The Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) evaluates creativity through holistic expert judgments. We investigate the use of two advanced Large Language Models (LLMs), Claude-3-Opus and GPT-4o, to evaluate poetry by a methodology inspired by the CAT. Using a dataset of 90 poems, we found that these LLMs can surpass the results achieved by non-expert human judges at matching a ground truth based on publication venue, particularly when assessing smaller subsets of poems. Claude-3-Opus exhibited slightly superior performance than GPT-4o. We show that LLMs are viable tools for accurately assessing poetry, paving the way for their broader application into other creative domains.

Model-based reinforcement learning refers to a set of approaches capable of sample-efficient decision making, which create an explicit model of the environment. This model can subsequently be used for learning optimal policies. In this paper, we propose a temporal Gaussian Mixture Model composed of a perception model and a transition model. The perception model extracts discrete (latent) states from continuous observations using a variational Gaussian mixture likelihood. Importantly, our model constantly monitors the collected data searching for new Gaussian components, i.e., the perception model performs a form of structure learning (Smith et al., 2020; Friston et al., 2018; Neacsu et al., 2022) as it learns the number of Gaussian components in the mixture. Additionally, the transition model learns the temporal transition between consecutive time steps by taking advantage of the Dirichlet-categorical conjugacy. Both the perception and transition models are able to forget part of the data points, while integrating the information they provide within the prior, which ensure fast variational inference. Finally, decision making is performed with a variant of Q-learning which is able to learn Q-values from beliefs over states. Empirically, we have demonstrated the model's ability to learn the structure of several mazes: the model discovered the number of states and the transition probabilities between these states. Moreover, using its learned Q-values, the agent was able to successfully navigate from the starting position to the maze's exit.

Active inference is a leading theory of perception, learning and decision making, which can be applied to neuroscience, robotics, psychology, and machine learning. Active inference is based on the expected free energy, which is mostly justified by the intuitive plausibility of its formulations, e.g., the risk plus ambiguity and information gain / pragmatic value formulations. This paper seek to formalize the problem of deriving these formulations from a single root expected free energy definition, i.e., the unification problem. Then, we study two settings, each one having its own root expected free energy definition. In the first setting, no justification for the expected free energy has been proposed to date, but all the formulations can be recovered from it. However, in this setting, the agent cannot have arbitrary prior preferences over observations. Indeed, only a limited class of prior preferences over observations is compatible with the likelihood mapping of the generative model. In the second setting, a justification of the root expected free energy definition is known, but this setting only accounts for two formulations, i.e., the risk over states plus ambiguity and entropy plus expected energy formulations.

Active inference is a theory of perception, learning and decision making, which can be applied to neuroscience, robotics, and machine learning. Recently, reasearch has been taking place to scale up this framework using Monte-Carlo tree search and deep learning. The goal of this activity is to solve more complicated tasks using deep active inference. First, we review the existing literature, then, we progresively build a deep active inference agent. For two agents, we have experimented with five definitions of the expected free energy and three different action selection strategies. According to our experiments, the models able to solve the dSprites environment are the ones that maximise rewards. Finally, we compare the similarity of the representation learned by the layers of various agents using centered kernel alignment. Importantly, the agent maximising reward and the agent minimising expected free energy learn very similar representations except for the last layer of the critic network (reflecting the difference in learning objective), and the variance layers of the transition and encoder networks. We found that the reward maximising agent is a lot more certain than the agent minimising expected free energy. This is because the agent minimising expected free energy always picks the action down, and does not gather enough data for the other actions. In contrast, the agent maximising reward, keeps on selecting the actions left and right, enabling it to successfully solve the task. The only difference between those two agents is the epistemic value, which aims to make the outputs of the transition and encoder networks as close as possible. Thus, the agent minimising expected free energy picks a single action (down), and becomes an expert at predicting the future when selecting this action. This makes the KL divergence between the output of the transition and encoder networks small.

Over the last 10 to 15 years, active inference has helped to explain various brain mechanisms from habit formation to dopaminergic discharge and even modelling curiosity. However, the current implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time-horizon. Fountas et al (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to impressive results in two different tasks. In this paper, we present an alternative framework that aims to unify tree search and active inference by casting planning as a structure learning problem. Two tree search algorithms are then presented. The first propagates the expected free energy forward in time (i.e., towards the leaves), while the second propagates it backward (i.e., towards the root). Then, we demonstrate that forward and backward propagations are related to active inference and sophisticated inference, respectively, thereby clarifying the differences between those two planning strategies.

Active inference is a state-of-the-art framework for modelling the brain that explains a wide range of mechanisms such as habit formation, dopaminergic discharge and curiosity. However, recent implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time horizon. Fountas et al. (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to very good results in two different tasks. Additionally, Champion et al. (2021a) proposed a tree search approach based on structure learning. This was enabled by the development of a variational message passing approach to active inference (Champion et al., 2021b), which enables compositional construction of Bayesian networks for active inference. However, this message passing tree search approach, which we call branching-time active inference (BTAI), has never been tested empirically. In this paper, we present an experimental study of the approach (Champion et al., 2021a) in the context of a maze solving agent. In this context, we show that both improved prior preferences and deeper search help mitigate the vulnerability to local minima. Then, we compare BTAI to standard active inference (AI) on a graph navigation task. We show that for small graphs, both BTAI and AI successfully solve the task. For larger graphs, AI exhibits an exponential (space) complexity class, making the approach intractable. However, BTAI explores the space of policies more efficiently, successfully scaling to larger graphs.

We review the 2014 International Planning Competition (IPC-2014), the eighth in a series of competitions starting in 1998. IPC-2014 was held in three separate parts to assess state-of-the-art in three prominent areas of planning research: the deterministic (classical) part (IPCD), the learning part (IPCL), and the probabilistic part (IPPC). Each part evaluated planning systems in ways that pushed the edge of existing planner performance by introducing new challenges, novel tasks, or both. The competition surpassed again the number of competitors than its predecessor, highlighting the competition’s central role in shaping the landscape of ongoing developments in evaluating planning systems.