joaquin Quiรฑonero, Palermo, Joe, Parish, Joel, Heidecke, Johannes, Hallman, John, Rizzo, John, Gordon, Jonathan, Uesato, Jonathan, Ward, Jonathan, Huizinga, Joost, Wang, Julie, Chen, Kai, Xiao, Kai, Singhal, Karan, Nguyen, Karina, Cobbe, Karl, Shi, Katy, Wood, Kayla, Rimbach, Kendra, Gu-Lemberg, Keren, Liu, Kevin, Lu, Kevin, Stone, Kevin, Yu, Kevin, Ahmad, Lama, Yang, Lauren, Liu, Leo, Maksin, Leon, Ho, Leyton, Fedus, Liam, Weng, Lilian, Li, Linden, McCallum, Lindsay, Held, Lindsey, Kuhn, Lorenz, Kondraciuk, Lukas, Kaiser, Lukasz, Metz, Luke, Boyd, Madelaine, Trebacz, Maja, Joglekar, Manas, Chen, Mark, Tintor, Marko, Meyer, Mason, Jones, Matt, Kaufer, Matt, Schwarzer, Max, Shah, Meghan, Yatbaz, Mehmet, Guan, Melody Y., Xu, Mengyuan, Yan, Mengyuan, Glaese, Mia, Chen, Mianna, Lampe, Michael, Malek, Michael, Wang, Michele, Fradin, Michelle, McClay, Mike, Pavlov, Mikhail, Wang, Miles, Wang, Mingxuan, Murati, Mira, Bavarian, Mo, Rohaninejad, Mostafa, McAleese, Nat, Chowdhury, Neil, Chowdhury, Neil, Ryder, Nick, Tezak, Nikolas, Brown, Noam, Nachum, Ofir, Boiko, Oleg, Murk, Oleg, Watkins, Olivia, Chao, Patrick, Ashbourne, Paul, Izmailov, Pavel, Zhokhov, Peter, Dias, Rachel, Arora, Rahul, Lin, Randall, Lopes, Rapha Gontijo, Gaon, Raz, Miyara, Reah, Leike, Reimar, Hwang, Renny, Garg, Rhythm, Brown, Robin, James, Roshan, Shu, Rui, Cheu, Ryan, Greene, Ryan, Jain, Saachi, Altman, Sam, Toizer, Sam, Toyer, Sam, Miserendino, Samuel, Agarwal, Sandhini, Hernandez, Santiago, Baker, Sasha, McKinney, Scott, Yan, Scottie, Zhao, Shengjia, Hu, Shengli, Santurkar, Shibani, Chaudhuri, Shraman Ray, Zhang, Shuyuan, Fu, Siyuan, Papay, Spencer, Lin, Steph, Balaji, Suchir, Sanjeev, Suvansh, Sidor, Szymon, Broda, Tal, Clark, Aidan, Wang, Tao, Gordon, Taylor, Sanders, Ted, Patwardhan, Tejal, Sottiaux, Thibault, Degry, Thomas, Dimson, Thomas, Zheng, Tianhao, Garipov, Timur, Stasi, Tom, Bansal, Trapit, Creech, Trevor, Peterson, Troy, Eloundou, Tyna, Qi, Valerie, Kosaraju, Vineet, Monaco, Vinnie, Pong, Vitchyr, Fomenko, Vlad, Zheng, Weiyi, Zhou, Wenda, McCabe, Wes, Zaremba, Wojciech, Dubois, Yann, Lu, Yinghai, Chen, Yining, Cha, Young, Bai, Yu, He, Yuchen, Zhang, Yuchen, Wang, Yunyun, Shao, Zheng, Li, Zhuohan
The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.
Rule Based Rewards for Language Model Safety
Mu, Tong, Helyar, Alec, Heidecke, Johannes, Achiam, Joshua, Vallone, Andrea, Kivlichan, Ian, Lin, Molly, Beutel, Alex, Schulman, John, Weng, Lilian
Reinforcement learning based fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) on human preferences has been shown to enhance both their capabilities and safety behavior. However, in cases related to safety, without precise instructions to human annotators, the data collected may cause the model to become overly cautious, or to respond in an undesirable style, such as being judgmental. Additionally, as model capabilities and usage patterns evolve, there may be a costly need to add or relabel data to modify safety behavior. We propose a novel preference modeling approach that utilizes AI feedback and only requires a small amount of human data. Our method, Rule Based Rewards (RBR), uses a collection of rules for desired or undesired behaviors (e.g. refusals should not be judgmental) along with a LLM grader. In contrast to prior methods using AI feedback, our method uses fine-grained, composable, LLM-graded few-shot prompts as reward directly in RL training, resulting in greater control, accuracy and ease of updating. We show that RBRs are an effective training method, achieving an F1 score of 97.1, compared to a human-feedback baseline of 91.7, resulting in much higher safety-behavior accuracy through better balancing usefulness and safety.
A Framework for Automated Measurement of Responsible AI Harms in Generative AI Applications
Magooda, Ahmed, Helyar, Alec, Jackson, Kyle, Sullivan, David, Atalla, Chad, Sheng, Emily, Vann, Dan, Edgar, Richard, Palangi, Hamid, Lutz, Roman, Kong, Hongliang, Yun, Vincent, Kamal, Eslam, Zarfati, Federico, Wallach, Hanna, Bird, Sarah, Chen, Mei
We present a framework for the automated measurement of responsible AI (RAI) metrics for large language models (LLMs) and associated products and services. Our framework for automatically measuring harms from LLMs builds on existing technical and sociotechnical expertise and leverages the capabilities of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4. We use this framework to run through several case studies investigating how different LLMs may violate a range of RAI-related principles. The framework may be employed alongside domain-specific sociotechnical expertise to create measurements for new harm areas in the future. By implementing this framework, we aim to enable more advanced harm measurement efforts and further the responsible use of LLMs.
Transformer-based Vulnerability Detection in Code at EditTime: Zero-shot, Few-shot, or Fine-tuning?
Chan, Aaron, Kharkar, Anant, Moghaddam, Roshanak Zilouchian, Mohylevskyy, Yevhen, Helyar, Alec, Kamal, Eslam, Elkamhawy, Mohamed, Sundaresan, Neel
Software vulnerabilities bear enterprises significant costs. Despite extensive efforts in research and development of software vulnerability detection methods, uncaught vulnerabilities continue to put software owners and users at risk. Many current vulnerability detection methods require that code snippets can compile and build before attempting detection. This, unfortunately, introduces a long latency between the time a vulnerability is injected to the time it is removed, which can substantially increases the cost of fixing a vulnerability. We recognize that the current advances in machine learning can be used to detect vulnerable code patterns on syntactically incomplete code snippets as the developer is writing the code at EditTime. In this paper we present a practical system that leverages deep learning on a large-scale data set of vulnerable code patterns to learn complex manifestations of more than 250 vulnerability types and detect vulnerable code patterns at EditTime. We discuss zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning approaches on state of the art pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs). We show that in comparison with state of the art vulnerability detection models our approach improves the state of the art by 10%. We also evaluate our approach to detect vulnerability in auto-generated code by code LLMs. Evaluation on a benchmark of high-risk code scenarios shows a reduction of up to 90% vulnerability reduction.