The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game theoretic analysis becomes effectively infeasible beyond a low number of players. Recent approaches have gone around this limitation by instead considering Mean-Field games, an approximation of anonymous $N$-player games, where the number of players is infinite and the population's state distribution, instead of every individual player's state, is the object of interest. The practical computability of Mean-Field Nash equilibria, the most studied Mean-Field equilibrium to date, however, typically depends on beneficial non-generic structural properties such as monotonicity or contraction properties, which are required for known algorithms to converge. In this work, we provide an alternative route for studying Mean-Field games, by developing the concepts of Mean-Field correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria. We show that they can be efficiently learnt in \emph{all games}, without requiring any additional assumption on the structure of the game, using three classical algorithms. Furthermore, we establish correspondences between our notions and those already present in the literature, derive optimality bounds for the Mean-Field - $N$-player transition, and empirically demonstrate the convergence of these algorithms on simple games.

Mean Field Games (MFGs) have been introduced to efficiently approximate games with very large populations of strategic agents. Recently, the question of learning equilibria in MFGs has gained momentum, particularly using model-free reinforcement learning (RL) methods. One limiting factor to further scale up using RL is that existing algorithms to solve MFGs require the mixing of approximated quantities such as strategies or $q$-values. This is far from being trivial in the case of non-linear function approximation that enjoy good generalization properties, e.g. neural networks. We propose two methods to address this shortcoming. The first one learns a mixed strategy from distillation of historical data into a neural network and is applied to the Fictitious Play algorithm. The second one is an online mixing method based on regularization that does not require memorizing historical data or previous estimates. It is used to extend Online Mirror Descent. We demonstrate numerically that these methods efficiently enable the use of Deep RL algorithms to solve various MFGs. In addition, we show that these methods outperform SotA baselines from the literature.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), discrete actions, as opposed to continuous actions, result in less complex exploration problems and the immediate computation of the maximum of the action-value function which is central to dynamic programming-based methods. In this paper, we propose a novel method: Action Quantization from Demonstrations (AQuaDem) to learn a discretization of continuous action spaces by leveraging the priors of demonstrations. This dramatically reduces the exploration problem, since the actions faced by the agent not only are in a finite number but also are plausible in light of the demonstrator's behavior. By discretizing the action space we can apply any discrete action deep RL algorithm to the continuous control problem. We evaluate the proposed method on three different setups: RL with demonstrations, RL with play data --demonstrations of a human playing in an environment but not solving any specific task-- and Imitation Learning. For all three setups, we only consider human data, which is more challenging than synthetic data. We found that AQuaDem consistently outperforms state-of-the-art continuous control methods, both in terms of performance and sample efficiency. We provide visualizations and videos in the paper's website: https://google-research.github.io/aquadem.

We use functional mirror ascent to propose a general framework (referred to as FMA-PG) for designing policy gradient methods. The functional perspective distinguishes between a policy's functional representation (what are its sufficient statistics) and its parameterization (how are these statistics represented) and naturally results in computationally efficient off-policy updates. For simple policy parameterizations, the FMA-PG framework ensures that the optimal policy is a fixed point of the updates. It also allows us to handle complex policy parameterizations (e.g., neural networks) while guaranteeing policy improvement. Our framework unifies several PG methods and opens the way for designing sample-efficient variants of existing methods. Moreover, it recovers important implementation heuristics (e.g., using forward vs reverse KL divergence) in a principled way. With a softmax functional representation, FMA-PG results in a variant of TRPO with additional desirable properties. It also suggests an improved variant of PPO, whose robustness and efficiency we empirically demonstrate on MuJoCo. Via experiments on simple reinforcement learning problems, we evaluate algorithms instantiated by FMA-PG.

We propose to learn to distinguish reversible from irreversible actions for better informed decision-making in Reinforcement Learning (RL). From theoretical considerations, we show that approximate reversibility can be learned through a simple surrogate task: ranking randomly sampled trajectory events in chronological order. Intuitively, pairs of events that are always observed in the same order are likely to be separated by an irreversible sequence of actions. Conveniently, learning the temporal order of events can be done in a fully self-supervised way, which we use to estimate the reversibility of actions from experience, without any priors. We propose two different strategies that incorporate reversibility in RL agents, one strategy for exploration (RAE) and one strategy for control (RAC). We demonstrate the potential of reversibility-aware agents in several environments, including the challenging Sokoban game. In synthetic tasks, we show that we can learn control policies that never fail and reduce to zero the side-effects of interactions, even without access to the reward function.

