Leading AI developers and startups are increasingly deploying agentic AI systems that can plan and execute complex tasks with limited human involvement. However, there is currently no structured framework for documenting the technical components, intended uses, and safety features of agentic systems. To fill this gap, we introduce the AI Agent Index, the first public database to document information about currently deployed agentic AI systems. For each system that meets the criteria for inclusion in the index, we document the system's components (e.g., base model, reasoning implementation, tool use), application domains (e.g., computer use, software engineering), and risk management practices (e.g., evaluation results, guardrails), based on publicly available information and correspondence with developers. We find that while developers generally provide ample information regarding the capabilities and applications of agentic systems, they currently provide limited information regarding safety and risk management practices. The AI Agent Index is available online at https://aiagentindex.mit.edu/

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

All natural languages are structured hierarchically. In humans, this structural restriction is neurologically coded: when two grammars are presented with identical vocabularies, brain areas responsible for language processing are only sensitive to hierarchical grammars. Using large language models (LLMs), we investigate whether such functionally distinct hierarchical processing regions can arise solely from exposure to large-scale language distributions. We generate inputs using English, Italian, Japanese, or nonce words, varying the underlying grammars to conform to either hierarchical or linear/positional rules. Using these grammars, we first observe that language models show distinct behaviors on hierarchical versus linearly structured inputs. Then, we find that the components responsible for processing hierarchical grammars are distinct from those that process linear grammars; we causally verify this in ablation experiments. Finally, we observe that hierarchy-selective components are also active on nonce grammars; this suggests that hierarchy sensitivity is not tied to meaning, nor in-distribution inputs.

Abstract-- We present an online method for embodied agents to learn and accomplish diverse user goals. While offline methods like RLHF can represent various goals but require large datasets, our approach achieves similar flexibility with online efficiency. We extract natural language goal representations from conversations with Large Language Models (LLMs). We prompt an LLM to role play as a human with different goals and use the corresponding likelihoods to run Bayesian inference over potential goals. As a result, our method can represent uncertainty over complex goals based on unrestricted dialog. We evaluate our method in grocery shopping and home robot assistance domains using a text-based interface and AI2Thor simulation respectively. Results show our method outperforms ablation baselines that lack either explicit goal representation or probabilistic inference. Imagine a scenario where your However, applying traditional Bayesian inference to natural robot assistant is tasked with gathering ingredients to bake language goals presents two significant challenges.

Interpretability techniques are valuable for helping humans understand and oversee AI systems. The SaTML 2024 CNN Interpretability Competition solicited novel methods for studying convolutional neural networks (CNNs) at the ImageNet scale. The objective of the competition was to help human crowd-workers identify trojans in CNNs. This report showcases the methods and results of four featured competition entries. It remains challenging to help humans reliably diagnose trojans via interpretability tools. However, the competition's entries have contributed new techniques and set a new record on the benchmark from Casper et al., 2023.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without generating inputs that elicit them. LAT leverages the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. We use it to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

Machine unlearning can be useful for removing harmful capabilities and memorized text from large language models (LLMs), but there are not yet standardized methods for rigorously evaluating it. Second, we apply a comprehensive set of tests for the robustness and competitiveness of unlearning in the "Who's Harry Potter" (WHP) model from Eldan and Russinovich (2023). While WHP's unlearning generalizes well when evaluated with the "Familiarity" metric from Eldan and Russinovich, we find i) higher-than-baseline amounts of knowledge can reliably be extracted, ii) WHP performs on par with the original model on Harry Potter Q&A tasks, iii) it represents latent knowledge comparably to the original model, and iv) there is collateral unlearning in related domains. Overall, our results highlight the importance of comprehensive unlearning evaluation that avoids ad-hoc metrics. It is difficult to ensure that large language models (LLMs) will always behave harmlessly. Meanwhile, LLMs also memorize pretraining data, raising concerns involving privacy and fair use (Carlini et al., 2022; Shi et al., 2023; Karamolegkou et al., 2023). To reduce these risks, machine unlearning has emerged as a way to remove undesirable knowledge from LLMs (Bourtoule et al., 2021; Nguyen et al., 2022; Si et al., 2023; Shaik et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024a). Ideally, LLM unlearning should produce a model that is competitive on most tasks but which robustly loses knowledge on the unlearning task in a way that is resistant to extraction by an adversary. Prior works have introduced various ad hoc techniques (see Table 1 and Section 2). However, to date, little has been done to comprehensively evaluate LLM unlearning (Liu et al., 2024a).

For an autonomous system to be helpful to humans and to pose no unwarranted risks, it needs to align its values with those of the humans in its environment in such a way that its actions contribute to the maximization of value for the humans. We propose a formal definition of the value alignment problem as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL). A CIRL problem is a cooperative, partial-information game with two agents, human and robot; both are rewarded according to the human's reward function, but the robot does not initially know what this is. In contrast to classical IRL, where the human is assumed to act optimally in isolation, optimal CIRL solutions produce behaviors such as active teaching, active learning, and communicative actions that are more effective in achieving value alignment. We show that computing optimal joint policies in CIRL games can be reduced to solving a POMDP, prove that optimality in isolation is suboptimal in CIRL, and derive an approximate CIRL algorithm.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

In practice, preference learning from human feedback depends on incomplete data with hidden context. Hidden context refers to data that affects the feedback received, but which is not represented in the data used to train a preference model. This captures common issues of data collection, such as having human annotators with varied preferences, cognitive processes that result in seemingly irrational behavior, and combining data labeled according to different criteria. We prove that standard applications of preference learning, including reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), implicitly aggregate over hidden contexts according to a well-known voting rule called Borda count. We show this can produce counter-intuitive results that are very different from other methods which implicitly aggregate via expected utility. Furthermore, our analysis formalizes the way that preference learning from users with diverse values tacitly implements a social choice function. A key implication of this result is that annotators have an incentive to misreport their preferences in order to influence the learned model, leading to vulnerabilities in the deployment of RLHF. As a step towards mitigating these problems, we introduce a class of methods called distributional preference learning (DPL). DPL methods estimate a distribution of possible score values for each alternative in order to better account for hidden context. Experimental results indicate that applying DPL to RLHF for LLM chatbots identifies hidden context in the data and significantly reduces subsequent jailbreak vulnerability. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/hidden-context