We conducted controlled experimental bias audits for four versions of ChatGPT, which we asked to recommend an opening offer in salary negotiations for a new hire. We submitted 98,800 prompts to each version, systematically varying the employee's gender, university, and major, and tested prompts in voice of each side of the negotiation: the employee versus employer. We find ChatGPT as a multi-model platform is not robust and consistent enough to be trusted for such a task. We observed statistically significant salary offers when varying gender for all four models, although with smaller gaps than for other attributes tested. The largest gaps were different model versions and between the employee- vs employer-voiced prompts. We also observed substantial gaps when varying university and major, but many of the biases were not consistent across model versions. We tested for fictional and fraudulent universities and found wildly inconsistent results across cases and model versions. We make broader contributions to the AI/ML fairness literature. Our scenario and our experimental design differ from mainstream AI/ML auditing efforts in key ways. Bias audits typically test discrimination for protected classes like gender, which we contrast with testing non-protected classes of university and major. Asking for negotiation advice includes how aggressive one ought to be in a negotiation relative to known empirical salary distributions and scales, which is a deeply contextual and personalized task that has no objective ground truth to validate. These results raise concerns for the specific model versions we tested and ChatGPT as a multi-model platform in continuous development. Our epistemology does not permit us to definitively certify these models as either generally biased or unbiased on the attributes we test, but our study raises matters of concern for stakeholders to further investigate.

Unlike traditional firms, open collaborative systems rely on volunteers to operate, and many communities struggle to maintain enough contributors to ensure the quality and quantity of content. However, Wikipedia has historically faced the exact opposite problem: too much participation, particularly from users who, knowingly or not, do not share the same norms as veteran Wikipedians. During its period of exponential growth, the Wikipedian community developed specialized socio-technical defense mechanisms to protect itself from the negatives of massive participation: spam, vandalism, falsehoods, and other damage. Yet recently, Wikipedia has faced a number of high-profile issues with recruiting and retaining new contributors. In this paper, we first illustrate and describe the various defense mechanisms at work in Wikipedia, which we hypothesize are inhibiting newcomer retention. Next, we present results from an experiment aimed at increasing both the quantity and quality of editors by altering various elements of these defense mechanisms, specifically pre-scripted warnings and notifications that are sent to new editors upon reverting or rejecting contributions. Using logistic regressions to model new user activity, we show which tactics work best for different populations of users based on their motivations when joining Wikipedia. In particular, we found that personalized messages in which Wikipedians identified themselves in active voice and took direct responsibility for rejecting an editor’s contributions were much more successful across a variety of outcome metrics than the current messages, which typically use an institutional and passive voice.