Adversarial imitation learning has become a popular framework for imitation in continuous control. Over the years, several variations of its components were proposed to enhance the performance of the learned policies as well as the sample complexity of the algorithm. In practice, these choices are rarely tested all together in rigorous empirical studies. It is therefore difficult to discuss and understand what choices, among the high-level algorithmic options as well as low-level implementation details, matter. To tackle this issue, we implement more than 50 of these choices in a generic adversarial imitation learning framework and investigate their impacts in a large-scale study ( 500k trained agents) with both synthetic and human-generated demonstrations. While many of our findings confirm common practices, some of them are surprising or even contradict prior work. In particular, our results suggest that artificial demonstrations are not a good proxy for human data and that the very common practice of evaluating imitation algorithms only with synthetic demonstrations may lead to algorithms which perform poorly in the more realistic scenarios with human demonstrations.

We present a method enabling a large number of agents to learn how to flock, which is a natural behavior observed in large populations of animals. This problem has drawn a lot of interest but requires many structural assumptions and is tractable only in small dimensions. We phrase this problem as a Mean Field Game (MFG), where each individual chooses its acceleration depending on the population behavior. Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Normalizing Flows (NF), we obtain a tractable solution requiring only very weak assumptions. Our algorithm finds a Nash Equilibrium and the agents adapt their velocity to match the neighboring flock's average one. We use Fictitious Play and alternate: (1) computing an approximate best response with Deep RL, and (2) estimating the next population distribution with NF. We show numerically that our algorithm learn multi-group or high-dimensional flocking with obstacles.

We address scaling up equilibrium computation in Mean Field Games (MFGs) using Online Mirror Descent (OMD). We show that continuous-time OMD provably converges to a Nash equilibrium under a natural and well-motivated set of monotonicity assumptions. This theoretical result nicely extends to multi-population games and to settings involving common noise. A thorough experimental investigation on various single and multi-population MFGs shows that OMD outperforms traditional algorithms such as Fictitious Play (FP). We empirically show that OMD scales up and converges significantly faster than FP by solving, for the first time to our knowledge, examples of MFGs with hundreds of billions states. This study establishes the state-of-the-art for learning in large-scale multi-agent and multi-population games.

Despite definite success in deep reinforcement learning problems, actor-critic algorithms are still confronted with sample inefficiency in complex environments, particularly in tasks where efficient exploration is a bottleneck. These methods consider a policy (the actor) and a value function (the critic) whose respective losses are built using different motivations and approaches. This paper introduces a third protagonist: the adversary. While the adversary mimics the actor by minimizing the KL-divergence between their respective action distributions, the actor, in addition to learning to solve the task, tries to differentiate itself from the adversary predictions. This novel objective stimulates the actor to follow strategies that could not have been correctly predicted from previous trajectories, making its behavior innovative in tasks where the reward is extremely rare. Our experimental analysis shows that the resulting Adversarially Guided Actor-Critic (AGAC) algorithm leads to more exhaustive exploration. Notably, AGAC outperforms current state-of-the-art methods on a set of various hard-exploration and procedurally-generated tasks. Research in deep reinforcement learning (RL) has proven to be successful across a wide range of problems (Silver et al., 2014; Schulman et al., 2016; Lillicrap et al., 2016; Mnih et al., 2016).

Bootstrapping is a core mechanism in Reinforcement Learning (RL). Most algorithms, based on temporal differences, replace the true value of a transiting state by their current estimate of this value. Yet, another estimate could be leveraged to bootstrap RL: the current policy. Our core contribution stands in a very simple idea: adding the scaled log-policy to the immediate reward. We show that slightly modifying Deep Q-Network (DQN) in that way provides an agent that is competitive with distributional methods on Atari games, without making use of distributional RL, n-step returns or prioritized replay. To demonstrate the versatility of this idea, we also use it together with an Implicit Quantile Network (IQN). The resulting agent outperforms Rainbow on Atari, installing a new State of the Art with very little modifications to the original algorithm. To add to this empirical study, we provide strong theoretical insights on what happens under the hood -- implicit Kullback-Leibler regularization and increase of the action-gap.